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Abstract
Product design stage is utterly important for successful product development,
as up to 90% of the product costs are locked in during the concept and design
engineering phases. At these phases, manufacturers of new products actively in-
volve their suppliers to participate in product development. However, academic
literature has not given sufficient attention to the link between the early sup-
plier involvement stage and the subsequent mass production stage. The goals of
the product developing manufacturer and its suppliers are not necessarily aligned,
which can result in serious inefficiencies. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to
resolve the conflict of incentives at the product design stage when a manufacturer
of a new product involves a supplier of a key component. This thesis considers
three important facets of collaborative product development: (1) multiple alterna-
tive designs of the key component, (2) parallel component development by several
suppliers, and (3) testing of the key component by the supplier in order to learn its
quality. Relying on the methodology of non-cooperative game theory, the thesis
provides practical prescriptions on how to mitigate the incentive misalignment in
each of the three cases.
Acknowledgements
This thesis is a good example of collaborative product development by itself. I
would not be able to accomplish it without contribution and support of my col-
leagues, friends, and family.
Svenja Sommer has been directing my research since the very beginning of my
doctoral studies. Thanks to her continuous efforts, my thesis matured and finally
took its current shape. Our collaboration proved to be fruitful, and I believe it
will go well beyond this thesis.
Zhixi Wan helped me to develop my initial research direction. At a later stage,
I truly appreciate Zhixi’s invitation to Urbana-Champaign, where we made enor-
mous progress in our research.
My interest in doctoral studies started with a meeting with Laoucine Kerbache. A
brief conversation in St. Petersburg happened to turn my life in a totally different
direction.
At the early stages of my studies, Christian van Delft organized a series of meetings
with top managers, who provided invaluable insights for my research and gave rise
to the on-going projects.
I am very grateful to my fellow students for all the memories we share, and espe-
cially to Sara, who turned our PhD office into the second home.
A special contribution to my thesis completion belongs to my wife. Evgenia, thank
you for your support and understanding during all these years.
ii
Contents
Abstract i
Acknowledgements ii
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
Résumé en français viii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Fine-Tuning Target Costing for Alternative Designs 6
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Supplier’s Optimal Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.5 Payment Scheme Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.1 Functional Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5.2 Value-Adding Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.6 Robustness Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.1 Parallel Prototyping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.6.2 Multiple Prototypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Effect of Supplier Competition on Parallel Team Deployment 39
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 Target Costing Incentive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Performance-Contingent Incentive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
iii
Contents iv
3.6 Effect of Supplier Competition on Manufacturer Profit . . . . . . . 55
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4 Supplier Incentives for Component Testing 63
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.4 Optimal Supplier Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.4.1 First-Best Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.4.2 Reward Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.4.3 Residual Claimant Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4.4 Efficient Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5 Model Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.5.1 Cost-Sharing in Reward Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.5.2 Contract Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5.3 Improvement Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5 Conclusion 85
Appendices 89
A Supplement for Chapter 2 89
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
A.3 General Framework for Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2.5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.5 Proof of Corollary 2.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.6.1 Costly Prototyping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.7 Manufacturer’s Objective Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.7.1 C Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.7.2 F scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
B Supplement for Chapter 3 113
B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Contents v
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
C Supplement for Chapter 4 117
C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Bibliography 122
List of Figures
1 Le processus d’implication des fournisseurs dans la conception de
produit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1.1 A Process View on Supplier Involvement in Product Development . 3
2.1 Event Timeline for Period t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Optimal Target Costing Policy for Value-Adding Components . . . 29
3.1 (a) A Typical Supply Chain at the Product Development Stage and
(b) Event Sequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2 Supplier’s Efforts under Target Costing Contract . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.3 Supplier’s Efforts under Performance-Contingent Contract . . . . . 53
3.4 Optimal Team Allocation for m = 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.5 Competition Effect on Manufacturer’s Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.1 Decision Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 The Manufacturer’s Expected Payoff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3 The Manufacturer’s Expected Payoff: Low l and High L . . . . . . 80
4.4 The Manufacturer’s Expected Payoff: Subsidy Allowed . . . . . . . 81
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Profit Comparisons between the Optimal C and F Schemes . . . . . 35
3.1 Supplier Payoff Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.1 Optimal Target Cost Scheme for Parallel Prototyping . . . . . . . . 107
vii
Résumé en français
Introduction
Aujourd’hui, c’est de plus en plus fréquent que le produit nouveau est le résultat de
la collaboration de plusieurs entreprises, le plus important, le fabricant du produit
final et les fournisseurs de composants et de modules clés. Le processus de la
conception de produits va irrépressiblement delà des limites d’une seule entreprise.
Pour donner quelques exemples, tandis que pour le développement de Boeing-737
environ 35-50% de tous les composants ont été développés et par la suite achetés
par les fournisseurs externes, ce nombre a atteint 70% pour Boeing-787 (Tang
et al., 2009). Les futurs progrès de l’industrie du smartphone sont en grande
partie liées aux nouveaux écrans de saphir ou écrans flexibles à haute résistance,
qui sont en cours d’élaboration, non seulement par les fabricants de smartphones,
mais souvent par les fournisseurs potentiels de ces écrans (Solid State Technology,
2014; Mone, 2013).
Le processus de la conception de produit comprend plusieurs étapes, de l’idée ini-
tiale à la production en série. Toutefois, jusqu’à 90% des coûts de production en
série de produits sont verrouillés durant les premières phases d’ingénierie (Levin
and Kalal, 2003), faisant ces étapes cruciales pour le succès du produit. Qu’est-
ce qui se passe à ces étapes ? C’est exactement le moment où les entreprises
impliquent leurs fournisseurs à participer à la conception de produits grâce au
viii
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développement des composants clés pour le futur produit. Cependant, la littéra-
ture académique n’a pas accordé suffisamment d’attention à la collaboration avec
les fournisseurs au stade de la conception initiale, en grande partie en se concen-
trant sur les étapes ultérieures de l’implication des fournisseurs. En particulier,
le chaînon manquant adressée par cette thèse est la relation entre le stade de la
conception initiale du composant clé et de son stade de la production en série,
quand le fournisseur est impliqué et dans le développement de composants et son
potentiel approvisionnement d’avenir.
Le problème profond de la conception collaborative de produits est que les inci-
tations du fabricant du nouveau produit et le fournisseur du composant clé ne
coïncident pas nécessairement. Par exemple, l’objectif du fabricant est souvent de
maximiser la marge entre la valeur du nouveau produit et son coût de production
en série, alors que l’objectif du fournisseur est d’assurer un contrat bénéfique pour
la phase de production en série. En plus de cela, les pertes de réputation en cas
de défaillance du nouveau produit peuvent être répartis de manière inégale. Il
peut provoquer une distorsion supplémentaire dans incitations. Le problème peut
être exacerbé par la distribution asymétrique des informations importantes. Le
fournisseur est plus impliqué dans le développement de composants et il apprend
forcément beaucoup plus sur la composante que le fabricant, qui, souvent, ne par-
ticipe pas à la plus grande partie du processus de la conception, sauf pour la phase
de test.
Comme le Schéma 1 représente, au moment de l’implication des fournisseurs les
caractéristiques importantes du composante clé sont souvent inconnus. Les deux
parties ont une estimation très approximative des coûts futurs de production
en série et les avantages de ce composant, et même le fait de la faisabilité du
composant peut être discutable. L’incertitude est aggravée encore davantage si
plusieurs modèles alternatifs pour le composant existent. Toutefois, les contrats
obligatoires de production en série sont signés à ce stade précoce, qui peut être
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Schéma 1: Le processus d’implication des fournisseurs dans la conception de
produit
longue avant l’étape de production en série. Après la signature du contrat, un
certain nombre d’événements peut se produire : le fournisseur peut obtenir une
meilleure estimation du coût futur du composant, certains modèles du composant
peuvent être rejetées par l’une des parties, le fournisseur peut observer la qualité
des composants, les équipes du fabricant travaillant sur le projet peuvent échouer
ou réussir, etc. Le comportement du fournisseur et le fabricant à ce stade est
largement définie par le type et les caractéristiques du contrat, qu’ils ont choisi.
La relation entre le contrat pour la phase de production en série et le comporte-
ment des parties dans différents contextes de la conception de produit est l’objet
d’étude de cette thèse.
Le désalignement d’incitation entre le fournisseur et le fabricant peut grande-
ment fausser l’efficacité de la conception collaborative de produit. Par conséquent,
l’objectif de cette thèse est de développer l’ensemble de recommandations de ges-
tion, qui visent à atténuer les inconvénients de la conception collaborative de
produit, tout en conservant tous les avantages de la collaboration. La conception
de produit peut prendre de nombreuses formes différentes et impliquent donc dif-
férents problèmes potentiels. Trois de ces formes décrites ci-dessous sont pris en
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compte dans cette thèse.
La thèse se compose de trois essais chacune traitant d’un problème distinct dans
le cadre général d’incitation conflits aux premiers stades de la conception de pro-
duit. Chaque essai constitue une base pour un article académique séparée avec
la motivation, la revue de la littérature, et le modèle analytique indépendants.
Néanmoins, chacun d’entre eux tentent de concilier les incitations de fabricant et
fournisseur dans différents contextes de la conception de produit.
Dans le premier essai, nous étudions comment les approches classique de coût cible
(coût-fondé et marché-fondé) doivent être ajustés en présence de designs alternat-
ifs en raison de comportements opportunistes du fournisseur. Ayant acquis des
informations privées sur les coûts de production en série du composant basé sur
des designs différents, le fournisseur peut promouvoir certains modèles au détri-
ment des autres, qui sont potentiellement plus bénéfique pour le fabricant. Par
un moyen de soin réglage précis du contrat de coût cible, nous essayons de trou-
ver un moyen d’atténuer le comportement opportuniste destructeur et accroître
l’efficacité du processus de la conception collaborative. En présence de plusieurs
designs alternatifs pour le même composant, il est important de répondre à une
série de questions. Est un coût cible unique le meilleur choix pour obtenir le faible
coût et le design de haute qualité ? Si le fabricant teste deux designs alternatifs,
est-il possible de réduire les coûts encore plus par de fixer la cible basse pour la
première, et une cible plus clémente pour la seconde ? Ces questions et d’autres,
qui font face le fabricant, reçoivent l’attention primaire dans notre recherche.
Dans le deuxième essai, nous nous concentrons sur l’effet de la concurrence sur les
efforts déployés par les fournisseurs au stade de la conception de produit. Pour
atténuer l’incertitude inhérente au développement de produits, le fabricant du nou-
veau produit peut favoriser la concurrence interne et déployer plusieurs équipes
de développement, travaillant en parallèle sur le même projet, mais essayant les
Résumé en français xii
approches et / ou designs différents. Le défi est de savoir comment choisir et
répartir les fournisseurs pour les équipes internes concurrentes sous la condition
que les fournisseurs ne partagent ont pas généralement les objectifs du fabricant
et peuvent exercer différents efforts en fonction de la décision d’attribution de
l’équipe. Nous considérons deux fournisseurs, chacun ayant une expertise en tech-
nologie différente, qui pourrait être potentiellement utilisé pour le développement
de produits. Va l’attribution de plusieurs équipes à un fournisseur augmenter ou
diminuer les efforts élevés par les fournisseurs concurrents ? La réponse à cette
question définit largement la décision d’attribution de l’équipe optimale par le
fabricant.
Le troisième essai est basé sur les nombreux exemples récents de défaillances des
composants développés par des tierces parties. Sous la condition que le partage
ex-post des coûts en cas de défaillance d’un composant est généralement com-
pliquée en raison de divers obstacles juridiques et la potentielle faillite de la partie
responsable, nous nous concentrons sur les contrats, qui inciterait les fournisseurs
pour assurer la probabilité de réussite plus élevé pour leurs composants au stade
de la conception. Nous considérons le fournisseur, qui peut exercer des tests coû-
teux pour apprendre la qualité des composants et ensuite décider de laisser aller
le composant à la production en série ou l’abandonner. La stratégie alternative
pour le fournisseur est pour laisser aller le composant à l’aveuglette, c’est à dire,
sans des tests suffisants, pour la production en série. Nous nous concentrons sur
deux contrats admissibles menant à différentes structures d’incitation : contrat de
récompense, ce qui implique que le fournisseur reçoit un bonus en cas de succès
du composant, et le contrat de récompense résiduelle, ce qui signifie que le four-
nisseur reçoit les résidus après que le fabricant conserve le bénéfice fixe prédéter-
miné. Techniquement, le dernier contrat implique non seulement récompenser en
cas de succès, mais aussi des sanctions pécuniaires en cas de panne. En outre,
nous construisons un contrat efficace qui coordonne le fournisseur et le fabricant
Résumé en français xiii
et permet à la supply chaîne pour obtenir le meilleur résultat.
Conclusion
Cette thèse est une tentative pour apporter des solutions à certains des problèmes
aigus, qui se produisent en raison de l’alignement des incitations entre le four-
nisseur du fournisseur d’un composant clé et le fabricant du nouveau produit aux
premiers stades de développement collaboratif de produits. Nous avons examiné
trois scénarios différents de collaboration et les problèmes correspondants, qui se
posent dans son cours. Pour chaque scénario, nous avons construit un modèle
analytique, qui comprend les spécificités de chaque cas particulier. En outre, par
un moyen de la théorie des jeux non coopératifs, nous avons analysé les incitations
des parties concernées et identifié les voies possibles, qui peuvent combler leurs
objectifs.
Le premier essai traite de contrat de coût cible pour les designs différents du même
composant, qui sont développés et testés séquentiellement. Comme le fournisseur
acquiert des informations privées sur le coût de production en série de composants
à base de différents designs, il peut manipuler le choix de la conception pour la
phase de production en série de la manière opportuniste. Nous constatons que
ce n’est pas nécessairement optimale pour régler les coûts cibles identiques pour
les designs alternatifs similaires (en termes de coût des composants estimée et la
performance au stade de la production en série), et il n’est pas nécessairement
optimale pour régler différents coûts cibles pour les conceptions différentes. En
outre, nous montrons que le calendrier des décisions est important, c’est à dire,
pour régler les coûts cibles à l’avant (le régime avec engagement) ou pour annon-
cer chaque coût cible seulement avant un développement conception particulière
(le régime flexible). Si, intuitivement le mécanisme de flexibilité peut être dom-
iné, car il aggrave le comportement opportuniste du fournisseur, dans certaines
Résumé en français xiv
circonstances, le fabricant peut effectivement profiter du comportement oppor-
tuniste du fournisseur en concevant soigneusement les coûts cible dans le régime
flexible. Enfin, nous montrons qu’il est optimal pour tester les designs alternatifs
dans l’ordre croissant de la marge bénéficiaire, si le coût des tests par le design est
suffisamment faible, ce qui est en contraste avec la littérature, qui supprime l’effet
du comportement opportuniste des fournisseurs.
Le deuxième essai aborde le problème des conflits d’incitation lorsque le fabricant
crée plusieurs équipes parallèles travaillant sur le même projet. La décision cruciale
pour le fabricant est d’allouer à chaque équipe de l’un des différents fournisseurs
potentiels du composant clé de manière à ce que les fournisseurs exercent suffisam-
ment d’efforts pour le développement de composants. On retrouve les niveaux
de fournisseur d’équilibre de l’effort en fonction de l’allocation d’équipe entre les
fournisseurs cadre de deux contrats admissibles: le coût cible et le performance-
contingent contrat. Fait intéressant, nous constatons que le niveau d’effort espéré
d’un fournisseur pourrait en fait augmenter, quand le nombre d’équipes travaillant
avec le fournisseur augmente, si il y a des synergies entre les équipes. Cela sig-
nifie que l’augmentation de la concurrence (jusqu’à un niveau raisonnable) peut
augmenter les niveaux de l’effort du fournisseur et, par conséquent, le bénéfice
prévu par le fabricant. En outre, nous montrons que, même dans des situations,
où un fournisseur domine l’autre dans les principales caractéristiques, il pourrait
être optimale pour le fabricant d’allouer au moins une équipe au fournisseur pire
à induire la concurrence et bénéficier des efforts des fournisseurs plus élevés.
Le troisième essai se concentre sur l’inadéquation des incitations à l’égard de tester
le composant avant son adoption à l’étape de la production en série. Il existe de
multiples exemples concrets, lorsque les fournisseurs n’effectuent pas suffisamment
de tests et les fabricants manquent d’expertise à réaliser et identifier les tests néces-
saires, qui pourraient résulter des défaillances des composants, après que le produit
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est développé et lancé. Nous étudions différents contrats admissibles entre le fab-
ricant et le fournisseur et constatons, que ni contrat de récompense, ni contrat
de récompense résiduelle ne peuvent pas atteindre le résultat optimal. La raison
est que le fournisseur dispose de l’option de quitter le projet après la phase de
test, qui rend le paiement résiduel non-applicable pour tous les résultats possibles.
Étonnamment, bien que le contrat de récompense résiduelle conduit à très haut
niveau de test par le fournisseur, il ne bénéficie pas le fabricant, parce que le four-
nisseur préfère ne pas laisser le composant moins qu’il est entièrement sûr dans sa
fiabilité. En outre, nous construisons un contrat efficace menant au profit optimal
de la supply chaîne. Cependant, cela implique des sanctions pour le fournisseur,
même si il ne laisse pas le composant et choisit d’arrêter le développement, ce qui
rend ce contrat difficile à appliquer dans la pratique. Par conséquent, nous con-
centrons notre attention sur l’analyse de la façon dont le fabricant choisit entre le
contrat récompense et le contrat de récompense résiduelle. Enfin, nous étudions si
les subventions du fabricant peuvent conduire à davantage de tests et dans quelles
conditions le fournisseur aurait essayé d’améliorer le composant.
Dans l’ensemble, les idées principales de cette thèse peuvent être résumés comme
suit:
• Le fabricant peut bénéficier à partir du comportement des fournisseurs op-
portuniste en ajustant soigneusement le coût cible. En particulier, si la
différence de performance espérée de designs de composants alternatifs est
suffisamment élevée et de leur rendement espéré est suffisamment supérieure
à leur coût de production en série prévu, le fabricant doit déployer le régime
flexible et commencer à tester les designs de composants avec un avec le
rendement espéré inférieure.
Résumé en français xvi
• Concurrence supplémentaire entre les fournisseurs grâce à l’allocation plus
des équipes internes peut stimuler les efforts de l’autre fournisseur et aug-
menter le bénéfice espéré du fabricant. Cet effet est valide, si le nombre total
d’équipes est suffisamment petite et la synergie du fournisseur de travailler
avec plusieurs équipes est suffisamment élevée. En outre, le fabricant peut
trouver optimal d’allouer plus d’équipes au fournisseur, dont les capacités
sont dominées par les capacités d’un autre fournisseur.
• Les contrats de récompense et de récompense résiduelle n’offrent pas suff-
isamment d’incitations pour le fournisseur pour effectuer les tests du com-
posant au niveau optimal avant sa sortie pour la production en série. Pour
inciter le fournisseur à effectuer les tests du composant suffisants, le fabri-
cant peut avoir besoin de déployer un contrat de récompense résiduelle, qui
pénalise le fournisseur, même si il choisit de ne pas laisser le composant pour
la production en série.
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Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Nowadays, it is increasingly common that a new product is a result of collaboration
of multiple companies, most importantly, the manufacturer of the final product
and the suppliers of key components and modules. The product development
process irrepressibly goes beyond the boundaries of a single company. To give a
few examples, while for the development of the relatively old Boeing-737, about 35-
50% of all components were developed and subsequently procured by the external
suppliers, this number reached 70% for the recent Boeing-787 (Tang et al., 2009).
The future advances in the smartphone industry are largely related to the new
highly resistant sapphire or flexible displays, currently being developed not only
by smartphone manufacturers but often by the potential suppliers of those displays
(Solid State Technology, 2014; Mone, 2013).
Product development process incorporates multiple stages from the initial idea to
mass production. However, up to 90% of the mass production costs are locked in
during the concept and design engineering phases (Levin and Kalal, 2003) making
these stages crucial for success of the product. What happens at these stages?
1
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It is exactly the moment when companies involve their suppliers to participate in
product development through the development of key components for the future
product. However, academic literature has not given sufficient attention to collab-
oration with suppliers at the early design stage, largely focusing on later stages
of supplier involvement. In particular, the missing link addressed by this thesis is
the relationship between the early design stage of a key component and its mass
production stage when a supplier is involved into both component development
and its potential future procurement.
A deep problem of collaborative product development is that incentives of the
manufacturer of a new product and the involved supplier of the key component
do not necessarily coincide. For example, the manufacturer’s objective is often
to maximize the margin between the value of the new product and its mass pro-
duction cost for the manufacturer, whereas the supplier’s objective is to ensure a
beneficial contract for the mass production stage. On top of that, reputation losses
in case of a new product failure can be distributed unequally thus creating addi-
tional distortion in incentives. The problem may be exacerbated by asymmetric
distribution of important information. The supplier, being more involved in the
component development, inevitably learns much more about the component than
the manufacturer who often does not participate in the component’s development
process except for the testing phase.
As Figure 1.1 illustrates, at the moment of supplier involvement the important
characteristics of the component are often unknown. Both sides have a very rough
estimation of the future mass production costs and benefits of this component, and
even the very fact of component feasibility may be questionable. The uncertainty
is aggravated even further if multiple alternative designs for the component exist.
However, the binding mass production contracts are signed at this early stage
which can be long before the mass production stage itself. After the contract is
signed, a number of events can happen: the supplier can get a better estimation of
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Figure 1.1: A Process View on Supplier Involvement in Product Development
the component future cost, some designs of the component can be rejected by either
side, the supplier can observe the component quality, some of the manufacturer’s
teams working on the project can fail or succeed, etc. The behavior of the supplier
and the manufacturer at this stage is largely defined by the type and characteristics
of the contract they have chosen. The relationship between the contract for the
mass production stage and the behavior of the parties in different settings of the
product development is the cornerstone of the current thesis.
The incentive misalignment of the supplier and manufacturer can greatly distort
the efficiency of collaborative product development. Hence, the objective of this
thesis is to develop a set of managerial recommendations which aim at mitigating
the disadvantages of collaborative product development, while keeping all the ben-
efits of collaboration. Product development can take numerous various forms and
therefore imply different potential problems. Three such forms described below
are considered in the current thesis.
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1.2 Thesis Structure
The thesis consists of three essays each dealing with a distinct problem under the
general umbrella of incentive conflict at the early product development stages.
Each essay forms a basis for a separate academic paper with independent motiva-
tional example, literature review, and analytical model. Nevertheless, all of them
attempt to reconcile the manufacturer and supplier incentives albeit in different
settings of the product development.
In the first essay, we study how the classical target costing approaches (cost- and
market-based) need to be adjusted in the presence of alternative designs due to the
supplier’s opportunistic behavior. Having acquired private information about the
mass production costs of component based on different designs, the supplier may
promote certain designs at the expense of the others which are potentially more
beneficial for the manufacturer. By a means of careful fine-tuning of the target
costing contract, we try to find a way to mitigate the destructive opportunistic
behavior and boost the efficiency of the collaborative development process. In the
presence of multiple alternative designs for the same component, it is important to
answer a series of questions. Is a single cost target the best choice to obtain a low
cost and high quality design? If the manufacturer tests two alternative designs, is
it possible to reduce the costs even more by setting an aggressive target for the
first, and a more lenient target for the second? These and other questions facing
the manufacturer receive the primary attention in our research.
In the second essay, our focus is on the effect of competition on the suppliers’ efforts
at the product development stage. To mitigate uncertainty inherent to product
development, a manufacturer of a new product may promote internal competition
and deploy several development teams working in parallel on the same project
but trying different approaches and/or designs. The challenge is how to choose
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and allocate suppliers to the competing internal teams given that the suppliers do
not generally share the manufacturer’s objectives and can exert different efforts
depending on the team allocation decision. We consider two suppliers, each with
expertise in different technology that could be potentially used for the product
development. Will allocation of more teams to a supplier lead to higher or lower
efforts of the competing suppliers? The answer to this question largely defines the
optimal team allocation decision of the manufacturer.
The research of the third essay is motivated by numerous recent examples of
failures of components developed by third parties. Given that ex-post cost sharing
in case of component failure is usually complicated due to various legal obstacles
and the potential bankruptcy of the liable party, we focus on contracts which would
incentivize suppliers to ensure a higher success probability for their components
at the development stage. We consider a supplier that can exercise costly tests to
learn the component quality and then decide to release the component for mass
production or to scrap it. The alternative strategy for the supplier is to release
the component blindly, i.e., without sufficient testing for mass production. We
focus on two admissible contracts leading to different incentive structures: reward
contract, implying that the supplier receives a bonus in case of component success,
and residual claimant contract, meaning that the supplier receives the residuals
after the manufacturer retains the predetermined fixed profit. Technically, the
latter contract implies not only a reward in case of success but also monetary
penalties in case of failure. Furthermore, we construct an efficient contract which
coordinates the supplier and the manufacturer and allows the supply chain to
achieve the first best outcome.
Chapter 2
Fine-Tuning Target Costing for
Alternative Designs
2.1 Introduction
With competition growing fiercer, firms are forced to apply techniques to control
and potentially reduce the costs of their products to stay competitive. A large per-
centage of these final product costs are determined during product development;
an estimated 80% to 90% of the product costs are locked in during the concept
and design engineering phases (Levin and Kalal, 2003). One widely-employed tech-
nique to achieve cost control during the development process is component-level
target costing (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1999; Dekker and Smidt, 2003; Mihm,
2010). Component-level target costing has been used already in the 1960s by
Japanese manufacturers (Feil et al., 2004), and is now widely applied by com-
panies like Rolls-Royce (Zsidisin and Smith, 2005) and Mercedes-Benz (Albright
and Davis, 1999). In component-level target costing, the manufacturer determines
a target cost for a component before the component development takes place.
While target costing can be applied both internally and with outside parties,
6
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component-level target costing is often discussed explicitly with suppliers in mind:
“component-level target costing helps discipline and focus suppliers’ creativity in
ways beneficial to the buyer” (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1999, p. 24). Involving
suppliers is critical, since suppliers account for as much as 50% of the product cost
in the US (Ragatz et al., 1997), and due to increasing specialization suppliers are
often responsible for designing the components they supply. Hence, design choices
by suppliers determine a large part of the final manufacturing costs. The target
cost provided to suppliers serves as a prominent reference point for the subsequent
mass production contract price for the component (Monczka et al., 2008, p. 413).
Product development often involves choices about component designs; alternative
designs, technologies or materials might be available, and the feasibility and final
performance can only be determined in interaction with other components. For
example, the supplier of floor beams for the Boeing-787, a subsidiary of Tata Mo-
tors, had first developed a prototype using Titanium, and, at Boeing’s request, the
supplier developed another prototype based on composite material. This beam de-
velopment relied on cutting-edge technology, and only prototypes allowed Boeing
and Tata Motors to estimate and compare the performance of both beam designs
(Kulkarni, 2011).
The presence of alternative designs raises the question how target costs should
be set. Is a single cost target the best choice to obtain a low cost and high
quality design? If the manufacturer tests two alternative designs, is it possible
to reduce the costs even more by setting an aggressive target for the first, and a
more lenient target for the second? Or should the manufacturer rather start with
a lenient target (to ensure development success at the expense of profitability),
and use a more aggressive target for the second design? Should he even commit
to the target cost level for the second design up front or should it be determined
based on the outcome of the first design? For example, without commitment, if an
aggressive target cost could not be achieved with the first design, the manufacturer
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could allow for a more lenient one for the second attempt, and otherwise, try again
an aggressive target cost also for the second design. What is the impact of these
choices on the incentives for the suppliers to provide the manufacturer with a
functioning prototype? To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature on
target costing seems largely silent regarding the above questions.
Indeed, the literature recognizes that the incentives of suppliers and manufactur-
ers are largely misaligned, making suppliers focus more on achieving low compo-
nent cost and manufacturers on developing a reliable component of high quality
(Goldbach, 2002; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003). In the presence of multiple design
alternatives this problem is aggravated by information asymmetry: During the
component design and testing, the supplier does not only learn about the com-
ponents’ performances but also obtains a better estimate of their respective mass
production costs, which is not readily visible and verifiable for the manufacturer;
(e.g., this was the case in the above example of Tata Motors and Boeing). Hence,
the supplier might prefer a component design with lower mass production cost
rather than with higher quality (if delivered at the same target cost), and she
might resist a particular design by declaring it technically infeasible or infeasible
at a given target cost level.
In this chapter, we focus on collaborative product development between a single
supplier and a manufacturer, in which they jointly test different design alterna-
tives. The literature on target costing proposes two fundamental approaches to
determining target costs: A cost-based approach, where the target costs are de-
rived from estimated purchasing and production costs for the component, and a
market-based approach, where the target costs are derived from the value to the
customer minus a desired profit margin (Kato, 1993; Ellram, 2000). We will there-
fore examine a setting with identical cost estimation (same distribution), but with
performance estimates which are either the same for all design alternatives (func-
tional components) or which differ (value-adding components). The cost-based
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approach would hence suggest identical target costs for the alternative designs,
while the market-driven approach would suggest higher target costs for the de-
signs with higher performance contribution. We build a game theory model to
explore whether either of these approaches is appropriate for multiple design al-
ternatives (and if so for which type of components). On top of this, we study
whether the manufacturer should announce the target costs up front (commit-
ment scheme), or he should keep the flexibility to adjust the target costs based on
the outcome (flexible scheme). We do this by exploring the impact of the chosen
approach on the supplier’s incentives and behavior (whether or not she reveals
a feasible prototype). We show that all three approaches, a single fixed target
cost, different target costs committed to up front, and a flexible scheme allowing
for adjustments of the target costs can be optimal but under different conditions.
Overall, our study provides guidance to managers about fine-tuning the target
costing approach for alternative designs.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter contributes to different streams of literature. The literature on tar-
get costing is largely practitioner-oriented and builds on case studies or empirical
data analyses. Ansari et al. (2006) provide a comprehensive literature review on
this topic. The most important milestones for target costing in the context of
product development are laid by Kato (1993) and Cooper and Slagmulder (1999)
explaining its key principles, Tani (1995) and Davila and Wouters (2004) focusing
on its benefits and drawbacks, and Ellram (2000, 2006) and Zsidisin and Ellram
(2003) linking it to purchasing and supply chain management. Formal modeling
approaches have not received substantial attention on this topic, with a notable
exception of Mihm (2010) who compares target costing with other management
practices focusing on incentives they create for product engineers. We contribute
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to the literature by identifying the ways to fine-tune target costing when a man-
ufacturer interacts with the same supplier for multiple design alternatives, one of
which will be chosen at the end of the design phase.
This chapter also contributes to the interface of the new product development and
supply chain management literature. The new product development literature has
largely focused on a single firm. Regarding design choice, the literature is typically
modeled it as a search for the best alternative over a certain landscape of potential
options. Key issues arising from this include the decision about sequential or paral-
lel development, optimal number of tests to perform, and incorporation of learning
in the testing strategy (Weitzman 1979, Loch et al. 2001, Dahan and Mendelson
2001, Erat and Kavadias 2008). Terwiesch and Loch (2004) have extended this
literature by studying a collaborative prototyping process. Their model describes
the prototyping for custom-designed products, where the supplier leads by setting
the prices of the prototypes and the final product, and the customer mainly de-
cides when to stop further search. In our model, it is the manufacturer (i.e., buyer)
who leads the collaborative prototyping process by setting the designs’ target costs
and invites the supplier to develop (and de facto co-select) a design from a given
set of alternatives. While our model is also a sequential collaborative prototyp-
ing model, this chapter focuses on a different trade-off than the above mentioned
papers. Rather than focusing on the trade-off between performance and incurred
prototyping costs (which we assume to be negligible in our mass production con-
text), we focus on the incentives created for the supplier by the chosen design
testing order and target costs.
From supply chain perspective, this chapter contributes to the recent research on
information, incentive, and coordination issues in collaborative new product de-
velopment (where the product is developed jointly by multiple entities interacting
and communicating closely with each other). Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009)
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focus on horizontal collaboration of two firms in the context of alliances and an-
alyze the revenue, investment, and innovation sharing mechanisms between the
participating firms. While extensively covering the sharing of product develop-
ment cost, the authors leave the target costing for the mass production stage out
of the scope of their analysis. Iyer et al. (2005) turn to vertical collaboration with
hidden supplier capability. In their paper, the buyer decides on the amount of
effort to exert to help the supplier develop the product, and their primary focus
is on the development of the optimal screening contract through offering a menu
of contracts. We suppress the analysis of the effort levels to concentrate on the
dynamics stemming from the development of multiple prototypes. Kim and Netes-
sine (2013) explore the possibility of new product cost reduction obtained through
collaborative efforts exerted by both parties in the product development stage.
Similar to our research, they consider the unit cost at the mass production stage.
Their focus is however on incentives for optimal effort choices, while we explore
incentive conflicts arising from inherent dynamics of the new product development
process when one of multiple possible design alternatives has to be chosen prior
to the product release.
2.3 Model
A manufacturer (“he”) involves his supplier (“she”) in the development of a new
product component. The manufacturer has N distinctive designs and needs to
choose at most one for mass production. We consider the scenario where proto-
type development consumes significant amount of resources (e.g., employees with
relevant expertise and facility capacity), and therefore, the supplier develops dis-
tinctive designs one at a time. Such a sequential process is also assumed in existing
studies, such as Thomke and Bell (2001), Erat and Kavadias (2008), and Terwi-
esch and Loch (2004). Formally, we assume that the prototyping process consists
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of N periods, indexed by t = 1, . . . , N , and the supplier prototypes design t in
period t. For each design t, the manufacturer sets a target cost, denoted by wt.
Note that although iterative cycles with small adjustments of the same design are
possible within one period, the target cost remains fixed for these iterations. To
study the optimal timing for setting wt, we consider the following two schemes.
• Commitment scheme (C scheme). The manufacturer sets the target costs at
the outset, (i.e., prior to period 1), and commits to making no adjustment.
Namely, the manufacturer chooses a combination of (w1, w2, . . . , wN). In a
special case, the manufacturer can set equal target costs across the N designs,
i.e., w1 = w2 = . . . = wN .
• Flexible scheme (F scheme). The manufacturer chooses the target wt at the
beginning of period t, so that he has the flexibility to adjust the target cost of
design t after seeing the outcomes of the previous t− 1 prototypes.
At the outset, the manufacturer chooses either the C scheme or the F scheme. In
each following period t, through the prototyping process the supplier obtains an
estimate of the mass production cost of design t, denoted by ct. The supplier’s
cost estimation involves a lot of her private knowledge about past experience,
manufacturing know-hows, technologies in development, tooling costs, second-tier
suppliers, etc.; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the cost ct is the sup-
plier’s private information. However, we assume that both firms share the same
estimation of the component cost, i.e., the distribution, prior to the development
phase. This is reasonable because the manufacturer’s “supply management [team]
is working closely with the supplier in developing cost breakdowns, and gathering
market data to assess the reasonableness of supplier cost estimates and determin-
ing what the costs ‘should’ reasonably be” (Ellram, 2006, p. 21). In particular,
we assume that ct is an independent draw from the probability distribution A
with decreasing reversed hazard rate; commonly-used continuous or discrete dis-
tributions such as normal, uniform, exponential, geometric, binomial, Poisson, all
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satisfy this property (Block et al., 1998). Let A denote the tail distribution of A.
At the end of period t, the supplier releases prototype t for performance testing
only if she accepts the target cost wt; otherwise, she declares the design infeasible
in the sense that it cannot be developed given the target cost wt. In other words,
we assume the manufacturer cannot force the supplier to release a prototype, nor
will he renegotiate target costs (which goes against the purpose of target costing,
since the option to renegotiate can induce the supplier to strategically hold the
prototype and renegotiate for a higher target). We further discuss renegotiation
in §2.7. If the supplier releases prototype t, the two firms jointly test prototype
t and learn its performance, denoted by rt. We note that such joint tests become
increasingly common due to high-tech solutions for collaborative prototype testing
(Cisco, 2010; Wijtkamp, 2012).
As in many studies on prototype testing, e.g., Terwiesch and Loch (2004) and
Terwiesch and Xu (2008), we model rt as a scalar. In particular, we assume
rt has binary outcomes 0 and Rt > 0, where 0 stands for zero payoff to the
manufacturer in case design t fails the tests, and Rt is a deterministic payoff if
design t passes the tests and is finally chosen. We assume that Rt is common
knowledge due to the inherent nature of the target costing process in which “the
purchasing organization must share anticipated sales and production schedules
[with the supplier]” (Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003, p. 18). Formally, we assume that it
is common knowledge that rt is an independent draw from a two-point probability
distribution Gt with probability mass α ∈ (0, 1) (i.e., success probability) on rt =
Rt and with probability mass 1− α (i.e., failure probability) on rt = 0.
We consider two types of components. When the component serves a simple
and well-defined function, the manufacturer is indifferent to the choice between
designs that perform to specifications, i.e., Rt equals some constant R > 0 for
all t. We refer to such components as “functional components”, reflecting their
Chapter 2. Fine-Tuning Target Costing for Alternative Designs 14
binary nature — the component based on a certain prototype either serves the
required function or fails to do so, without any differentiation across successful
prototypes. In other cases, however, different designs exhibit notable specification
differences, for example, in terms of weight, volume, aesthetic attractiveness, etc.
Each design, if successfully passing the tests, adds a considerably different value
Rt to the manufacturer’s final product. We refer to such components as “value-
adding components”. For example, a component made from composite material is
expected to be lighter than a component made from metal, and thus the former
may add a greater value to the final product if it works. Therefore, prior to
prototyping both firms know the value of Rt. However, the feasibility of producing
the component from either material is unknown.
Under both C and F target costing schemes, the target costs wt are set prior to
developing prototype t and thus remain independent of the realized performance
value rt. After all N periods, if all designs have been declared infeasible, the
manufacturer uses the old design of the component (the outside option) and the
two firms both receive normalized zero payoff; otherwise, the manufacturer chooses
at most one feasible design for mass production. If the manufacturer chooses a
feasible design t, his payoff is rt−wt and the supplier’s payoff is wt−ct. We assume
both firms maximize their expected payoffs. This implies that the manufacturer
will choose a design t such that rt − wt ≥ rt′ − wt′ , ∀ t′ 6= t. In case of a
tie between several designs, the manufacturer chooses one in accordance with
the supplier’s preference. Similarly, in case of indifference between accepting or
rejecting a design, the supplier chooses to accept. Figure 2.1 presents the timeline
of events.
Under the C scheme, the manufacturer defines all target costs in the beginning of
period 1.
Figure 2.1: Event Timeline for Period t
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In the next sections, we derive the firms’ expected payoff functions and analyze
their strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium. In particular, we formulate the
supplier’s problem and characterize her strategy in §4; we need to introduce more
simplifying assumptions in §5, where we formulate the manufacturer’s problem,
solve the equilibrium, and analyze the manufacturer’s choice between C and F
schemes. To examine the robustness of our results in §5 under more general (and
hence complicated) settings, we extend our model and report numerical studies in
§6.
2.4 Supplier’s Optimal Strategy
In each period t, the supplier estimates the mass production cost of design t (i.e.,
observes ct) and then chooses to either accept the target cost (and release the
prototype for performance testing) or reject the design (by declaring the prototype
infeasible). Her optimal decision depends on the target wt and her cost estimation
ct. Furthermore, since her ultimate profit is determined by the manufacturer’s final
design choice, the optimal decision should be based on her evolving expectation
about the manufacturer’s final choice; under the C scheme, the decision should
take into account the manufacturer’s pre-chosen targets in the remaining periods
{wt+1, . . . , wN}, whereas under the F scheme the decision potentially affects those
targets in the remaining periods.
To account for the various elements that can affect the supplier’s sequential decision-
making in N periods, we formulate her problem by a dynamic program. Define
state variables πt and vt as the profits of the manufacturer and the supplier, re-
spectively, if the manufacturer chooses the best among the successful designs in
the first t− 1 periods. We call the choice the status-quo and refer to πt and vt as
the firms’ status-quo profits; by assumption π1 = v1 = 0.
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Suppose the manufacturer chooses a C scheme and announces {w1, w2, . . . , wN} at
the outset of period 1. In equation (2.1) we define the supplier’s optimal profit-
to-go function uCt [πt, vt] under the C scheme at the time of the decision in period
t:
uCt [πt, vt] = max

uCt+1[πt, vt], if rejected;
Pr(rt − wt > πt) uCt+1[rt − wt, wt − ct]
+ Pr(rt − wt = πt) uCt+1[πt, (wt − ct) ∨ vt]
+ Pr(rt − wt < πt) uCt+1[πt, vt], if accepted.
(2.1)
The right-hand side of equation (2.1) means that the supplier chooses to reject
or accept design t by comparing her expected profits under the two scenarios. If
she rejects the design, both firms’ status-quo profits remain unchanged (πt+1 = πt
and vt+1 = vt) from period t to period t + 1. By contrast, if she accepts the
design, the state variables may change depending on the performance test result,
i.e., the realized performance value rt. In particular, if rt is high enough, i.e.,
rt − wt > πt, design t replaces the manufacturer’s previous status-quo, and hence
the new status-quo profits are πt+1 = rt − wt and vt+1 = wt − ct; if rt is too low,
i.e., rt − wt < πt, πt+1 = πt and vt+1 = vt. Finally, in case design t ties with
the manufacturer’s previous status-quo choice, i.e., rt − wt = πt, we assume the
manufacturer chooses design t if it provides higher profits to the supplier. The
sign ∨ means pairwise maximum.
Suppose the manufacturer chooses an F scheme. In such a case, the two firms
engage in a sequential game. We consider the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Since
the manufacturer cannot observe the past costs, he updates his belief about vt via
Bayes’ rule based on the supplier’s decision to release or reject design t; we dis-
cuss the updating process in more details in the next section, where we formulate
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the manufacturer’s problem. Let Wt ≡ {wt, wt+1, . . . , wN} represent the manu-
facturer’s strategy at the beginning of each period t. His strategy is a stochastic
process of target costs in the remaining periods; in other words, the manufacturer’s
strategy, the supplier’s decisions, and the updated belief together determine how
Wt evolves. Using this notation, the supplier’s optimal profit-to-go function under
the F scheme at the time of the decision in period t is given by equation (2.2):
uFt [πt, vt| Wt]
= max

uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(0)
t+1], if rejected;
Pr(rt − wt > πt) uFt+1[rt − wt, wt − ct| W
(2)
t+1]
+ Pr(rt − wt = πt) uFt+1[πt, (wt − ct) ∨ vt| W
(0) or (2)
t+1 ]
+ Pr(rt − wt < πt) uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(1)
t+1], if accepted.
(2.2)
The superscripted W (i)t+1, i = 0, 1, 2, represent different possible paths of the
stochastic process: subscript i = 0 for when the supplier rejects prototype t;
i = 1 for when the supplier releases but the manufacturer rejects prototype t; last,
i = 2 for when the supplier releases and the manufacturer accepts the prototype.
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) are defined for all t = 1, ..., N , subject to the terminal
condition:
uCN+1[πN+1, vN+1] = uFN+1[πN+1, vN+1| WN+1] = vN+1, ∀ πN+1,∀ WN+1. (2.3)
The supplier solves the dynamic program defined by (2.1) and (2.3) under the
C scheme, or by (2.2) and (2.3) under the F scheme. Evidently, the solution
depends on the manufacturer’s strategy (which determines wt and Wt) and the
type of component (functional or value-adding, which determines the distribution
of rt). Therefore, one cannot fully characterize the solution in general. However,
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we prove some useful structural features of the supplier’s optimal strategy, i.e.,
the best-response given the manufacturer’s strategy, in Proposition 2.2. To build
intuition, we first discuss some properties of the supplier’s optimal profit-to-go
function. We provide all the proofs in the Appendix.
Lemma 2.1. The supplier’s optimal profit-to-go function has the following prop-
erties:
(i) Both uCt [πt, vt] and uFt [πt, vt|Wt] are increasing in vt;
(ii) uCt+1[πt, vt] is invariant to πt if R1 − w1 ≤ R2 − w2 ≤ ... ≤ RN − wN , and
non-increasing in πt, otherwise.
Lemma 2.1(i) means that the supplier’s expected final profit evaluated in any
period can only be higher if she derives a higher profit from the manufacturer’s
status-quo choice. While intuitive, the result has an important implication: The
supplier follows a threshold policy. Note that under either scheme, the supplier’s
expected profit increases in vt and, therefore, decreases in ct, if she accepts design t.
This can be easily seen from the expression on the right-hand side of equations (2.1)
and (2.2). Furthermore, ct does not vary the supplier’s expected profit in case the
supplier rejects design t. Together, this implies that under either scheme there
exists a unique cost threshold in each period such that the supplier always releases
the prototype if ct is below the threshold and, otherwise, she always rejects it.
This result is stated formally in Proposition 2.2. Lemma 2.1(i) has another non-
trivial implication: The supplier never allows vt+1 to be lower than vt under the
C scheme, since change in vt does not affect Wt as it does under the F scheme. As
we shall explain, this implication establishes the general results in Proposition 2.2
(i) and (ii).
Lemma 2.1(ii) describes the impact of πt on the supplier’s expected final payoff,
and it reveals when and how the two firms’ payoffs are related. In particular, it
suggests that under the C scheme there exists a conflict between the two firms’
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payoffs: The supplier is typically worse off if the manufacturer derives higher profit
from his status-quo choice. Intuitively, this is because a manufacturer with a better
status-quo choice is less likely to switch to a different design in the remaining
periods, which lowers the supplier’s chance to obtain a higher profit than her
status-quo profit. There exists one exception: If the manufacturer sets the testing
order and target costs so that his potential profit from design t (i.e., Rt − wt)
increases in t, he will always choose the last feasible design released by the supplier,
independently of πt, and hence the supplier’s profit-to-go function is invariant. We
note that the lemma does not say anything about the monotonicity of uFt [πt, vt|Wt]
in πt. The reason is that under the F scheme the supplier’s strategy dynamically
interacts with the manufacturer’s strategy (reflected in the stochastic processWt).
In particular, any change in πt affects Wt and the overall impact on uFt cannot be
determined in general.
Proposition 2.2. In period t, there exists a unique threshold ct that depends on
πt and vt. The supplier releases prototype t if and only if ct ≤ ct. In particular,
cN = wN − vN ; for t < N :
(i) Under the C scheme, ct < wt− vt, if ∃ t′ > t such that Rt−wt > Rt′ −wt′ ≥ πt
and Pr(ct′ ≤ ct′) > 0; otherwise, ct = wt − vt.
(ii) Under the F scheme, ct < wt − vt, if ∀ t′ > t such that Rt ≥ Rt′; otherwise, ct
can be greater than, equal to, or smaller than wt − vt.
On the surface, the existence of ct seems intuitive: The supplier releases prototype
t if and only if ct is sufficiently low. The main point of Proposition 2.2 is, however,
that the supplier’s acceptance threshold ct generally deviates from the target cost
wt. In particular, Proposition 2.2(i) says ct ≤ wt − vt always holds under the C
scheme. This implies that, once there has been some feasible design (and hence
πt > 0 and vt > 0), the supplier will reject all feasible designs t with ct ∈ (wt −
vt, wt). The supplier rejects such designs to avoid that the manufacturer switches
Chapter 2. Fine-Tuning Target Costing for Alternative Designs 20
his preference to design t, which would reduce the supplier’s status-quo profit
(because vt+1 = wt − ct < vt) — as Lemma 2.1 implies, the supplier should not
allow this to happen.
Furthermore, Proposition 2.2(i) suggests that, unless the manufacturer sets the
target costs such that his potential profit from design t (i.e., Rt − wt) increases
in t, the threshold ct is strictly lower than wt − vt, which means the supplier will
even reject a design t with ct ∈ (ct, wt − vt) — a design that can make both
the manufacturer and herself better off (in terms of πt and vt, respectively). We
will refer to such supplier behavior as strategic rejection. The intuition for such
behavior is the following: Lemma 2.1(ii) implies that the supplier is worse off if the
manufacturer’s status-quo profit increases, ceteris paribus; therefore, the supplier
would rather forego a small improvement of her status-quo profit than increase
the manufacturer’s status-quote profit. In other words, by rejecting such designs
she improves the chance that the manufacturer accepts a future design which is
more profitable for her.
Proposition 2.2(ii) suggests that the supplier’s strategic rejection behavior can
also occur when the manufacturer uses the F scheme. In particular, it surely
occurs if the manufacturer sequences the designs in decreasing order of expected
performance (i.e., Rt decreasing in t) or if the component is functional (i.e., Rt = R
being constant). In such cases, we prove that the manufacturer always reduces the
target cost as his status-quo profit increases; as a result, the supplier has incentive
to reject the prototypes that can only slightly increase her status-quo profit.
However, Proposition 2.2(ii) also suggests that, when the manufacturer uses the F
scheme for value-adding components, the supplier may use a threshold ct > wt−vt,
which means that the supplier may release a design t with ct > wt − vt. This
is surprising because such a design can only reduce her status-quo profit given
wt − ct < vt. We will refer to such supplier behavior as strategic acceptance. As
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Proposition 2.2(ii) indicates, strategic acceptance occurs only if the supplier ex-
pects some design t′ in a later period with high performance expectation (i.e.,
Rt′ > Rt). In such a case, the supplier’s strategic acceptance can manipulate the
manufacturer’s belief about vt and hence induce the manufacturer to choose high
target cost wt′ . We further discuss strategic acceptance of value-adding compo-
nents in §2.5.2.
In summary, the dynamic nature of equations (2.1) and (2.2), the stochastic factors
ct and rt, and the complexity in the manufacturer’s strategy together create an
analytical difficulty to characterize the supplier’s best-response strategy. Despite
so, the results in Proposition 2.2 reveal many insights about the manufacturer’s
design of the target costing scheme. First, as the supplier maximizes her profit
in the collaborative prototyping process, she tends to strategically influence the
buyer’s final design choice, and she does so through two types of strategic decisions:
strategic rejection and strategic acceptance. Second, both the component type
(functional vs. value-adding) and the target costing scheme type (commitment vs.
flexibility) affect the supplier’s strategic behavior. In particular, the commitment
scheme helps the manufacturer preempt the supplier’s strategic behavior (as long
as he sets the testing order and target costs so that Rt−wt increases in t), whereas
the flexible scheme generally provokes either type of strategic behavior. Third, in
the functional component case, the testing and target cost order R− wt matters;
in the value-adding component case, the testing order Rt matters. In the next
section, we investigate how the manufacturer optimally decides the testing order,
and further seek insights to the manufacturer’s preference between the two types
of target costing schemes.
Chapter 2. Fine-Tuning Target Costing for Alternative Designs 22
2.5 Payment Scheme Comparison
In this section, we formulate the manufacturer’s problem under the two schemes,
and examine his choice for both component types.
When choosing the C scheme, the manufacturer sets a target cost for each design
at the outset of period 1. If the component is of the value-adding type (i.e., Rt
is different across t), he also decides on the sequence of the designs to prototype.
We denote the decisions by wC = (w1, w2, . . . , wN) and RC = (R1, R2, . . . , RN).
Given wC and RC , the supplier solves her decision threshold ct at the outset
of period t per dynamic program (2.1) given the realized state (πt, vt). In other
words, wC andRC define the stochastic process {c1, c2, . . . , cN}, which evolvement
is governed by the realizations of ct and rt. Therefore, the manufacturer chooses
wC and the sequence of RC to maximize his expected payoff at the outset of
period 1:
N∑
i=1
E
(ri − wi)+A(ci) ∑
s⊆S\{i}
[ ∏
j∈S\{i}\s
A(cj)
∏
j∈s
A(cj) Pr(ri − wi ≥ rj − wj)
] ,
(2.4)
where S = {0, 1, ..., N} and s denotes any subset of S \ {i}. We explain expres-
sion (2.4) in the Appendix, part A.7.1.
When choosing the F scheme, the manufacturer sequences the designs to proto-
type if the component is of value-adding type. He sets the target wt at the outset
of period t, knowing that equation (2.2) defines the supplier’s acceptance thresh-
old ct. However, he cannot solve program (2.2) to precisely find ct because he
cannot observe the state variable vt, which equals wk − ck, where k denotes the
manufacturer’s status-quo choice. The manufacturer knows wk, but not ck; as a
result, he forms a belief about the distribution of ck and updates it from period
to period. Let Bt denote the belief at the outset of period t; Bt is null before
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the manufacturer has a status-quo choice. We formulate his dynamic program by
equation (2.5):
yFt [πt, Bt] = maxwt E
{
A(ct) yFt+1[πt, B
(0)
t+1] + A(ct) yFt+1[max{rt − wt, πt}, B
(1) or (2)
t+1 ]
}
,
(2.5)
with t = 1, ..., N and the terminal condition yFN+1[πN+1, BN+1] = πN+1,∀ πN+1,∀BN+1.
We explain equation (2.5) and provide details on the manufacturer’s belief updat-
ing mechanism in the Appendix, part A.7.2.
Formulations (2.4) and (2.5) explain why in general the manufacturer’s problem is
analytically intractable. Under the C scheme formulation, the intractability stems
from the evolution of the stochastic process {c1, c2, . . . , cN} and the complexity of
the objective function (2.4). Under the F scheme formulation, the intractability
stems from the manufacturer’s belief updating process and the involved equilib-
rium of two dynamic programs (i.e., (2.2) and (2.5)). In fact, the game under the
F scheme is very similar to a dynamic bargaining game with persistent private
information (e.g., Kennan 2001, Loginova and Taylor 2008) in the sense that the
supplier possesses private information about ck and hence vt, which exhibit correla-
tion across periods. Even in those recent developments, economists conclude that
“[t]o obtain results it is necessary to make some strong simplifying assumptions”
(Kennan 2001, p. 2). In fact, both Kennan (2001) and Loginova and Taylor (2008)
assume two periods and that the dynamic private information variable follows a
two-point distribution.
To shed light on the manufacturer’s problem under both schemes and seek insights
to his preference between the two schemes, we make similar assumptions and focus
in the rest of this section on the case N = 2 and assume that A is a two-point
distribution with probability mass β ∈ (0, 1) at ct = 0 and probability mass 1− β
at ct = 1, where the value 1 represents the standardized upper bound of the cost.
Given that we focus on design alternatives rather than on modifications of a design,
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a small N reflects the reality well. The two-point distribution of ct helps restore
tractability of the belief updating process about Bt. We return to our general
formulations (2.4) and (2.5) for our numerical examinations in §2.6.2, where we
consider continuous distributions of ct and check the robustness of the insights
derived from the simplifying assumptions.
In the following, we focus our analysis on the case with Rt > 1; namely, the
manufacturer pursues a potential design only if it offers a sufficiently high profit
potential. However, our analysis easily extends to the case of Rt < 1, which is in
fact simpler, since the only profitable condition is ct = 0.
2.5.1 Functional Components
When the component is of functional type, the two designs are ex-ante symmetric,
and so the manufacturer does not have a sequence problem. If the manufacturer
chooses to use the C scheme and announces (w1, w2), he can predict c1 and the
distribution of c2 by solving the supplier’s dynamic program (2.1); then, he can
evaluate his payoff by plugging w1, w2, c1, and the distribution of c2 in to ex-
pression (2.4). We solve his optimization problem (relegating the details to the
Appendix, part A.3.1), and summarize the result in Proposition 2.3(i).
If the manufacturer chooses the F scheme, the two firms play a sequential Bayesian
game defined by {w1;w(i)2 , B
(i)
2 , i = 0, 1, 2} and {c1; c
(i)
2 , i = 0, 1, 2}, where index
i differentiates three scenarios of period 2: i = 0 if the supplier does not release
prototype 1 and hence π2 = v2 = 0; i = 1 if the supplier releases prototype 1 but
the prototype fails the performance test and hence π2 = v2 = 0; and finally i = 2 if
the supplier releases prototype 1 and it passes the test and hence π2 = R1−w1 and
v2 = w1− c1. To form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, at t = 2 for each i = 0, 1, 2,
c
(i)
2 should solve the supplier’s program (2.2), and w
(i)
2 should solve the manufac-
turer’s program (2.5) given c(i)2 and B
(i)
2 ; at t = 1, c1 should solve the supplier’s
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program (2.2) given the equilibrium implied stochastic process W1, and w1 should
solve the manufacturer’s program (2.5) given c1. Finally, the belief B(0)2 and B
(1)
2
are null, and B(2)2 is the posterior distribution of c1 given that c1 < c
(2)
1 . We solve
the equilibrium (relegating the details to the Appendix, part A.3.1), and summa-
rize the result in Proposition 2.3(ii). Let R ≡ min
{
1−α+αβ(1−β)
(1−α)(1−β) ,
2−α
(1−β)(2−α(1+β))
}
,
R ≡ max
{
2−α
(1−β)(2−α(1+β)) ,
1−α(1−β(1−β))
(1−α)(1−β)
}
, and RF ≡ 11−β .
Proposition 2.3. Suppose the component is of functional type.
(i) If the manufacturer chooses the C scheme, it is optimal to set (w1, w2) equal to
(0, 0) when R < R; equal to (αβ, 1) or (1, 0) when R ≤ R < R; and equal to
(1, 1) when R ≥ R.
(ii) If the manufacturer chooses the F scheme, it is optimal to set w1 = 0 and
w
(1)
2 = w
(2)
2 = 0 when R < RF ; set w1 = αβ, w
(0)
2 = w
(1)
2 = 1, and w
(2)
2 = αβ
when RF ≤ R < R; and set w1 = 1 +αβ, w(0)2 = w
(1)
2 = 1, and w
(2)
2 = αβ when
R ≥ R.
(iii) The optimal C scheme weakly dominates the optimal F scheme.
Proposition 2.3 provides rich insights. First, parts (i) and (ii) show that the
manufacturer’s optimal target costs under both schemes share a similar structure,
namely, the functional component’s potential value R drives the optimal choice
of target costs. Intuitively, the manufacturer trades off between low target cost
and high probability of prototype release (by the supplier). When R is sufficiently
low, the manufacturer chooses the former over the latter; in particular, he uses
the lowest possible target cost in both periods (w1 = w2 = 0). By contrast,
when R is sufficiently high, the manufacturer chooses the latter over the former;
in particular, he sets high target costs in both periods. When R is medium, the
manufacturer may seek a low target cost from the first prototype and maximize
the release probability of the second prototype in case the first fails; in particular,
the manufacturer finds it optimal to use the medium w1 = αβ to “bet” on the
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first prototype (in which case the supplier releases only if c1 = 0) and use the high
w2 = 1 to “secure” the second prototype if the first fails (in which case the supplier
releases regardless of c2). Alternatively, the manufacturer can “secure” the first
prototype using w1 = 1 and leave very modest probability of acceptance for the
second design with w2 = 0 (which would be released only if c2 = 0 and c1 = 1).
Second, the manufacturer takes advantage of flexibility in the F scheme: Except
when R < RF , he sets a high target cost for the second prototype if the first one
fails (i.e., w(0)2 = w
(1)
2 = 1) so as to maximize the release probability of the second
one, and he sets a low target for the second one if the first one succeeds (i.e.,
w
(2)
2 = αβ) so as to seek the low cost from the second prototype.
Surprisingly, although the F scheme provides the flexibility to set the target cost
of the second prototype based on the outcome of the first one, the manufac-
turer is better off by using the optimal C scheme than the optimal F scheme, as
Proposition 2.3(iii) clearly suggests. To elaborate this finding, we compare Propo-
sition 2.3(i) with 2.3(ii), and note that the two strategies differ when RF ≤ R < R
(and the optimal payment is (0, 0) under the C scheme and w1 = αβ, w(0)2 =
w
(1)
2 = 1, and w
(2)
2 = αβ under the F scheme) and R ≥ R (with the corresponding
optimal payments of (1, 1) and w1 = 1 + αβ, w(0)2 = w
(1)
2 = 1, and w
(2)
2 = αβ).
The optimal C scheme strictly dominates the optimal F scheme in these two cases.
This is because the F scheme induces the supplier’s strategic rejection in the first
period (i.e., c1 < w1 per Proposition 2.2(ii)) and as a result the manufacturer has
to use a higher w1 in the optimal F scheme than in the optimal C scheme. In
particular, when RF ≤ R < R, we can show that any w1 < αβ in the F scheme
will induce the supplier to always reject the first prototype: She does so to force
the manufacturer to set the high second period target cost w2 = 1. By contrast,
by using the C scheme, the manufacturer commits to w2 = 0, which removes the
supplier’s incentive of rejecting the first prototype with c1 = 0; thus, the optimal
C scheme (with low w1 = 0) sufficiently induces the release of the first prototype
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when c1 = 0. Similarly, when R ≥ R, the optimal C scheme preempts the sup-
plier’s strategic rejection (i.e., c1 = w1 = 1 per Proposition 2.2(i)), and hence the
supplier always releases the first prototype. By contrast, if using the F scheme the
manufacturer has to set w1 > 1 to induce the supplier to always release the first
prototype; otherwise, if he sets w1 = 1, the supplier will strategically reject when
c1 = 1.
To summarize, when the component is of functional type, the manufacturer should
always prefer commitment to flexibility because the supplier always exhibits strate-
gic rejection behavior under the F scheme (per Proposition 2.2(ii)). Proposi-
tion 2.2(i) suggests that, when the component is of functional type, the C scheme
preempts the strategic rejection unless w2 is sufficiently higher than w1. This ex-
plains why some intuitive C scheme policies with w1 < w2 are not optimal. For
example, one might consider (w1 = 0, w2 = 1) as a reasonable strategy because it
allows the manufacturer to bet on the lowest possible cost from the first prototype
and at the same time secure the second prototype release if the first one fails.
However, we find that this strategy can never be optimal because it induces the
supplier to always reject the first prototype in the hope of obtaining a higher payoff
from the second. By contrast, the C scheme (w1 = 1, w2 = 0) avoids such strategic
rejection, and Proposition 2.3 suggests that it is one of the optimal strategies when
R < R < R.
Our results for medium R demonstrate an interesting contrast to the conventional
target costing approaches. Recall that both cost- and market-based approach
would prescribe equal target costs for both designs. Nevertheless, we show that
for multiple design alternatives, differentiated target costs might be better because
they allow the manufacturer to mitigate the supplier’s opportunistic behavior.
Hence, our findings shed light on how to adjust the conventional target costing
approaches.
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2.5.2 Value-Adding Components
Suppose the component is of value-adding type and there are two designs, one
with potential performance RH and the other with potential performance RL <
RH . The manufacturer needs to determine the prototyping sequence, either as
(R1, R2) = (RH , RL) or as (R1, R2) = (RL, RH). For either sequence, we solve for
the optimal C scheme target costs (w1, w2) and find the equilibrium {w1;w(i)2 , B
(i)
2 , i =
0, 1, 2} and {c1; c(i)2 , i = 0, 1, 2} under the F scheme. The procedures are the same
as those described in §2.5.1 for the functional component case. Under each scheme,
we compare the manufacturer’s optimal payoff under the two sequences to find the
optimal sequence, relegating the technical details to the Appendix, part A.3.2. We
introduce a definition and notations, and summarize the results in Proposition 2.4.
Definition. A set of designs {RH , RL} is referred to as having high performance
difference if RH −RL ≥ 1, and is referred to as having low performance difference,
otherwise.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose the component is of value-adding type and let RL ≡
1−α+αβ(1−β)
(1−α)(1−β) , R
H ≡ 1−αβ(1−β)(1−β)(1−αβ) , and R
F ≡ 11−β .
(i) If the set of designs has high performance difference, RL ≥ RF , and (1 −
β)RH + (1 − α − αβ)RL ≥ 2 − α, the manufacturer finds it optimal to choose
the F scheme, in which he sequences (R1, R2) = (RL, RH) and uses w1 = 1−α,
w
(0)
2 = w
(1)
2 = 1, and w
(2)
2 = 2− α.
(ii) Otherwise, the manufacturer finds it optimal to use the C scheme. In particular,
when the designs have low performance difference, if RL ≥ R
L and (1−α)(1−
β)RL + (1 − β)(1 + αβ)RH ≥ 2, he sequences (R1, R2) = (RL, RH) and sets
(w1, w2) = (1, 1); otherwise, if RL < R
L, he sequences (R1, R2) = (RH , RL)
and sets (w1, w2) = (1, 0); otherwise, he sequences (R1, R2) = (RL, RH) and
sets (w1, w2) = (0, 0). When the designs have high performance difference, he
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Figure 2.2: Optimal Target Costing Policy for Value-Adding Components
sequences (R1, R2) = (RL, RH), and he sets (w1, w2) = (0, 1) if (1 − β)(RH −
αβRL) ≥ 1, and (w1, w2) = (0, 0) otherwise.
We illustrate the results of Proposition 2.4 in Figure 2.2, where the solid lines
separate the two regions in which the manufacturer prefers different schemes (i.e.,
the optimal F scheme vs. the optimal C scheme), and the dotted lines separate the
sub-regions in which the optimal C scheme implies different target costs. The most
important result is Proposition 2.4(i), namely, the manufacturer can prefer the F
scheme to all C scheme policies when the component is of value-adding type. This
is in stark contrast to Proposition 2.3(iii), which suggests that the manufacturer
should never use the F scheme when the component is of functional type.
When and why should the manufacturer prefer flexibility to commitment? Propo-
sition 2.4(i) characterizes the conditions, namely, when both designs have high
potential performance, i.e., RL ≥ 11−β and (1− β)RH + (1−α(1 + β))RL ≥ 2−α,
and exhibit high performance difference, i.e., RH − RL ≥ 1. Intuitively, when
both designs have high potential performance, the manufacturer finds it optimal
to maximize the release probabilities by setting w1 = w2 = 1 if he chooses to use
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the C scheme. However, even this optimal C scheme cannot induce the supplier
to always release both designs: If he uses sequence (RH , RL) the supplier will
strategically reject the first prototype when c1 = 1; if he uses sequence (RL, RH)
the supplier will not release the second prototype when the first is accepted and
c1 = 0, c2 = 1, which is undesirable to the manufacturer when RH − 1 > RL.
By contrast, by using the F scheme and sequence (RL, RH), the manufacturer
can induce the supplier to always release the second prototype because he has
the flexibility to set a very high target cost w(2)2 > 1 (in case the first prototype
was accepted) and set w(0)2 = w
(1)
2 = 1 (in cases the first prototype was rejected).
Furthermore, the flexible second target cost creates an extra incentive for the sup-
plier to release the first prototype because she expects the manufacturer to set
w
(2)
2 > w
(0)
2 = w
(1)
2 . This extra incentive is so strong that (under the conditions of
Proposition 3) she chooses to always release the first prototype even if the man-
ufacturer sets w1 = 1 − α < 1, which means that she accepts the first prototype
at a loss when c1 = 1. Hence, by carefully choosing the target costs the manu-
facturer can take advantage of the supplier’s strategic behavior, as predicted by
Proposition 2.2(ii). Corollary 2.5 summarizes this particular benefit of having the
flexibility to set the target cost for the second prototype.
Corollary 2.5. Under the conditions of Proposition 2.4(i), if the manufacturer
uses the optimal F scheme, the supplier always accepts both designs, regardless of
the realized costs c1 and c2.
Nevertheless, if either RH or RL is insufficiently high, the manufacturer finds
it too costly to induce the supplier to always release both prototypes; or if the
second prototype does not provide sufficient improvement from the first one (i.e.,
RH − RL < 1, including the functional component case as an extreme case), the
manufacturer is unwilling to set w(2)2 > 1 after the first prototype was accepted.
For those scenarios, he always prefers the C scheme, and this is consistent with
the finding in Proposition 2.3(iii).
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Proposition 2.4(ii) characterizes the optimal target costs when the manufacturer
chooses the C scheme. The results are structurally similar to those for the func-
tional component case (Proposition 2.3(i)). Now we compare them to the conven-
tional target costing approaches. It is optimal to set high target costs w1 = w2 = 1
when both RL and RH are sufficiently high, and it is optimal to set low target
costs w1 = w2 = 0 when both RL and RH are sufficiently low, which is consistent
with the cost-based target costing. An interesting contrast occurs in the value-
adding component case: One design has sufficiently high potential performance
(i.e., RH > R
H) and the other has sufficiently low potential (i.e., RL < R
L). In
such a situation, it is optimal to set a high target cost for the high-potential de-
sign and a low target cost for the low-potential design, which is consistent with the
market-based target costing. Therefore, our results help delimit the applicability
of cost-based and market-based target costing approaches.
Finally, Proposition 2.4 suggests that the manufacturer should strategically se-
quence the designs to avoid the supplier’s strategic rejection behavior, i.e., to
avoid the rejection of the first prototype when c1 = w1, per Proposition 2.2. We
highlight this important finding in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.6. In choosing the optimal target costs and scheme as prescribed by
Proposition 2.4, it is weakly optimal for the manufacturer to sequence the designs
in increasing performance order (R1 < R2) when using the optimal F scheme, and
to sequence the designs in increasing payoff order (R1−w1 < R2−w2) when using
the optimal C scheme.
In other words, our analysis suggests that the manufacturer should always test the
design with higher potential at a later stage, because such a sequence neutralizes
the strategic rejection in the early period by assuring the supplier that he always
chooses the last acceptable design. This finding could complement the well-known
result in the sequential testing literature (Weitzman, 1979), which suggests that
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a single decision-maker should test designs in decreasing order of attractiveness
(e.g., performance to cost ratio). The intuition to starting the test with the most
attractive design is that the tester can stop the searching/testing as early as pos-
sible to save searching/testing costs. While we ignore the direct costs of testing,
our results show that in collaborative settings this result might reverse. If both
firms control the sequential testing process, a decreasing order of attractiveness
induces strategic rejections by the supplier (Proposition 2.2), which can be more
costly to the manufacturer than the cost of testing another design.
We can show that this result is robust even if we allow for (sufficiently low) direct
testing costs. In particular, if
M ≤

α(RH − 1)−RL, if RH < RF ,
αβRH −RL, if RH ≥ RF ,
(2.6)
where M > 0 is the manufacturer’s cost of developing a prototype, the results on
the optimal sequencing as formalized in Corollary 2.6 remain intact. The formal
proof is provided in the Appendix, part A.6.1.
2.6 Robustness Tests
2.6.1 Parallel Prototyping
In the previous analysis, we have considered sequential prototyping process in
which each design is released and tested after its development by the supplier. An
interesting question is whether the manufacturer can be better off if the supplier
can develop the designs in parallel or, equivalently, release all the prototypes at
the same time. In this section, we compare the manufacturer’s profit under the
parallel prototyping to his profit under the sequential prototyping as considered
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in the previous section, and hence we continue to use the assumptions from §2.5.
We find the following:
Proposition 2.7. The optimal target costing policy under parallel prototyping is
weakly dominated by the optimal C scheme policy under sequential prototyping.
Proposition 2.7 states that the manufacturer should generally avoid parallel pro-
totyping, even if prototypes are costless and the supplier has sufficient resources
to perform the prototype development in parallel. The reason is that with parallel
prototyping the supplier will learn the mass production cost for all designs, before
her decision on which prototypes to release for testing. As a consequence, the
manufacturer has to set higher target costs to ensure the same release probability
as in the sequential prototyping case.
2.6.2 Multiple Prototypes
In §2.5, we focused on the two-design (N = 2) case and achieve analytical tractabil-
ity by assuming the costs follow a two-point distribution. Our analysis yields the
main insight to the manufacturer’s choice of the optimal timing to set target costs:
He should use the commitment scheme when the various designs have low perfor-
mance difference (including the functional component case) and use the flexible
scheme in the presence of high performance difference and sufficiently high perfor-
mance relative to costs. The purpose of this section is to numerically examine the
insight in the three-design cases (N = 3) where the costs follow two commonly
used types of continuous distributions: normal and uniform.
Our numerical studies vary Rt (i.e., the designs’ potential performance values)
and the cost distribution parameters. We find that the main insight is robust. We
provide a group of examples in Table 2.1, which reports the profit comparisons
between the optimal C scheme and the optimal F scheme. In Table 2.1, the
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functional component case has two row sections: one assuming a normal cost
distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1, i.e., ct ∼ N (0.5; 0.1), and
the other assuming the standard uniform cost distribution, i.e., ct ∼ U [0, 1]. In
each cost distribution section, we vary the performance value R from the mean cost
0.5 to 1.2. Similarly, the value-adding component case has the two cost distribution
row sections. In each cost distribution case, we vary the set of performance values
so that each next row has a higher maximum performance and a larger performance
difference across designs. We report the manufacturer’s expected profit (πm), the
supplier’s expected profit (πs), the supply chain’s expected profit (πm + πs), and
the optimal first-period target cost (w1), under the optimal C scheme (columns C)
and the optimal F scheme (columns F). To highlight the optimal scheme choice,
we bold the values of πm under the optimal scheme.
The examples of functional components confirm the main insight of Proposi-
tion 2.3, namely, the optimal C scheme weakly dominates the optimal F scheme,
and the dominance becomes stronger as R increases because the optimal F scheme
needs to use a higher first-period target w1 than the optimal C scheme does. It
is interesting to note that the optimal C scheme also makes the supplier and the
supply chain better off.
The examples of value-adding components confirm the main insight of Proposi-
tion 2.4, namely, the manufacturer prefers the optimal F scheme when the perfor-
mance difference across designs and the maximum performance design are suffi-
ciently high. An important result (not reported directly in the table) is that the
optimal testing sequence for value-adding components is in the order of increasing
Rt in the optimal F scheme and in the order of increasing Rt − wt in the optimal
C scheme. This confirms the results of Corollary 2.6 for N = 3 and more general
cost functions.
Finally, we note that the strategic acceptance behavior exists in the value-adding
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Condition πm πs πm + πs w1
α = .9 C F C F C F C F
Functional components
ct ∼ N (0.5; 0.1)
R = .5 .04 .04 .04 .03 .08 .06 .42 .42
R = .6 .09 .08 .09 .06 .18 .14 .46 .46
R = .8 .25 .22 .24 .11 .48 .33 .52 .52
R = 1.2 .61 .56 .54 .16 1.15 .72 .56 .60
ct ∼ U [0, 1]
R = .5 .13 .13 .10 .06 .23 .19 .22 .22
R = .6 .18 .18 .15 .08 .33 .26 .26 .28
R = .8 .30 .28 .25 .13 .55 .42 .34 .36
R = 1.2 .58 .52 .48 .26 1.06 .78 .44 .54
Value-adding components
ct ∼ N (0.5; 0.1)
R = {.8, 1, 1.2} .51 .50 .14 .13 .64 .62 .38 .36
R = {.8, 1.2, 1.6} .83 .83 .12 .16 .95 .99 .30 .18
R = {.8, 1.2, 1.8} .99 1.01 .16 .17 .64 .62 .30 .18
R = {.8, 1.2, 3.6} 2.57 2.71 .20 .30 2.77 3.01 .24 .02
ct ∼ U [0, 1]
R = {.8, 1, 1.2} .46 .44 .18 .22 .63 .66 .22 .32
R = {.8, 1.2, 1.6} .68 .65 .27 .31 .95 .96 .22 .26
R = {.8, 1.2, 1.8} .79 .76 .32 .38 1.11 1.15 .20 .32
R = {.8, 1.2, 3.6} 2.34 2.44 .43 .60 2.78 3.04 .02 .02
Table 2.1: Profit Comparisons between the Optimal C and F Schemes
component examples. When the performance difference is sufficiently high relative
to the cost distribution mean and variance, the optimal F scheme sets a low first-
period target. For example, consider the case R = {.8, 1.2, 1.8} and the normal
cost distribution: Here w1 is as low as 0.18 under the optimal F scheme, and in
comparison is w1 = 0.30 under the optimal C scheme. The first-period target is
so much lower under the optimal F scheme, because in equilibrium the supplier
may strategically accept the first prototype at a loss to induce the manufacturer
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to set high targets for the next prototypes, in line with Proposition 2.2(ii).
2.7 Conclusion
Target costing has been suggested as a cost control mechanism that will allow
firms to design products appropriate for today’s competitive environment. In this
chapter, we explore how target costing can be fine-tuned in a setting in which a
firm explores multiple design alternatives with a supplier. While for each design
target costs should remain non-negotiable to effectively control costs, multiple dif-
ferent designs raise the question how target costs should be set. In particular,
are different approaches (cost-based versus market-based target costing, and com-
mitment versus flexible schemes) appropriate for determining the target costs for
different designs?
We show that in the presence of alternative designs a single target cost can result in
opportunistic behavior by suppliers, who reject prototypes which would otherwise
be profitable for both parties. Manufacturers can however adjust this opportunistic
behavior by carefully choosing the target costs for multiple designs. Interesting,
for designs with a-priori the same estimation of cost and performance (referred to
as functional components), where both target costing approaches would prescribe
the same target cost, the managers may optimally set different target cost levels
to adjust the supplier’s opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, for value
adding components, higher performance designs do not necessarily need to be
coupled with higher target costs (market-based determination of target costs),
but a fixed target cost (cost-based determination of target costs) can be optimal.
Even more interesting, if there are large differences between the designs’ expected
performances, the manufacturer can turn the suppliers’ strategic behavior into an
advantage by choosing a flexible scheme, where each target is set only after the
results of the prior prototyping test are known. Hence, our results, summarized
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in Figure 2 above, provide guidance to managers how to adjust the target costing
approach to the specific situation faced for a component.
Our study generates new insights to the problem of sequential prototype testing.
To reduce the cost of testing, one would typically want to test designs in decreasing
order of performance contributions (given identical costs). While our scenario is
very different in the sense that we do not focus on when to stop testing (both
designs will be tested), our results have nevertheless interesting implications and
suggest that determining the optimal sequence of testing is more complicated
whenever prototypes are developed with suppliers. With small enough costs of
prototyping (to the manufacturer) we find that it is beneficial to test designs in
increasing order of performance contributions, in order to reduce the supplier’s
strategic behavior, a factor that could also play a critical role and turn around
the results in scenarios where manufacturers can decide when to stop testing. Our
results also shed new light on the choice of parallel versus sequential prototyping.
Intuitively, parallel prototyping is a more appropriate form of testing the designs
(e.g., to speed up time to market), if the prototyping costs are negligible. However,
parallel testing can give rise to even more strategic behavior by the supplier.
Hence, even if parallel prototyping is feasible (i.e., there is no capacity constraint
on the development side for suppliers), doing so might not be in the interest of
the manufacturer, if time to market pressures are not too high. Taken together,
these findings suggest that we need to be careful about making target costing and
prototyping decisions whenever suppliers are involved.
We now discuss some limitations of our current model and potential future re-
search. Our model largely assumes negligible testing costs, and hence is appro-
priate for the scenarios where the manufacturer has already decided to test two
(or a few) design alternatives before making a choice among them. If the test-
ing costs are significantly high or if many alternative designs exist, manufacturers
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need not to test all designs and might prefer stopping the search for a good com-
ponent based on observed performances, which points to an interesting avenue for
future research. Our model assumes no learning between designs (similar to the
early testing literature), which well captures the scenarios when the manufacturer
wants to test a few very different designs. Another avenue for future research is
hence to incorporate learning in our model, similar to what Erat and Kavadias
(2008) have done for the single-firm prototyping scenario.
Chapter 3
Effect of Supplier Competition on
Parallel Team Deployment
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we examine the effect of competition between the suppliers involved
in the development process on the conventional product development practices. In
particular, we focus on the creation of parallel teams, i.e., the creation of several
internal development groups aimed at developing the same new product. The
rationale behind forming the parallel teams is the desire to manage uncertainty —
different teams will choose different paths and/or technologies for the new product
development, and hence the probability of the development success increases. The
reason for parallel rather than sequential teams is mainly linked to the today’s
requirement for quick time to market, which can be achieved by following the
parallel approach.
Due to increasing technological complexity, product development teams are rarely
capable of developing the new products totally in-house. As we have seen in
Chapter 2, it is more and more common that external parties, typically future
39
Chapter 3. Effect of Supplier Competition on Parallel Team Deployment 40
suppliers, develop key components for the new products. This adds a new layer of
complexity to the problem of parallel team deployment.
The suppliers as external parties may have different objectives from the manufac-
turer of the new product. In case of parallel teams, the manufacturer’s objective
is to ensure that at least one team succeeds with product development whereas
the resulting product is of high quality and/or reasonable costs. For a supplier,
the difference is that her objective is to ensure that at least one team, among
those with which she works, is chosen by the manufacturer for the mass produc-
tion stage. In other words, the suppliers are not interested in maximizing the
component performance or minimizing its cost as a primary objective, but rather
they seek to outperform the competing suppliers.
Being a complex process, product development implies significant non-contractable
efforts necessary for the successful completion of the development and for achiev-
ing a high level of performance. From the suppliers’ side, these efforts reflect the
amount of resources allocated to the development project in general — the sup-
plier may choose to prioritize this project over her other projects, search for better
second-tier suppliers, allocate her best personnel to this project, etc. Monitoring
of all these various project-related efforts can be very costly if not infeasible, and
hence the corresponding specifications are rarely included in the contracts. There-
fore, the manufacturer needs to ensure that the supplier has sufficient incentive to
exert high efforts, i.e., to find the best second-tier suppliers, provide the best pos-
sible amenities to the manufacturer’s teams at the expense of her other projects,
etc.
In the light of the above, it is vital for the manufacturer to understand how
competition affects the supplier incentives. Does allocation of more teams to a
supplier lead to higher or lower efforts from her side? How does it affect efforts of
another supplier? The answer to these questions is far from being intuitive. For
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example, when supplier A receives more teams to work with, supplier B faces a
clear trade-off. On the one hand, the chances to succeed diminish for supplier B
and therefore she might prefer lower effort level, but on the other hand, supplier
A empowered with more teams may also reduce her effort prompting supplier
B to try to outperform her. This problem has an important application for the
allocation of teams to different suppliers. The manufacturer can allocate his teams
to two alternative suppliers, while one supplier is clearly better than another, i.e.,
one supplier will definitely develop a higher performing component than another
given the same effort levels from their sides. Is it optimal for the manufacturer to
allocate a high number of teams to the better supplier, or on the contrary, allocate
them to the worse supplier to put more pressure on the better one?
In addition to different expertise levels, the suppliers can work with different tech-
nologies making the team allocation decision even more difficult. For the develop-
ment of the Dreamliner, Boeing has involved the supplier of lithium-ion batteries,
a technology never used before in aviation industry (LeVine, 2013). Although the
probability of success for a new technology is clearly lower than for a conventional
technology, in case of success the performance will be greater given the same efforts
from the supplier. Does it mean that the manufacturer should optimally allocate
more teams to the more risky but highly promising technology or the reverse?
3.2 Literature Review
The research on parallel new product development originates from Nelson (1961)
who considers the optimal number of teams developing alternative designs with
the objective to choose one team whose design promises the lowest cost for the
final product at a predetermined review time. Abernathy and Rosenbloom (1969)
discuss the application of parallel strategy as an efficient way to deal with high
uncertainty. Arditti and Levy (1980) further develop this idea for the case when
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design performance is stochastic and focus on the trade-off between the cost of
maintaining parallel teams and the increase in the overall project success proba-
bility.
Tandon (1983) considers the environment, in which multiple firms decide to under-
take competing R&D projects, and his focus is on the number of firms which will
enter the competition. In his model, the decision on number of parallel projects
is decentralized and depends on the environment parameters. This approach but
with environment defined by another party rather than by nature is further de-
veloped within the literature on open innovation tournaments (see, for example,
Terwiesch and Xu 2008 and Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). The main difference of
our research is that it focuses on the problem of supplier allocation to parallel
teams, and the suppliers are heterogeneous in their capabilities.
One can draw a parallel between our work and Erat and Krishnan (2012) where
agents are (self-)assigned to different solution areas. However, the prominent dif-
ference is that the solution areas cannot decide on their effort level opposite to the
suppliers. Erat and Krishnan (2012) conclude that it is beneficial to explore less
promising supplier area to increase the breadth of search, so that if a more promis-
ing solution area fails, a less promising can succeed. In our model, we capture an
additional effect of supplier competition, and we find that it might be beneficial to
work with less capable suppliers, even when we suppress the benefit of the breadth
of search.
Another research stream focuses on internal team motivation and inter-team col-
laboration, the issues raised by Birkinshaw (2001). Taylor (2010) provides an
insightful case analysis discussing the strategies of team collaboration. Sundare-
san and Zhang (2012) investigate the optimal incentive schemes for collaborative
and non-collaborative parallel teams. Our research has a different focus on inves-
tigating the incentives of the third parties, key component suppliers, rather than
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the incentives of internal teams.
Ding and Eliashberg (2002) consider new product as a sequential process and
analyze the optimal number of parallel teams (approaches) in different stages of
the process, thus optimizing the overall development pipeline. In our research,
we focus on a particular stage of the new product development when external
suppliers need to be involved to create viable prototypes based on different parallel
approaches. By concentrating on a particular stage, we are able to describe the
rich interaction structure of incentives of internal and external parties.
The comparison of parallel strategy to sequential has received a vivid coverage
in the literature. Morgan and Manning (1985) show the benefits of the hybrid
parallel/sequential strategy. Dahan and Mendelson (2001) provide the analysis
of different strategies under different extreme-values distributions. The learning
dimension is incorporated by Loch et al. (2001).
Another problem related to our research is how to allocate limited resources be-
tween parallel projects or teams. Gerchak (1998) addresses this issue under differ-
ent objectives of the focal company. Gurler et al. (2000) establishes the conditions
for the closed-form solutions. However, the underlying incentive conflict is far
from one between a manufacturer and an external supplier.
Our research can be also described in the formal language of principal-agent model.
The principal hires two different class of agents, development teams and suppliers,
and finds the optimal matching between the agent types with the objective to
maximize the probability of the development success. The problem is, however,
different from the classical matching problem (as described by Mortensen 1982)
as the buyer can directly allocate each team to a particular supplier. Our focus
is not on the partner choice but rather on the game between suppliers once the
allocation is externally set.
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3.3 Model
For the development of a new product, the manufacturer of the new product
creates m parallel teams, which he can allocate to different suppliers. We treat
the number of parallel teams as an exogenous variable since it is often defined by
the disposable budget or resources for the project. Our primary focus is thus on
how to optimally allocate the teams. Capturing the trade-off between the new and
conventional technologies, we consider two asymmetric suppliers: supplier n who
has higher expertise for working with the new technology and supplier c whose
expertise lies in the domain of the conventional technology.
In our model, we allow for two sources of uncertainty. The first is the technology
uncertainty — a technology might prove to be unsuitable for the new product
despite any supplier efforts and the number of teams allocated to the supplier. The
new and conventional technology prove to be feasible for the new product with
probabilities γn and γc, respectively, so that γc > γn to reflect the intuition that
conventional technology might work for the new product with higher probability
than new technology. The second uncertainty source stems from the team level;
each team can succeed with probability α.
Each supplier decides on how much efforts, ejn and ejc, to exert toward each team
j allocated to her. The efforts are costly, and we assume a continuous and twice
differentiable cost function c(eji ) for i = n, c and j = 1, 2, ..., ti such that c′(e
j
i ) > 0
and c′′(eji ) ≥ 0, where ti is the number of teams allocated to supplier i. The
total cost the supplier bears for all the teams allocated to her we describe as
c(ei)(1 +β(ti− 1)) where β ∈ [0, 1] is the level of component customization, which
defines the supplier’s synergy of efforts. If β = 1, the component is fully customized
for each team, and thus the supplier does not enjoy any potential synergy, while
on the other extreme with β = 0 additional teams do not lead to any extra costs.
Chapter 3. Effect of Supplier Competition on Parallel Team Deployment 45
We assume that the teams are ex-ante symmetric, and the suppliers exert the
same effort level toward each of the teams allocated to her. Although it might be
different for the projects with multitudinous parallel teams, generally a supplier is
expected to work with no more than 2 or 3 teams, and any unjustified preferences
toward some teams from the supplier’s side would promptly become evident for
all parties raising the reputation concerns.
Supplier efforts define the component performance ri(ei) for i = n, c. In line with
the existing literature, we define performance as a single-dimensional measure.
We assume that performance increases in efforts but with a diminishing marginal
return, i.e., r′(ei) > 0 and r′′(ei) ≤ 0. Furthermore, let rn(e) ≥ rc(e) for a given
effort level to reflect the advantage of the new technology. We consider perfor-
mance deterministic, however, our insights are robust for the stochastic setting
under the risk-neutrality assumption. The model captures the performance risk
through probabilities of their success, γn and γc. We assume that both parties are
risk neutral, as in practice a large supplier involved in component development is
typically no more risk averse than a manufacturer.
Graphically, Figure 3.1(a) presents the supply chain at the product development
stage, and Figure 3.1(b) describes the event sequence in our model. First, the
manufacturer allocates tn teams to the new technology supplier and tc teams to
the conventional technology supplier so that tn+ tc = m. All teams are considered
ex-ante symmetric in our model. Then the suppliers simultaneously choose effort
levels en and ec. Finally, the uncertainty on the technology and the team levels
is resolved, and the manufacturer chooses for the mass production the supplier
with higher performance ri(ei), i = n, c providing the technology of the winning
supplier and at least one team succeeded.
To simplify the notation, we will denote the probabilities that a supplier succeeds
in the development with at least one team as Sn ≡ γn
(
1 − (1 − α)tn
)
and Sc ≡
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Figure 3.1: (a) A Typical Supply Chain at the Product Development Stage
and (b) Event Sequence
γc
(
1− (1− α)tc
)
, and the supplier’s costs as Bi ≡ 1 + β(ti − 1), where i = n, c.
We will consider two contracting schemes for the new product development: target
costing and performance-contingent reward. Under the target costing scheme, the
manufacturer sets the target for the price of the component at the mass production
stage, and this price is independent of the component performance. Generally, this
approach leads to better cost control from the manufacturer’s side, but it might
shift the supplier’s objective away from maximizing the component performance.
Performance-contingent reward implies that the supplier receives a pre-defined
portion of the component performance as the price at the mass production stage.
3.4 Target Costing Incentive
Before diving into the formal definition of equilibrium efforts, let us discuss the
intuition behind the supplier’s behavior. Consider Figure 3.2 comprising of two
graphs: performance as a function of efforts on top and cost as a function of
efforts below. After the manufacturer announces the target cost u, the suppliers
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need to ensure that their components perform above this level (to satisfy the
manufacturer’s participation constraint), and en and ec denote these minimum
effort levels for the new and conventional technology supplier, respectively. On
the lower graph, we can see the costs c(en) and c(ec) incurred by each supplier.
Figure 3.2: Supplier’s Efforts under Target Costing Contract
Note that if any of the suppliers exerted a slightly higher effort, her component
performance would be higher and therefore she will be chosen by the manufacturer.
Each supplier would prefer to increase her efforts until the point when costs of
efforts outweigh the benefit of having a higher performing component. From the
analysis of supplier payoff as we will further discuss in Equation (3.1), we find that
this point is achieved when the cost equals SnScu
Bi
+ c(ei), for i = n, c. We denote
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the corresponding maximum effort levels as ēn and ēc. However, supplier n can
achieve the performance of rc(ēc) at a lower effort level than ēn. Since r−1n (ēc) < ēn,
supplier n would never exert any effort above r−1n (ēc) in equilibrium, as the other
supplier never finds it beneficial to exert effort leading to a higher performance.
Therefore, in equilibrium supplier n can exert efforts in the interval [en, r−1n (ēc)]
and supplier c — [ec, ēc]. Note that ēc defines the maximum equilibrium effort for
both suppliers, whereas ēn does not play a role. Recall that ēc = SnScuBc + c(ec).
Considering SnScu
Bc
, we can see that it is non-monotone in tc and monotone in
tn. In practice it means that sometimes adding more teams for the conventional
technology supplier may result in higher efforts exerted by the new technology
supplier. In the remainder of the section, we formalize the analysis and identify
the conditions when this property holds.
We start with formulating the suppliers’ objective functions which are discrete
because each supplier can be either the first or the second best choice for the
manufacturer depending on the exerted efforts. Note that vi(ei) stands for expected
profit of supplier i since the technology and team uncertainty is incorporated
through γi and α, respectively, where i = n, c.
vi(ei) =


Siu− c(ei)Bi, if ri(ei) > rj(ej);
Si(1− Sj)u− c(ei)Bi, if ri(ei) < rj(ej);
, if ri(ei) ≥ u;
0, if ri(ei) < u.
(3.1)
where i 6= j and i, j = n, c. The probability that supplier i succeeds with at least
one team is Si. However, if she is the second-best choice for the manufacturer, she
also needs that the other supplier fails, which happens with probability 1−Sj. In
any case, each supplier bears cost of effort proportional to the number of teams
allocated to the supplier and corrected on the synergy level across teams. For
simplicity, we do not allow for a tie between suppliers but all the results hold true
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if we consider ties with random tie break mechanism. The intuition is that each
supplier can easily break the tie in her favor by exerting an ε higher effort, where
ε is a small positive value.
For the equilibrium analysis, we limit our attention to the case when a supplier
chooses to participate even when she is the second best choice, i.e., c
(
r−1i (u)
)
≤
Si(1−Sj)u
Bi
. The analysis for the opposite case follows similar logic.
Proposition 3.1. Under the target costing reward,
i. The supplier’s best response functions are
BRi(ej) =

r−1i (rj(ej) + ε), if ei < r−1i (ēj);
r−1i (u), otherwise;
(3.2)
ii. The only equilibrium exists in the mixed strategies defined by the following
cumulative distribution functions:
Fn (x) =

0, if r−1c (rn(x)) < ec;
Bc
SnScu
(
c (r−1c (rn(x)))− c (ec)
)
, if ec ≤ r−1c (rn(x)) < ēc;
1, if r−1c (rn(x)) ≥ ēc;
(3.3)
and
Fc (x) =

0, if x < ec;
1− Bn
SnScu
(
c (r−1n (rc(ēc)))− c(r−1n (rc(x)))
)
, if ec ≤ x < ēc;
1, if x ≥ ēc;
.
(3.4)
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The best-response functions as formulated in Proposition 3.1(i) reflect the desire
of both suppliers to become the first-choice supplier, since it generates a strictly
higher payoff given the same effort levels. As long as the opponent’s effort is
sufficiently low, it is always profitable to exert a slightly higher effort. However,
if the opponent’s effort is high, it is more profitable to reduce the effort level to
zero. This structure does not allow for any pure-strategy equilibrium, since one
of the suppliers will always prefer to increase her efforts to make the performance
ε-higher than the rival’s performance or drop the effort down to zero.
Therefore, the suppliers have to follow mixed strategies in the equilibrium as de-
scribed by Proposition 3.1(ii). Each supplier randomizes her effort level on the
support
[
ei,min{ēi, r−1i (ēj)}
]
with the cumulative distribution function Fn or Fc.
Analysis of equilibrium strategies as formalized in Equations (3.3) and (3.4) al-
lows us to grasp the trade-off between the supplier’s equilibrium effort level and
the number of teams allocated to her competitor. When discussing the effort levels
further in this section, we will refer to the stochastic effort levels following the prob-
ability distribution for the mixed strategies as prescribed by Proposition 3.1(ii).
Note that lower values of Fn or Fc indicate stochastically higher effort levels. The
immediate observation is that for β = 0, i.e., when the component offered to differ-
ent teams is fully standardized and thus Bn = Bc = 1, the equilibrium effort level
is monotonically increasing in the number of teams allocated to the competitor.
However, for positive β this relation is not necessarily monotone. This feature is
formalized in Proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.2. The equilibrium effort level of supplier n stochastically increases
in tc for β < β and decreases otherwise, where
β(tc) =
−(1− α)tc ln(1− α)
1− (1− α)tc + (tc − 1)(1− α)tc ln(1− α)
. (3.5)
Furthermore, β decreases in tc.
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The above proposition postulates that for projects with high synergy across teams
and low number of teams allocated to the conventional technology supplier, adding
an extra team to this supplier will increase the effort exerted by the new technology
supplier.
When supplier c receives an extra team in the scenario described above, her prob-
ability to develop a component successfully increases significantly, whereas her
costs of working with more teams do no change substantially as synergy effect is
sufficiently high, i.e., β < β. Under these conditions, supplier c tends to increase
her effort level to a certain extent. As a result, supplier n faces a decline in prob-
ability to become the preferred supplier and under sufficiently low β, she finds it
profitable to increase her effort levels as well. Clearly, this logic fails for high β or
high tc because supplier c will experience too high cost of exerting higher efforts
to more teams relative to the additional profit, and thus her effort will decrease
with the similar effect for supplier n.
Knowing the suppliers’ equilibrium strategies, we can construct the manufacturer’s
objective function as
π(tn, tc) = Sn(rn(en)− u) + Sc(1− Sn)(rc(ec)− u)
+ Fn
(
r−1n (rc(ec))
)
SnSc
(
rc(ec)− rn(en)
)
= Sn(rn(en)− u) + Sc(1− Sn)(rc(ec)− u) +
Bc
u
(
rc(ec)− rn(en)
)(
c (ec)− c (ec)
)
(3.6)
where ec ∈ [ec, ēc] and en ∈ [en, r−1n (rc(ēc))] follow the equilibrium distributions
and c
(
r−1i (u)
)
≤ Si(1−Sj)u
Bi
for i 6= j and i, j = n, c.
The immediate observation is π(0, tc) = π(tn, 0) = 0 meaning that in the absence
of competition the manufacturer’s profit is always zero. The reason is that each
supplier would exert the minimum sufficient effort to produce component with per-
formance exactly satisfying the target cost, thus leaving the manufacturer without
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any margin. It is particularly interesting that this result does not depend on values
of γn and γc. Putting it to the extreme, even if the new technology were risk-free,
i.e., γn = γc, the manufacturer would still prefer to allocate at least one team to
the conventional technology supplier to benefit from the competition.
3.5 Performance-Contingent Incentive
Now we consider the case when the supplier receives her reward proportionally to
the component performance. The supplier’s payoff shares some similarities with
the target costing incentives. In particular, it depends on whether the supplier’s
component is the first or the second choice for the manufacturer if both components
are successfully developed. Further, for simplicity we will say that a supplier wins
if her component is the first choice and loses otherwise. The supplier’s payoff is
formalized in Equation (3.7)
vPi =

Siφri(ei)− c(ei)Bi, if ri(ei) > rj(ej);
Si(1− Sj)φri(ei)− c(ei)Bi, if ri(ei) < rj(ej);
(3.7)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the portion of the component performance received by the
supplier, i 6= j, and i, j = n, c. As in the previous section, we start with intuitive
analysis of the equilibrium. To simplify further exposition, we denote the supplier
payoff if her component performs better as wi(ei) and otherwise as li(ei). Consider
Figure 3.3 depicting different equilibria depending on the parameters.
The graphs present marginal analysis of the suppliers’ decision-making process.
If supplier c knew that she would definitely perform worse that her competitor,
her marginal performance would be Sc(1−Sn)φr′(ec), and the optimal effort level
would be at the intersection of Sc(1−Sn)φr′(ec) and c′(ec), denoted as e∗c . However,
if the supplier knew that she would be the first choice of the manufacturer, her
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Figure 3.3: Supplier’s Efforts under Performance-Contingent Contract
marginal performance would increase to Scφr′(ec) ≥ Sc(1 − Sn)φr′(ec), and the
optimal effort level — to ē∗c . The area with diagonal hatching represents the gain
of supplier c from developing a better performing component than supplier n. As
long as this area is non-null, supplier c is eager to exert efforts even higher than ē∗c
to ensure that her performance is higher. Supplier c finds it optimal to increase the
effort until the point when the losses from too high effort, the horizontally hatched
area, equalizes with the gains from being the best; this threshold effort level is
denoted by ẽc. Beyond this point (when the horizontal hatching area equalizes the
diagonal hatching area), supplier c prefers to develop a worse component at effort
level e∗c rather than bearing extra costs of too high efforts.
Figure 3.3(a) depicts the case when r−1n (rc(ẽc)) > ē∗n which means that supplier
c finds it optimal to produce a better component than supplier n would produce
being the first choice for the manufacturer.
Formally, e∗i ≡ arg maxei {li(ei)} = argei
 c′(ei)r′i(ei) = φγi
(
1−(1−α)ti
)(
1−γj+γj(1−α)tj
)
1+β(ti−1)

and e∗i ≡ arg maxei {wi(ei)} = argei
 c′(ei)r′i(ei) = φγi
(
1−(1−α)ti
)
1+β(ti−1)
.
Proposition 3.3. Under the performance-contingent reward,
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i. The supplier’s best response functions are
BRi(ej)
=

e∗i , if rj(ej) > ri(e∗i ) and wi
(
r−1i (rj(ej) + ε)
)
< li(e∗i );
r−1i (rj(ej) + ε), if rj(ej) > ri(e∗i ) and wi
(
r−1i (rj(ej) + ε)
)
≥ li(e∗i );
e∗i , if rj(ej) ≤ ri(e∗i ).
(3.8)
where ε > 0, i 6= j, and i, j = n, c.
ii. If ẽi < r−1i (rj(e∗j)), the pure-strategy equilibrium exists which is (e∗i , e∗j),
where ẽi ≡ argei{wi(ei + ε) < li(e∗i )}, ∀ ε > 0, i 6= j, and i, j = n, c.
iii. Otherwise, the mixed-strategy equilibrium exists which is defined by the fol-
lowing cumulative distribution functions:
Fj
(
r−1j (ri(ei))
)
=

0, if ei ≤ e∗i ;
φSi
(
ri(ẽi)−ri(ei)(1−Sj)
)
−
(
c(ẽi)−c(ei)
)
Bi
φri(ei)SiSj , if e
∗
i < ei ≤ ẽi;
1, if ei > ẽi.
(3.9)
where i 6= j and i, j = n, c.
In words, Proposition 3.3(i) shows that the best response depends on how much
effort the other supplier exerts. If she exerts high efforts, supplier i is better off
by exerting the optimal effort for the losing case, e∗i . On the other extreme, when
ej is sufficiently low, supplier i will exert the optimal effort for the winning case,
e∗i . However, for some intermediate efforts, supplier i will exert such an effort
level that allows her to have a higher performance than supplier j, although it
does not maximize wi(ei) or li(ei) individually. Interestingly, this intermediate
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effort level of the supplier j leads to higher effort level of the supplier i. Formally,
r−1i (rj(ej) + ε) > e∗i > e∗i .
Given this structure, a pure-strategy equilibrium may exist under certain param-
eters as formalized in Proposition 3.3(ii). There exist two possible pure-strategy
equilibria, which are (e∗i , e∗j) for i 6= j, i, j = n, c. The necessary condition for
this equilibrium structure to hold is wi
(
r−1i (rj(e∗j) + ε)
)
< li(e∗i ), which means
that supplier i is better off by maximizing the losing case objective function rather
than trying to outperform supplier j. Note that the above condition holds if
rj(e∗j) > ri(e∗i ), since wi(e∗i ) > li(e∗i ) and supplier i would always adopt e∗i effort
level otherwise. It is curious to see how e∗i depends on the parameters: it is increas-
ing in γi and αi, while it is not monotone in ti — it is increasing for sufficiently
low ti and then decreasing for higher ti.
Finally, Proposition 3.3(iii) reveals the nature of the mixed-strategy equilibrium
which shares some structural similarities with the equilibrium under the target
costing incentive scheme. Both players randomize their effort levels on the interval
between 0 and some maximum threshold level. For the performance-contingent
incentive, this level ẽi is determined as such a level that supplier i prefers to develop
the second-best component with effort e∗i rather than exert any efforts beyond it.
3.6 Effect of Supplier Competition on Manufac-
turer Profit
In this section, we attempt to make a step further in our analysis and estimate
the competition effect on the manufacturer’s profit rather than on the other sup-
plier’s efforts. This raises the complexity of the problem, and to ensure analytical
tractability, we allow suppliers to exert only either low or high efforts, denoted
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as eL and eH . Table 3.1 presents the expected payoffs of the suppliers under this
effort structure.
PPPPPPPP
Sn
Sc Low effort High effort
Low effort Snyn(eL)− c(eL)Bn Sn(1− Sc)yn(eL)− c(eL)Bn(1− Sn)Scyc(eL)− c(eL)Bc Scyc(eH)− c(eH)Bc
High effort Snyn(eH)− c(eH)Bn Snyn(eH)− c(eH)Bn(1− Sn)Scyc(eL)− c(eL)Bc (1− Sn)Scyc(eH)− c(eH)Bc
Table 3.1: Supplier Payoff Matrix
In the payoff matrix, yi(·) = u for target costing contract and yi(·) = φri(·) for
performance-contingent contract, i = n, c. Let ρ ≡ Snyn(eH)−Sn(1−Sc)yn(eL)−∆cBn
SnScyn(eL)
and µ ≡ ∆cBc−Sc(1−Sn)(yc(eH)−yc(eL))
SnScyc(eL) , where ∆c = c(eH) − c(eL). When considered
for particular team allocation of tn and tc, we will denote these probabilities as
µtntc and ρtntc .
Proposition 3.4. The equilibrium supplier efforts for supplier N and C under
both target costing and performance-contingent contracts are as follows:
• (eL, eL) if µ ≥ 1, the low effort equilibrium;
• (eL, eH) if µ < 1 and ρ ≤ 0, the low risk equilibrium;
• supplier n (c) exerts eL with probability µ (ρ) and eH with probability 1− µ
(1− ρ) if µ < 1 and ρ > 0, the mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4 describes equilibria in general form for both target costing and
performance-contingent contracts. However, note that despite the apparent sim-
ilarity, the separating conditions are different for the two contracts. For target
costing contract, the parameters µ and ρ will take form of µT = (c(eH)−c(eL))Bc
SnScxc(eL)
and ρT = 1− (c(eH)−c(eL))Bn
SnScxn(eL) , respectively. We define three equilibrium types: low
effort equilibrium occurring when both suppliers prefer to exert minimal efforts,
low risk equilibrium — when conventional technology supplier chooses to exert
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high efforts, and mixed-strategy equilibrium — when different effort choices are
admissible.
In the previous section, we could see that synergy level have crucial effect on
the suppliers’ equilibrium behavior defining their reaction to additional competi-
tion. First, we examine how the manufacturer’s profit changes in synergy level.
Common sense would suggest that higher synergy should always benefit the manu-
facturer as it allows the suppliers to exert efforts for multiple teams at lower costs.
Equation (3.10) represents the first-order derivative of the manufacturer’s profit
with respect to β.
∂πT
∂β
= uSn(tc−1)(rHn −rLn )−uSc(1−Sn)(tn−1)(rHc −rLc )−∆c(tn+tc−2)(rHc −rLn )2(tn−1)(tc−1)(rHc −rLn )∆c ,
(3.10)
where ∆c = c(H)− c(L).
From (3.10), we conclude that ∂πT
∂β
> 0, if tc is sufficiently high relative to tn. It
means that synergy hurts the manufacturer’s profit (recall that higher β means
lower synergy) when supplier c gets high number of teams, while synergy leads
to increase in the manufacturer’s profit otherwise. Intuitively, when cross-team
synergy is low, supplier c knows that supplier n is less likely to exert high effort
and override her, and that is why supplier c is ready to bear additional costs in
pursuit of superior performance. More formally, ρT decreases whereas µT increases
in β. Therefore, when supplier c has sufficient number of teams, the manufacturer’s
profit will be higher under low synergy levels, with the opposite holding otherwise.
Now suppose that m = 3 under the target costing scheme, i.e., the manufacturer
needs to allocate three teams. For concreteness, let us introduce a performance
function for supplier n as rn(e) = e and for supplier c as rc(e) = ek , k ≥ 1. To
characterize the optimal team allocation, we introduce two measures of the project
success probability. Let V ≡ kγn + γc and W ≡ kγn + γc
(
1− γnα(2−α)
)
. In this
notation, V represents a weighted measure of success of either new or conventional
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technology where new technology is taken with a higher weight due to higher
performance. Then W represents another measure of success with a lower weight
for the conventional technology reflecting the idea that it will be needed only if
the new technology fails which happens with probability
(
1 − γnα(2 − α)
)
when
tn = 2.
Proposition 3.5. For m = 3, if the manufacturer chooses to induce competition,
the optimal team allocation is tn = 2, tc = 1 if β > β̄3 and tn = 1, tc = 2 if β ≤ β̄3,
where
β̄3 =
V
W
− kγneH − γceL
WµT21(eH − eL)
. (3.11)
Proposition 3.5 explains that it is optimal to allocate more teams to the new
technology supplier when the synergy level is sufficiently low, and otherwise the
manufacturer needs to allocate more teams to the conventional technology sup-
plier. The exact mechanism for this choice in more general form is discussed in
Section 3.4 and relates to different suppliers’ response to competition depending
on the synergy level.
As W and µT21 are increasing in α, we can easily see that β̄3 is non-increasing in α.
It means that at lower values of team-specific risk the manufacturer is better off
by allocating the second team to the new technology supplier at lower values of
β. At the same time, β̄3 is non-decreasing in eH (similarly, non-increasing in eL)
as long as eH > eL. Figure 3.4 presents these relationships graphically where the
line is the value of β̄3.
The main driver for manufacturer’s allocation of more teams to supplier c under
low team-specific risk, α, is that the supplier n is more likely to exert low efforts
at higher α while supplier c exhibits the opposite equilibrium behavior. The
intuition is that supplier n, being the first choice for the manufacturer but facing
high uncertainty, prefers to reduce the cost of efforts and to rely on the chance that
supplier c decides to exert low effort too or all tc fail. At the same time, supplier
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Figure 3.4: Optimal Team Allocation for m = 3
c tries to exploit her chance to win the race by exerting higher efforts (and hence
getting higher component performance in case of success) than supplier n and
becoming the first choice for the manufacturer. The opposite relation holds for
eH representing the difference between the admissible effort levels. Higher effort
difference means that a supplier needs to bear high cost to switch from low to
high effort state. This is relatively more important for conventional technology
supplier as she might fail to receive the mass production contract even if exerting
high efforts and succeeding in the development. Hence, the manufacturer should
optimally choose to allocate more teams to supplier n as the cost of effort difference
increases.
The next step is to identify the effect of competition on the manufacturer’s profit
which might potentially depend on the synergy level. Figure 3.5 shows the effect
of higher number of teams allocated to supplier c on the manufacturer’s expected
profit. As we expected, as long as the number of teams is sufficiently small, each
additional team leads to the increase in the manufacturer’s profit. This is due to
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the enhanced competition and higher effort levels induced from supplier n. How-
ever, when supplier c receives a sufficient number of teams, further increase leads
to a decline in the manufacturer’s profit due to lowering efforts of the competing
supplier.
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rHn = 5, rHc = 4.5, rLn = 4, rLc = 3.5, α = 0.75, eL = 0.5, eH = 0.55, γn = γc = 0.5,
tn = 2, u = 1
Figure 3.5: Competition Effect on Manufacturer’s Profit
Furthermore, we can see that with lower β, i.e., higher synergy of efforts across
teams, the manufacturer’s profit starts decreasing in tc at a larger value of tc.
Proposition 3.2 lays intuition for this effect: High synergy level ensures that the
equilibrium effort level for supplier n will stochastically increase until a higher
value of tc, which translates directly to the manufacturer’s profit.
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3.7 Conclusion
We have modeled the product development scenario when the manufacturer of the
new product deploys multiple parallel teams to complete the product development.
Each team can be allocated to a supplier of the key component to be developed.
After the development stage, the manufacturer chooses the design developed by
one of the teams and grants a contract for component procurement at the mass
production stage to the supplier working with this team.
The main insight of our analysis is that tougher competition between suppliers,
arising from additional teams allocated to one of them, may lead to higher equi-
librium efforts exerted by another supplier. It complements the classical insight
proposed by Fullerton and McAfee (1999) suggesting that two participants of a
contest are sufficient to induce the competition and further competition arising
from involvement of more participants will inevitably drive the equilibrium efforts
down. The intuition behind this effect is that more participants imply lower prob-
ability of success for each and thus make the expected gain less while the costs are
unaffected, which results in lower efforts. We, however, show that if competition
intensifies not through involvement of more participants (suppliers in our setting)
but rather through improvement of their characteristics (allocation of more teams
in our setting), the equilibrium efforts for the participants with unaffected char-
acteristics can increase.
We have found this effect under two wide-spread contracting schemes for the prod-
uct development stage: fixed-payment (target costing) contract and performance-
contingent contract. Under both contract types, we have discovered that an im-
portant factor determining the effect of competition on the effort levels is the
synergy level which suppliers experience working with multiple teams. If signif-
icant portion of suppliers’ efforts can be easily distributed across multiple teams
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without additional costs, we say that the product development project implies
high synergy level. However, if each team requires individualistic approach and
most efforts need to be doubled to be applied to the second team, the project im-
plies low synergy levels. Using this terminology, we have shown that the necessary
condition for competition to boost equilibrium efforts is high synergy levels. From
managerial perspective, it means that the manufacturer of the new product needs
to deploy larger number of teams when the project implies high synergies, and,
more importantly, allocate them equally to the suppliers even if one supplier is
significantly better than another.
Another important observation is that the competition starts to decrease the equi-
librium efforts of a supplier if another supplier receives sufficiently high number
of teams which makes her chances to succeed much greater than ones of her rival.
In such a case, for the manufacturer it might be more beneficial to reduce the
number of teams allocated to that supplier as high number of teams may hurt the
manufacturer’s profit even though the team maintenance is assumed costless in
our model.
Finally, we confirm that higher competition can lead not only to higher efforts
of suppliers but also to higher manufacturer’s profit. Further research is needed
to investigate the manufacturer’s optimal choice between the two contract types.
While in this chapter, we considered the allocation of teams as a decision variable,
one can reasonably consider the contract terms (target cost u and portion of
revenue φ) as decision variables, and compare the contracts under the optimal
terms and the optimal team allocation.
Chapter 4
Supplier Incentives for
Component Testing
4.1 Introduction
Consistently with the previous chapters, we consider a manufacturer developing a
new product and involving a supplier to develop a component of the future product.
Having lack of knowledge about the underlying technology for this component,
the manufacturer has to rely on the supplier’s opinion whether the component
performs sufficiently well and is worth to be placed in the new product. There
is some evidence suggesting that suppliers can sometimes release their component
to the manufacturer without proper checks of its performance. In this chapter,
we investigate the suppliers’ incentives and discuss the ways to make them more
responsible for the final product success.
Consider the following example. In 2003 Boeing launched the development project
of a new aircraft, Dreamliner, one of which key features was supposed to be a
considerably smaller weight in comparison to existing aircraft models. Pursuing
this goal, Boeing decided to replace the traditional for the aviation industry heavy
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nickel-cadmium battery with the novel substantially lighter lithium-ion battery
(Adolph, 2013). In 2005 Boeing approved Yuasa, a Japanese subcontractor, for
the development and subsequent supply of lithium-ion batteries. The supplier
developed the required battery to specifications provided by Boeing, and by 2013
mass production of the lithium-ion batteries had started.
However, shortly after Boeing sold its first new jets, several of the new aircraft
caught fire, and Boeing had to land the entire Dreamliner fleet for several months
to identify and fix the cause of the problem. Although the grounding-related
expenses were largely covered by insurance (Tsikoudakis, 2013), Boeing suffered
from around six billion dollars in cash drag during 2013 (Lowy, 2013), as well
as lost sales and reputation loss. Following the incidents, it was identified that
the cause of inflammations was battery overheating because the supplier had not
performed additional tests to verify that their batteries would work stable with
aircraft systems. The supplier’s quality control was decent for the requirements of
automotive industry but proved to be not conservative enough for aviation (Wald
and Mouawad, 2013). The Yuasa’s President commented after the investigation
referring to lessons for the future: “Instead of merely following instructions and
making batteries, we should also study their instructions, collect data ourselves
and make suggestions” (Kubota and Osada, 2013). Although the supplier suffered
from some reputation loss affecting her non-aviation business (Motavalli, 2013), no
real penalties could be applied for the battery failures (Cooper and Mukai, 2013).
The root problem is that the supplier may have little incentives to perform the
tests following the component development, while the manufacturer may not have
enough expertise to perform and even identify the necessary tests on his own. In
this chapter, we investigate the incentives the existing contracts create for suppliers
and the ways how manufacturers can modify them to induce a better component
testing from suppliers.
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4.2 Literature Review
From the agency theory perspective, our problem is related to the class of principal-
agent models with endogenous information (Laffont and Martimort, 2002, p. 395).
Crémer and Khalil (1992) investigate a setting similar to ours with the exception
that they do not allow the agent (the supplier) to fail and, consequently, the
principal (the manufacturer) cannot suffer from the agent’s failure. They find that
the optimal contract does not incentivize the agent to gather information (perform
tests), the result which is very far from our findings. Crémer et al. (1998) allow
the agent to gather information prior to the contract offer by the principal, which
makes the agent decision strategic. Szalay (2009) further develops this problem
but allows the information to be continuous in the amount of effort exerted for its
gathering. In our model, however, the agent starts the information gathering after
receiving the contract terms, and otherwise she would never start the component
development in the first place. Lewis and Sappington (1993) consider the problem
when the agent’s efforts may or may not lead to private information, which is
unobservable by the principle, and thus they do not focus on the issue of the
agent’s decision to gather information.
The essence of the problem lies within the realm of the literature on product
recalls and division of liability between the parties involved, although our problem
of product failure is more general and not limited to the recall cases only. Another
prominent difference is that product recall literature mostly looks for the ways to
incentivize the supplier to improve the component quality, while we concentrate
on the preceding stage — when the supplier may decide to learn the component
quality and the improvement decision may be never on the agenda.
Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) were one of the first to analyze the total cost of
product recalls in various industries. Their main conclusions state that the major
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loss from a product recall is often immaterial taking the form of goodwill loss,
and moreover a product recall produces significant negative externalities implying
losses for other stakeholders who are not responsible for the recall. Altough debat-
able (Hoffer et al., 1988), this idea of goodwill loss spread to the shareholders is
wide-spread in the literature (e.g., Rupp, 2004), which is especially strong for the
suppliers. In line with that research, we allow for supplier’s and manufacturer’s
separate goodwill costs, even though the supplier is responsible for the product
failure. Chao et al. (2009) present a deep analysis of the supplier incentives to im-
prove the product quality under different contracts defining the recall cost sharing
proportion between manufacturer and supplier depending on who is responsible
for the product quality problem. Our focus is, however, on the cases when the sup-
plier’s fault is not a subject for dispute, as in the battery failure example. Baiman
et al. (2000) construct the optimal contracts in a setting when the manufacturer
can perform appraisal tests to evaluate the component quality, while we consider
a scenario when such tests are infeasible due to lack of expertise on the manu-
facturer’s side. Furthermore, the Baiman et al. (2000) discussion largely builds
around the quality improvement decision of the supplier rather than decision to
learn the quality.
4.3 Model
We intend to model the supplier’s decision on performing additional tests for
the key component she develops. After developing the component, the supplier
needs to decide whether or not to perform tests of the new component at cost
c > 0. If the supplier chooses to perform the tests, she learns the probability
of the component success θ which is a draw from a probability distribution with
the cumulative density function F (θ) and the support [0, 1]. If the tests are not
performed, the supplier knowledge remains limited to the distribution F (θ). This
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Figure 4.1: Decision Tree
modeling approach allows to capture the difference in the degree of uncertainty
which the supplier experiences before and after performing the tests. At the next
stage, the supplier decides whether or not to recommend the new component for
the final product, i.e., to release the component to the manufacturer or claim that
the component might be inferior and quit the collaboration. The game tree (after
the manufacturer offered and the supplier accepted the contract) is depicted in
Figure 4.1. The rhombuses represent the supplier’s decisions and the circle stands
for the nature’s decision (stochastic event).
If the component proves to be successful, its one-dimensional contribution to the
final product is denoted as R. The same measure for the off-shelf component, the
manufacturer’s outside option, is S < R. If the component is accepted for the
mass production but it fails subsequently, the manufacturer bears total losses of
L. If the supplier chooses not to recommend the component for the new product
and quits the collaboration, her payoff is normalized to 0. However, if she does
recommend the component, her payoff depends on the component success. If the
component works well, the supplier is rewarded with r1 ≤ R − S. However, in
case of failure, the supplier bears the reputation loss l and incurs a penalty from
the manufacturer r0. Our analysis will also cover the case of the limited supplier
liability where we set r0 = 0. Hence, r0 and r1 are the manufacturer’s outcome-
dependent decision variables.
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We denote the supplier action as qi = {0, 1} where 0 means that the supplier
does not recommend the new component, 1 means that she recommends the new
component, and i = 0, 1 indicates the supplier information (0 if the supplier has
not performed the tests and thus is ignorant about θ and 1 if she has performed
the tests and knows θ precisely).
4.4 Optimal Supplier Behavior
We start with the analysis of the optimal supplier’s decision to release the com-
ponent or to quit the development. At this stage, the supplier has already either
acquired additional information on the component quality through testing or not.
Proposition 4.1 formalizes the intuition for this decision.
Proposition 4.1. The optimal action for the
• informed supplier is
q∗1 =

1 if θ ≥ z
0 if θ < z
, (4.1)
where z = l+r0
r1+l+r0 , and for the
• uninformed supplier is
q∗0 =

1 if Eθ{θr1 − (1− θ)(l + r0)} ≥ 0
0 if Eθ{θr1 − (1− θ)(l + r0)} < 0
. (4.2)
The important piece of intuition is that for the informed supplier there exists a
certain well-defined threshold for θ which allows the supplier to decide on whether
to release the component or not to proceed with the development project, and the
supplier releases the component only if the observed θ is above the threshold. This
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threshold is increasing in the supplier’s losses, both reputational and monetary, in
case of failure and decreases in the supplier’s gains in case of success.
The next step is to understand how the supplier makes her decision on whether
to move to the informed state through performing the tests or remain ignorant
about the component success probability. As this decision depends on a particular
contract offered by the manufacturer, we consider it separately for different admis-
sible contracts further in this section. After investigating the first-best scenario
when the supplier and manufacturer are integrated, we focus on reward contract
which does not allow for any penalties for supplier in case of component failure
and residual claimant contract which allows for the penalties. Finally, we will
construct the efficient contract which is able to achieve the first-best outcome but,
as we will see, is hardly possible for practical implementation.
4.4.1 First-Best Analysis
Here we analyze the outcome arising if manufacturer and supplier are a single
centralized decision maker, i.e., the first-best outcome which will serve as a bench-
mark for further analysis. Our objective is to find the optimal level of testing
which would be achieved in a situation when the incentives of the supplier and the
manufacturer coincide. To find this optimal level of testing, we solve the problem
backwards, starting with the supplier’s decision on release/quitting. Following the
framework set by Proposition 4.1, we find that the optimal action for the informed
supplier is
q∗1 =

1 if θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L ≥ 0
0 if θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L < 0
=

1 if θ ≥ z
0 if θ < z
, (4.3)
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where z = L
R−S+L with the corresponding optimal expected payoff of π
∗
1 =
(
1 −
F (z)
)
Eθ≥z{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} − c.
If the tests have not been performed, the optimal action is
q∗0 =

1 if Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} ≥ 0
0 if Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} < 0
, (4.4)
and the optimal expected payoff is π∗0 =
(
Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L}
)+
.
Clearly, the integrated decision-maker performs the tests only if π∗1 ≥ π∗0, in par-
ticular,
(
1− F (z)
)
Eθ≥z{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} − c ≥
(
Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L}
)+
, (4.5)
where z = L
R−S+L . Then, the decision to test or not to test the component depends
on the testing cost as described in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2. If Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} ≥ 0, testing is optimal if
c ≤
∫ z
0
(
(1− θ)L− θ(R− S)
)
f(θ)dθ = c1, (4.6)
and otherwise — if
c ≤
∫ 1
z
(
θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L
)
f(θ)dθ = c0. (4.7)
Proposition 4.2 denotes the highest testing costs when the supplier chooses to per-
form tests as c1 when the expected benefit from trying a new component without
testing is positive and c0 otherwise. These cost levels will serve as benchmarks
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for the further analysis. The first scenario is very likely when the potential good-
will loss is sufficiently small or the potential benefits of the new component far
outweigh the losses of possible failure.
4.4.2 Reward Contract
We start with the special case when the supplier cannot be obliged to pay any
penalty in case of component failure, i.e., r0 = 0, and the only loss she bears is
the reputation loss l. The purpose is to investigate the parties’ incentives under
a contract often taking place in practice. Another interpretation for this contract
type can be that the supplier has limited liability, and hence no significant penalty
can be charged as the supplier might declare bankruptcy. The supplier will perform
the tests as long as her expected payoff after testing is not less than her expected
payoff without testing:
(
1− F (ẑ)
)
Eθ≥ẑ{θr1 − (1− θ)l} − c ≥
(
Eθ{θr1 − (1− θ)l}
)+
, (4.8)
where ẑ = l
r1+l as obtained from Proposition 4.2 when r0 = 0. The immediate
observation is that liml→0 ẑ = 0, in which case (4.8) never holds. This property is
independent of the value of r1 as long as r1 6= 0. It means that when the supplier’s
reputation loss in case of failure is low (close to 0), the strategy of testing the
component is never optimal for her. This result is fairly intuitive: If there is no
penalty in case of failure, then the supplier will always try the new component,
which means that there is no rationale for the supplier to test the component
before installation. Therefore, the only incentive to perform the component tests
arises from the reputation loss in case of failure.
First, we need to check if there exists such r1 which would lead to the efficient
outcome described in Section 4.4.1. As θ cannot be specified in a contract, the
only feasible form is r1 = R− S − T , where R− S is the additional value created
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in case of the component success and T ≤ R− S is the manufacturer’s portion of
it. Then, we can rewrite (4.8) as
c ≤
∫ ẑ
0
(
(1− θ)l − θ(R− S) + θT
)
f(θ)dθ, (4.9)
if Eθ{θ(R−S − T )− (1− θ)l} ≥ 0, where ẑ = lR−S+l−T . Note that the right-hand
side of (4.9) is non-decreasing in T , which is non-trivial. It means that the less the
supplier expects to receive in case of the component success, the more she is prone
to test the component. Intuitively, one can think about it in the following way.
When the expected payoff in case of success is high, the supplier is very likely
to install the component anyway, with or without testing, i.e., to some extent,
regardless of the testing results, that is why the testing is less attractive in this
case. In other words, the value of testing for the supplier is smaller when the
reward for the successful component is high. However, when the expected gain in
case of success is lower, the supplier’s decision will depend on the test results, thus
increasing the value of testing and incentivizing the supplier to perform the tests.
Note that if Eθ{θ(R − S − T ) − (1 − θ)l} < 0, then c ≤
∫ 1
ẑ
(
θ(R − S) − (1 −
θ)l − θT
)
f(θ)dθ, making the right-hand side non-increasing in T . Therefore, the
optimal T is not necessarily the highest possible T satisfying the supplier partici-
pation constraint. In other words, the supplier’s expected payoff in case of blind
recommendation decreases in T faster than the supplier’s expected payoff in case
of testing. Proposition 4.3 describes the optimal T ∗.
Proposition 4.3. (i) If (4.9) holds at T = T , then
T ∗ = arg max
T∈[T ,T ]
{∫ 1
ẑ
(
θT − (1− θ)L
)
f(θ)dθ
}
, (4.10)
where T = R− S − l
(
1
Eθθ
− 1
)
and T = argT
{∫ 1
ẑ
(
θ(R− S)− (1− θ)l − θT
)
f(θ)dθ = c
}
.
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(ii) Otherwise, T ∗ = T .
A noteworthy observation is that the lower bound for the optimal manufacturer’s
portion, T , is decreasing in the supplier’s reputation loss l. It means that the higher
the supplier’s reputation loss, the higher portion of the pie the manufacturer may
need to promise to the supplier in case of success. It means that the manufacturer
may need to compensate the supplier for her high potential reputation losses.
However, the exact value of T ∗ will largely depend on the distribution of θ.
4.4.3 Residual Claimant Contract
The literature suggests that under endogenous information agency problems the
contracts making the supplier residual claimant for the total profit can achieve
the first-best outcome. The intuition is straightforward: If the supplier needs to
maximize the same objective function as the manufacturer but then gives away
some fixed amount, her optimal decisions will be identical to the manufacturer’s.
We would like to verify if this holds for our specific problem.
To align the supplier’s objective function with the manufacturer’s, the reward and
penalty should be r1 = R−S−T and r0 = L−l+T , respectively, where T < R−S
is the payment to the manufacturer which is made independent of the outcome.
For residual claimant contract, we assume a risk-neutral supplier which was not
a necessary assumption for the reward contract. This payment structure ensures
that the supplier obtains a residual from the total profit or loss, R − S − T or
−L− T , respectively. The condition for the supplier to perform tests becomes
(
1−F (z̃)
)
Eθ≥z̃{θ(R−S)− (1− θ)L−T}− c ≥
(
Eθ{θ(R−S)− (1− θ)L−T}
)+
,
(4.11)
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where z̃ = L+T
R−S+L . We can see that contrary to our intuition the testing region
under (4.11) does not generally coincide with that region under (4.5). To see it
more clearly, we will rewrite the (4.11) when Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} ≥ 0 as
c ≤ c1 + F (z)T +
∫ z̃
z
(
T + (1− θ)L− θ(R− S)
)
f(θ)dθ, (4.12)
From (4.12) we can see that the supplier is even more eager to test the design
rather than the single decision-maker. However, excessive testing, contrary to the
common sense, does not constitute an efficient (or superior to efficient) outcome.
The supplier indeed performs testing even if the testing costs are prohibitively high.
At the same time, the supplier is much less likely to release the component to the
manufacturer due to high penalties consisting of both reputation and monetary
components.
The underlying reason for not achieving the efficient outcome is that in our model
the supplier has an outside option, i.e., she can quit the collaboration and thus
avoid paying T to the manufacturer. This option creates sufficient distortion to the
model to prevent the residual claimant contract from achieving the efficient (first-
best) outcome. The interesting observation is that as T increases, the supplier is
ready to perform tests at higher costs. The latter occurs due to a higher value
of the option to quit for the supplier, as the loss in case of component failure
increases, and thus she prefers to gather additional information even at higher
costs.
To find the optimal T , we need to formally define the manufacturer’s payoff and
objective function. The manufacturer obtains S if the component is not installed,
T − l is the component is installed but fails, and T if the component is successfully
installed. From (4.12) we can see that if (4.11) holds for some value of T , then it
will hold for all T ′ ≥ T . Note also that for T = 0, (4.11) is equivalent to (4.5).
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The manufacturer’s expected payoff if the supplier chooses to perform the tests is
π1 = (1−F (z̃))Eθ≥z̃
(
θT+(1−θ)(T−l)
)
+F (z̃)S = (1−F (z̃))
(
T−Eθ≥z̃(1−θ)l
)
+F (z̃)S,
(4.13)
and if the supplier does not hold the tests, the manufacturer’s expected payoff is
π0 = Eθ
(
θT + (1− θ)(T − l)
)
= T − Eθ(1− θ)l. (4.14)
Therefore, the optimal T can be found as Proposition 4.4 prescribes.
Proposition 4.4. (i) If (4.5) holds, then the optimal T ∗ = T̃ , where
T̃ = argT
{(
1− F (z̃)
)
Eθ≥z̃{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L− T} − c = 0
}
. (4.15)
(ii) If (4.5) does not hold, and
– π1(T̃ ) ≥ π0(T̃ ) and (4.11) holds at T = T̃ , then T ∗ = T̃ ;
– (4.11) does not hold at T = T̃ , then T ∗ = Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L};
– (4.11) holds at T = T̃ and π1(T̃ ) < π0(T̃ ), then T ∗ = T˜ , where
T˜ = argT
{(
1− F (z̃)
)
Eθ≥z̃{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L− T} − c
=
(
Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L− T}
)+}
. (4.16)
Proposition 4.4(i) says that if (4.5) holds, then the manufacturer will set the
highest possible T ensuring the supplier’s participation, which is T̃ . This result
is based on the important insight that if the supplier chooses to test under some
low level of the manufacturer’s portion of profit, the supplier will always choose
to test under some higher level of the manufacturer’s portion, unless she chooses
to quit the development process (∀ T > T̃ ).
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Proposition 4.4(ii) deals with several possible parameter configurations. If the
supplier chooses to test at T = T̃ and it is the preferred manufacturer’s option, the
latter sets T ∗ = T̃ . However, if the supplier does not choose to test even at T = T̃ ,
it means that it is impossible to incentivize the supplier to test regardless of T .
Hence, the manufacturer sets the highest possible T ∗ ensuring that the supplier
does not quit the development. Finally, it can happen that the manufacturer
prefers the supplier to release the component without testing, as we know that
after testing the supplier might very often prefer not to release the component due
to potential losses. In this case, the manufacturer needs to lower T down to T˜
level to incentivize the supplier to release the component blindly.
4.4.4 Efficient Contract
As we could see, the residual claimant contract does not achieve the first-best out-
come in our model since it allows for the exit option. In this section we construct
a contract that would be able to achieve the first-best outcome and discuss its
possible practical implications. We call this contract the efficient contract. The
key to the construction of such a contract is that we need to extend the supplier
liability for the exit option, i.e., for the case when the supplier decides not to
release the component. In other words, the supplier needs to be obliged to pay a
penalty T even if she does not release the component and quits the collaboration.
Proposition 4.5. If r1 = R− S − T and r0 = L− l + T , where T < R− S, and
the supplier is obliged to pay r′0 = T if she decides to quit the development after
testing the component, then the first-best outcome is achieved. Furthermore,
(i) the supplier’s decision rule for testing the component is equivalent to (4.5)
for optimal T ;
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(ii) the optimal manufacturer’s portion of the profit is
T ∗ =
(
1− F (z)
)
Eθ≥z{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} − c (4.17)
if (4.5) holds, and T ∗ = Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} otherwise.
Proposition 4.5(ii) shows that the manufacturer does not only ensure the optimal
level of testing but also appropriates the entire expected profit from the develop-
ment of a new component leaving the supplier with zero expected profit.
Although this contract achieves the first-best outcome, it is hard to implement in
practice due to the penalty charged from the supplier in case of her decision not to
release the component. This penalty imposes too high risk on the supplier which,
if we consider a long-term perspective, can lead to the supplier’s bankruptcy or
lower performance and thus hurt back the manufacturer for the potential future
projects.
4.5 Model Extensions
4.5.1 Cost-Sharing in Reward Contract
The model can have several important extensions. First, we analyze the case
when the manufacturer can subsidize the component testing and bear a portion
φ ∈ [0, 1] of the testing costs. Therefore, φ is the additional decision variable of
the manufacturer, which potentially could induce the efficient testing level.
If the cost-sharing is allowed, the supplier will prefer testing when the following
holds:
c(1− φ) ≤
∫ ẑ
0
(
(1− θ)l − θ(R− S) + θT
)
f(θ)dθ, (4.18)
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if Eθ{θ(R−S−T )− (1−θ)l} ≥ 0, where ẑ = lR−S+l−T . Recall that the right-hand
side of (4.18) or, similarly, (4.9) is non-decreasing in T . It means that if (4.18)
holds at T = T , then φ∗ = 0, i.e., no cost subsidies are necessary since the supplier
will test the component anyway. The same holds true if subsidies cannot induce
testing, which is true if (4.9) does not hold at T = T |c=0. In other cases, subsidies
can be applied to induce testing if the benefit from testing exceeds the subsidy
value.
One could argue that a higher subsidy for testing may lead to a higher T even
when the supplier does not need to switch from non-testing to testing, and op-
timally the manufacturer might need to compensate the testing costs fully and
then compensate it with higher T . However, this intuition is not correct as the
marginal loss from increasing subsidies is always higher than the marginal gain
from increasing T . To see this, consider the manufacturer’s payoff when the sup-
plier chooses to test the component: π1 = −φc +
∫ 1
ẑ (Tθ − L(1 − θ))f(θ)dθ. The
most important insight is that the optimal level of payment to the manufacturer
if the supplier chooses to test the component is independent of c and equals T ∗ as
defined in Section 4.4.2. More formally, the decision variables are separable and
can be optimized independently of each other. Change in T ∗ is associated only
with the supplier’s decision to test or not to test. Therefore, the algorithm to find
the optimal subsidy level is as follows. First, find the optimal T ∗ without sub-
sidies. Then, if the supplier chooses to test under T ∗, no subsidies are required.
However, if the tests are not performed under T ∗ (and thus T ∗ = T ), find the
optimal T ∗0 assuming c = 0. If T ∗0 = T , then no subsidy is necessary. Otherwise,
solve (4.18) as equality for φ at T = T ∗0 . If π1 at T = T ∗0 is greater than the
optimal manufacturer’s expected payoff under no-subsidy case, then the found φ
is the optimal subsidy level.
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4.5.2 Contract Comparison
An important question is how the manufacturer optimally chooses between resid-
ual claimant and reward contracts when the efficient contract option is unavailable.
We provide a series of numerical examples to grasp the most important insights.
The profit under the efficient contract is provided for reference. The manufac-
turer’s payoff comparison of the three contract types is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
θ ∼ Beta(.5, .5), R = 1, S = .2, L = .3, l = .2, c = .02
Figure 4.2: The Manufacturer’s Expected Payoff
As we can see, the intuitively appealing residual claimant contract in the way we
defined it in 4.4.3 can be suboptimal to a simple reward contract without any
penalties for the failure. Though counter-intuitive at the first sight, this effect
has a logical explanation. As we could see from the analysis, the residual claimant
contract makes the supplier "over-test" the component, i.e., test it even if the costs
of testing are high relative to the potential rewards. This leads to the fact that
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the supplier is less motivated to participate in development at all, and she often
chooses to quit after the tests are completed at zero additional cost and thus to
avoid the risk of being penalized. For this reason, the manufacturer has to increase
the supplier’s reward in case of the component success, which leads to the lower
expected payoff for the manufacturer.
The key reason for this inefficiency lies in the possibility for the supplier to quit
the project after the component is tested. Being common practice, it, however,
leads to both contract inefficiency and lower manufacturer’s payoff. As we have
discussed, the option to overcome this problem is to impose the efficient contract
through installing a penalty from the supplier to quit the project.
However, this result is not generally true. In cases with a lower reputation loss
for the supplier in case of failure and a higher losses for the manufacturer, the
contract optimality can be reversed. Consider the example in Figure 4.3.
θ ∼ Beta(.5, .5), R = 1, S = .2, L = .6, l = .05, c = .02
Figure 4.3: The Manufacturer’s Expected Payoff: Low l and High L
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We can see that the contract assuming penalties for the component failure performs
better than the purely reward-based contract. The primary reason is that with a
low reputation loss, the supplier is not interested in performing the tests, as her
expected payoff from the blind (no-testing) component release is sufficiently high.
This strategy hurts the manufacturer especially strongly when the manufacturer’s
losses associated with the component failure are high. Similar effect will take place
if the supplier is entitled to subsidies for the component development which she
receives in case of the component adoption by the manufacturer.
Now let us consider the same set of parameters as in Figure 4.3, but we will allow
for cost subsidies for the reward contract. The result is shown in Figure 4.4.
θ ∼ Beta(.5, .5), R = 1, S = .2, L = .6, l = .05, c = .02, φ = .21
Figure 4.4: The Manufacturer’s Expected Payoff: Subsidy Allowed
We can see that the manufacturer’s expected payoff under the reward contract with
the optimal subsidy level generates the outcome close to that under the efficient
contract. Note that for this particular example, for illustrative purposes, we did
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not take the optimal φ under which the manufacturer’s expected payoff would be
even closer to that under the efficient contract and the corresponding graph would
have a single spike at T ∗.
4.5.3 Improvement Option
Another extension addresses the possibility for the supplier to improve the compo-
nent after testing at additional cost. The supplier’s problem is relatively simple:
She decides whether to improve or not based on cost-benefit analysis of this op-
tion. The manufacturer can account for this option when finding the optimal T .
However, for the manufacturer the issue is not that clear. Should the manufacturer
subsidize the improvement given that he cannot observe the test results?
In particular, in some cases the supplier would improve the component without
any subsidies, while in other cases the subsidies are essential to switch the supplier
preference from component recommendation or quitting the project to component
improvement. Another issue is whether the improvement subsidy should replace
the test subsidy, or they can be complements.
From modeling perspective, the supplier bears improvement costs ci and then
stochastically improves θ by θi so that the new success probability becomes θ +
θi, where the improvement value θi ∈ (0, 1 − θ) follows some known probability
distribution, where subscript i stands for improvement. After the improvement
value is realized, the supplier chooses to release the component or quit the project.
We denote the expected probability of success after improvement as θ(θ) and
assume that θ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ. The manufacturer needs to decide and
announce whether he is ready to subsidize the component improvement and in
which portion φi ∈ [0, 1] of improvement costs ci.
Chapter 4. Supplier Incentives for Component Testing 83
The supplier chooses to invest in the component if θ ≥ zi where zi = θi(θ) −
ci
R−S+l−T . If the condition does not hold, the supplier compares θ to ẑ = zc as
before. Note that zi = zc + (T−S−T )θi(θ)−l(1−θi(θ))−ciR−S−T+l .
If T is sufficiently low, then zi > zc, which means that after testing the supplier
chooses (a) to improve the component if θ ≥ zi, (b) to release the component
without improvement if zc ≤ θ < zi, and (c) to quit the collaboration if θ < zc.
However, if T is sufficiently high, then zi < zc, in which case the supplier decides
to improve the component if θ ≥ zi and to quit the collaboration otherwise, thus
never releasing the component without improvement, which makes improvement
subsidies from the manufacturer redundant for this case.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have modeled the supplier’s incentives to perform the com-
ponent testing prior to its release to the manufacturer for the mass production.
The simple contracts such as reward or residual claimant contract cannot ensure
the efficient outcome leading to the component under- or over-testing by supplier,
meaning that the supplier either does not perform the essential tests or performs
them even when the cost of testing is excessive. However, neither case is eventually
beneficial for the manufacturer.
Reward contract does not imply any penalties for the supplier in case of component
failure apart for the reputation loss which supplier bears in case of failure under
any contract type. The important insight for this contract type is that the value
of component testing is decreasing in the reward the supplier receives in case of
component success, and therefore with high reward the supplier is less prone to
test the component. The intuition is that when the supplier’s reward is relatively
small, and thus comparable to the reputation losses in case of failure, the supplier
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prefers to test the component at higher testing costs as she needs to be sure that
the component will work, or she quits the development process.
Residual claimant contract allows for penalties charged from the supplier in addi-
tion to her reputation loss in case of component failure. However, this contract is
not able to achieve the efficient outcome and incentivizes the supplier to test the
component even at prohibitively high cost. Surprisingly, this behavior does not
benefit the manufacturer. Although performing testing more often than the man-
ufacturer would do himself, the supplier does not choose to release the component
often enough. Being loaded with penalties in case of failure, the supplier chooses
to quit the development rather than to release the component, unless the success
probability learned during tests is very high.
There exists an efficient contract that leads to the first-best outcome. However,
it implies that the manufacturer should impose penalties on the supplier even if
the latter prefers to quit the development after performing the tests. Essentially,
the efficient contract will be the residual claimant contract with this additional
penalty charge. However, this contract attributes all the risk to the supplier while
the manufacturer extracts all the expected gain.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis is an attempt to provide solutions to some of the acute problems
occurring due to incentive misalignment of the key component supplier and the new
product manufacturer at the early stages of collaborative product development.
We have considered three different scenarios of collaboration and the corresponding
problems arising in its course. For each scenario we have constructed an analytical
model capturing the specifics of each particular case. Further, by a means of non-
cooperative game theory, we have analyzed the incentives of the involved parties
and identified the possible avenues bridging their objectives.
The first essay deals with a target costing contract for alternative designs of the
same component which are developed and tested sequentially. As supplier acquires
private information about the mass production cost of components based on differ-
ent designs, she can opportunistically manipulate the choice of the design for the
mass production stage. We find that it is not necessarily optimal to set identical
target costs for similar alternative designs (in terms of estimated component cost
and performance at the mass production stage), and it is not necessarily optimal
to set different target costs for dissimilar designs. Furthermore, we show that the
timing of decisions is important, i.e., to set target costs up front (commitment
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scheme) or to announce each target cost only before a particular design develop-
ment (flexible scheme). While intuitively the flexible scheme may be dominated
since it aggravates the supplier’s opportunistic behavior, under some circumstances
the manufacturer can actually take advantage of the supplier’s opportunistic be-
havior by carefully designing the flexible target costing scheme. Finally, we show
that it is optimal to test alternative designs in increasing profit margin order if
the testing cost per design is sufficiently low, which is in contrast to the literature
suppressing the effect of the supplier opportunistic behavior.
The second essay addresses the incentive conflict problem when the manufacturer
creates multiple parallel teams working on the same project. The crucial decision
for the manufacturer is to allocate each team to one of the different potential
suppliers of the key component in such a way that the suppliers exert sufficient
effort for the component development. We find the equilibrium supplier effort
levels as a function of team allocation between the suppliers under two admissi-
ble contracts: target costing and performance-contingent. Interestingly, we find
that the expected effort level of a supplier might actually increase in the number
of teams working with the competing supplier if there are synergies between the
teams. It means that increasing competition (up to a reasonable level) can boost
the supplier’s effort levels and, consequently, the manufacturer’s expected profit.
Furthermore, we show that even in situations when one supplier dominates the
other in the key characteristics, it might be optimal for the manufacturer to allo-
cate at least one team to the worse supplier to induce the competition and benefit
from the higher suppliers’ efforts.
The third essay focuses on the mismatch in incentives with respect to testing
the component prior to its adoption at the mass production stage. There exist
multiple practical examples when the suppliers do not perform enough testing and
the manufacturers lack expertise to perform and identify the required tests, which
might result in component failure after the product is developed and marketed.
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We investigate different admissible contracts between the manufacturer and the
supplier and find that neither reward nor residual claimant contract can achieve the
first-best outcome. The reason is that the supplier has an outside option to quit the
project after the testing stage which makes residual payment non-applicable for all
the possible outcomes. Surprisingly, although the residual claimant contract leads
to a very high level of testing by the supplier, it does not benefit the manufacturer,
as the supplier prefers not to release the component unless she is fully sure of its
reliability. Further, we construct an efficient contract leading to the first-best
supply chain profit. However, it implies penalties for the supplier even if she does
not release the component and chooses to stop the development, which makes this
contract hard to implement in practice. Hence, we focus our attention on analysis
of how the manufacturer optimally chooses between reward or residual claimant
contract. Finally, we investigate if manufacturer subsidies can lead to more testing
and under which conditions the supplier would try to improve a component should
she have such an opportunity.
Overall, the main insights from this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• The manufacturer can benefit from the opportunistic supplier behavior by
carefully adjusting the target costing scheme. In particular, if the expected
performance difference of alternative component designs is sufficiently high
and their expected performance is sufficiently greater than their expected
mass production cost, the manufacturer should deploy the flexible target
costing scheme and start testing from the component designs with lower
expected performance.
• Additional competition among suppliers through allocation of more internal
teams to one of them can boost up the efforts of the other supplier and
increase the manufacturer’s expected profit. This effect holds if the total
number of teams is sufficiently small and the supplier’s synergy of working
Chapter 5. Conclusion 88
with multiple teams is sufficiently high. Furthermore, the manufacturer may
find it optimal to allocate more teams to the supplier whose capabilities are
dominated by the capabilities of another supplier.
• Standard reward and residual claimant contracts do not provide enough
incentives for the supplier to perform the optimal testing of a component
before its release for the mass production. To incentivize the supplier to
perform sufficient component testing, the manufacturer may need to deploy
a residual reward contract which penalizes the supplier even if she chooses
not to release the component for mass production.
Appendix A
Supplement for Chapter 2
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
(i) Suppose that ∃ t : uCt+1[πt+1, vt+1] increases in vt+1. Then equation (2.1) implies
uCt [πt, vt] increases in vt. Note that uCN+1[πN+1, vN+1] ≡ vN+1 increases in vN+1.
By induction, uCt [πt, vt] increases in vt for all t = 1, ..., N . Similarly, we prove
uFt [πt, vt| Wt] increases in vt given equation (2.2). Note that a change in vt does
not lead to a change in Wt for the F scheme because vt cannot be observed by the
manufacturer.
(ii) Recall that πt ∈ {0, R1 − w1, ..., Rt−1 − wt−1}. Suppose 0 ≤ R1 − w1 ≤ ... ≤
Rt−1−wt−1... ≤ RN −wN , then ∀ t′ > t, Pr(rt′−wt′ > πt′) is invariant to πt′ . Now
suppose ∃ t : uCt+1[πt+1, vt+1] is invariant to πt+1, then given the above probability
and equation (2.1), uCt [πt, vt] is invariant to πt. Since uCN+1[πN+1, vN+1] is invariant
to πN+1, by induction uCt [πt, vt] is invariant to πt, ∀ t.
Now suppose the opposite, i.e., ∃ t′ > t : Rt − wt > Rt′ − wt′ . First consider
πt′ ≤ Rt − wt; as long as this condition holds, Pr(rt′ − wt′ > πt′) is constant in
πt′ , and hence uCt′ [πt′ , vt′ ] is constant for increasing πt′ . However, if πt′ increases
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sufficiently, such that πt′ > Rt−wt, then Pr(rt′−wt′ > πt′) = 0, i.e., the probability
of design t′ to be accepted is dropping to zero if the dominated earlier design t
was accepted by the supplier, and hence uCt′ [πt′ , vt′ ] decreases in this case. Again
for further increases of πt′ , uCt′ [πt′ , vt′ ] is constant. Using similar induction logic as
above, we show that uCt [πt, vt] is non-increasing in πt, ∀ t.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Denote the supplier profit-to-go function for period t + 1 from equations (2.1)
and (2.2) if the supplier rejects design t as UC(0)t and U
F (0)
t , respectively, and if
she accepts as UC(2)t and U
F (2)
t , respectively. We omit superscripts C and F if the
argument applies to both schemes. U (0)t is invariant to ct. Based on the result
of Lemma 2.1(i), U (2)t is monotonically decreasing in ct. Therefore, there exists a
unique ct such that the supplier releases a design t if and only if ct ≤ ct. Note that
if at some ct = x, U (0)t > (=)(<)U
(2)
t then ct < (=)(>)x.
Setting U (0)N = U
(2)
N and solving for cN , we obtain cN = wN − vN .
(i) For the C scheme, consider equation (2.1) at point ct = wt−vt. Then, U (0)t > (=
)(<)U (2)t is equivalent to uCt+1[πt, vt] > (=)(<)αuCt+1[Rt−wt, vt]+(1−α)uCt+1[πt, vt],
or simplifying, uCt+1[πt, vt] > (=)(<)uCt+1[Rt − wt, vt].
We claim that U (0)t > U
(2)
t and hence ct < vt − wt if ∃ t′ > t : Rt − wt > Rt′ − wt′ ,
Rt′ − wt′ ≥ πt, and Pr(ct′ ≤ ct′) > 0. Note that since ∃ t′ > t : Rt − wt >
Rt′ − wt′ ≥ πt, then Pr(rt′ − wt′ > πt′)|(πt+1 = πt) > 0 (i.e., if design t is rejected,
design t′ can be accepted), and Pr(rt′ − wt′ > πt′)|(πt+1 = Rt − wt) = 0 (i.e., if
design t is accepted, design t′ will be surely rejected). Given that Pr(ct′ ≤ ct′) > 0,
uCt′+1[πt, vt] > uCt′+1[Rt−wt, vt] from (2.1), which by induction leads to uCt+1[πt, vt] >
uCt+1[Rt − wt, vt], and hence ct < vt − wt.
Appendix A. Supplement for Chapter 2 91
Suppose that the above conditions do not hold. First, ∀ t′ > t : Rt−wt ≤ Rt′−wt′ .
Then, Pr(rt′−wt′ > πt′) is constant for all πt′ ≤ max{πt, Rt−wt}, i.e., for all future
periods it does not make any difference for the acceptance probability if the current
design is rejected or accepted. Therefore, ∀ t′ > t : uCt′ [πt, vt′ ] = uCt′ [Rt − wt, vt′ ],
and hence uCt+1[πt, vt] = uCt+1[Rt−wt, vt], and U
(0)
t = U
(2)
t and ct = vt−wt. Suppose
that Rt′ − wt′ < πt. Then, design t′ is always rejected by the manufacturer, i.e.,
Pr(rt′ − wt′ > πt′) = 0 and constant for all πt′ ≤ max{πt, Rt − wt}. Similarly,
U
(0)
t = U
(2)
t and hence ct = vt − wt. Suppose that Pr(ct′ ≤ ct′) = 0. Then, design
t′ is always rejected by the supplier. Similarly, U (0)t = U
(2)
t and hence ct = vt−wt.
Similar logic remains if any combination of the conditions does not hold.
(ii) The analysis of the F scheme is more complex due to adjustments inW (i)t+1, i =
{0, 1, 2}. We say that Ŵt dominates W̃t, denoted by Ŵt > W̃t, if ŵi ≥ w̃i
for all ŵi ∈ Ŵt and w̃i ∈ W̃t with at least one strict inequality. We say that
ut[πt, vt|Wt] is increasing (decreasing) inWt if for any Ŵt > (<)W̃t, ut[πt, vt| Ŵt] >
(<) ut[πt, vt| W̃t]. Similarly to the C scheme, consider equation (2.2) at point
ct = wt − vt:
uFt [πt, vt| Wt] = max

U
F (0)
t = uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(0)
t+1], if rejects design t;
U
F (2)
t = Pr(rt − wt > πt) uFt+1[rt − wt, vt| W
(2)
t+1]
+ Pr(rt − wt = πt) uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(0) or (2)
t+1 ]
+ Pr(rt − wt < πt) uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(1)
t+1], if accepts design t,
(A.1)
When choosing whether to accept or reject design t, the supplier compares
uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(0)
t+1] with the weighted average of uFt+1 if she releases the design.
A sufficient condition for UF (0)t > U
F (2)
t and hence ct < wt − vt is that all the
components of the weighted average are lower than uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(0)
t+1]. The above
holds if (a) uFt [πt, vt| Wt] is increasing in Wt, (b) W
(2)
t+1 < W
(0)
t+1, and (c) W
(1)
t+1 ≤
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W
(0)
t+1. In words, if (a) the supplier benefits from higherWt, (b) and (c) by releasing
design t with ct = vt − wt the supplier makes Wt decrease, then ct < wt − vt.
Note that if the supplier expects to get higher target costs following the design
acceptance, then it might be that ct = wt − vt or ct > wt − vt.
(a) Consider uFN [πN , vN | WN ] = max{vN ,Pr(rN −wN > πN)(wN − cN) + Pr(rN −
wN ≤ πN)vN}, which is strictly increasing in wN as long as wN ≤ RN − πN ,
which is always true assuming profit maximizing manufacturer. The reason is that
Pr(rN − wN > πN) does not depend on wN (and equals α) when wN ≤ RN − πN .
Therefore, uFN [πN , vN | WN ] is increasing in wN for feasible wN . Now suppose
∃ t : uFt+1[πt+1, vt+1| Wt+1] is increasing in wt+1. Consider uFt [πt, vt| Wt] from
equation (2.2). Since Pr(rt−wt > πt) does not depend on wt for profit maximizing
manufacturer, uFt [πt, vt| Wt] is increasing in wt for feasible wt, from which we
conclude that uFt [πt, vt| Wt] is increasing in Wt, and therefore the property (a) is
satisfied.
(b) For functional components, W (2)t+1 < W
(0)
t+1 is trivially satisfied. Given constant
R, the manufacturer always chooses to set lower Wt+1 following a prototype ac-
ceptance, since any other policy will not increase the manufacturer’s profit. The
same logic is applicable for value-adding components if Rt ≥ Rt′ for all t′ > t.
(c) Intuitively, when the supplier rejects design t the manufacturer considers the
true status-quo cost to be stochastically lower than when the supplier releases
design t. Therefore, after design rejection the manufacturer offers a lower target
cost rather than after design release. Formally, let b(i)t , i = 0, 1, 2 be the value
of the manufacturer belief, which is a random variable with a distribution B(i)t+1
as defined by equations (A.24)—(A.26). Note that b(1)t+1 ≥fosd b
(0)
t+1, where FOSD
stands for first-order stochastic dominance. We say that Wt is decreasing in bt if
b′t > bt ⇒ Wt(b′t) < Wt(bt).
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Next we show that Wt is decreasing in bt which completes the proof of part (c).
Consider the dynamic program describing the manufacturer profit, which is given
by equation (2.5). The first-order condition to find the optimal payment for the
manufacturer is
−
∂yFt+1[Rt − wt, B
(2)
t+1]
∂wt
A(wt − wk + bt)
a(wt − wk + bt)
= yFt+1[Rt − wt, B
(2)
t+1]− yFt+1[πt, B
(1)
t+1] +
yFt+1[πt, B
(1)
t+1]− yFt+1[πt, B
(0)
t+1]
α
(A.2)
A sufficient condition for wt to be decreasing in bt is the following:
1. ∂y
F
t+1[Rt−wt,B
(2)
t+1]
∂wt
< 0. It follows from the fact that yFt [πt, Bt] is increasing in
πt. Proof by induction follows.
2. A(wt−wk+bt)
a(wt−wk+bt)
is increasing in wt − wk + bt. It is satisfied since the cost distri-
bution has a decreasing reversed hazard rate.
3. yFt [πt, Bt] is increasing in bt. Proof by induction follows.
4. B(2)t+1 is independent of bt. It is always satisfied by definition (B
(2)
t+1 reflects
beliefs about ct, while bt is the belief about ck).
5. B(0)t+1 and B
(1)
t+1 are non-decreasing in bt. It follows from the Bayesian updating
rule.
6. ∂(y
F
t+1[πt,B
(1)
t+1]−y
F
t+1[πt,B
(0)
t+1])
∂bt
< 0, i.e., with higher belief, the further update
upwards brings less value than with lower belief. From the definitions of
B
(0)
t+1 and B
(1)
t+1,
∂(b(1)t+1−b
(0)
t+1)
∂bt
< 0. Therefore, the property is satisfied, since
yFt [πt, Bt] is increasing in bt (from property 3).
Under the above conditions, if bt increases, the left-hand side of (A.2) increases
while the right-hand side decreases. Therefore, wt has to decrease to maintain the
equality.
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Proof by induction for parts 1 and 3. To see that yFt [πt, Bt] is increasing in πt (bt),
suppose that ∃ t : yFt+1[πt+1, Bt+1] is increasing in πt+1 (bt+1). Then, from (2.5),
yFt [πt, Bt] is increasing in πt (bt). Now consider yFN [πN , BN ]:
yFN [πN , BN ] = A(wN −wk +bN)πN +A(wN −wk +bN)
(
α(RN −wN)+(1−α)πN
)
= πN + αA(wN − wk + bN)(RN − wN − πN). (A.3)
From (A.3), we can see that yFN [πN , BN ] is increasing in πN (bN). Therefore, by
induction yFt [πt, Bt] is increasing in πt (bt) for all t.
Now we show that ct > wt− vt is possible if the above conditions are not satisfied,
i.e., ∃ t′ > t : Rt′ > Rt. The logic is as follows: Consider the design acceptance
in period t such that πt+1 = πt + ε, and ct = wt − vt + ξ, where ε ≥ 0, ξ > 0.
Since b(2)t+1 <fosd b
(0)
t+1, then if ε is sufficiently small, W
(2)
t+1 > W
(0)
t+1. Thus, if ξ is
sufficiently small, uFt+1[rt − wt, vt − ξ| W
(2)
t+1] > uFt+1[πt, vt| W
(0)
t+1], i.e., the supplier
prefers to accept at ct = wt − vt + ξ, and ct > wt − vt.
A.3 General Framework for Propositions 2.3 and
2.4
The following applies to Proposition 2.3 when R1 = R2 = R and to Proposition 2.4
when R1 6= R2. For both schemes we derive the expressions for the supplier’s
thresholds, and the key is to show that under the optimal policy, c1 = 0 or c1 = 1.
Then, we derive the feasible target cost policies which induce these threshold levels.
Finally we provide the expressions for the manufacturer’s profit, based on which,
in parts A.3.1 and A.3.2, we compare the manufacturer’s profit under these target
cost policies.
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• C scheme. It is straightforward that
c2 =

w2 − w1 + c1, if 1 is accepted;
w2, otherwise.
(A.4)
Consider U (0)1 and U
(1)
1 , the supplier expected profit if she rejects or accepts the
first design, respectively.
U
(0)
1 = αA(w2)E(w2 − c | c ≤ w2) = α

βw2, if 0 ≤ w2 < 1;
βw2 + (1− β)(w2 − 1), if w2 ≥ 1.
(A.5)
U
(1)
1 = (1− α)U
(0)
1 + α

w1 − c1 + αX, if R1 − w1 ≤ R2 − w2;
w1 − c1, if R1 − w1 > R2 − w2,
(A.6)
where
X = Pr(w2 − c2 ≥ w1 − c1)(w2 − w1 + c1 − E(c | c ≤ w2 − w1 + c1))
=

0, if w2 − w1 + c1 < 0;
β(w2 − w1 + c1), if 0 ≤ w2 − w1 + c1 < 1;
β(w2 − w1 + c1) + (1− β)(w2 − w1 + c1 − 1), if w2 − w1 + c1 ≥ 1.
(A.7)
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Now we find
c1 = argc1{U
(1)
1 = U
(0)
1 }
=

w1, if R1 − w1 ≤ R2 − w2;
w1 − αβw2, if 0 ≤ w2 < 1
w1 − α(w2 − 1 + β), if w2 ≥ 1
, if R1 − w1 > R2 − w2.
(A.8)
Suppose that under some (w1, w2), it holds that 0 < c1 < 1 or c1 > 1. Recall
that c1 follows a two-point distribution with a support {0, 1}. Then, according to
(A.4) and (A.8), if R1 − w1 6= R2 − w2, it is possible to reduce w1 by some ε > 0
so that the supplier probability of the first design release does not change and the
same of the second design release does not decrease. If R1 − w1 = R2 − w2, it is
possible to reduce both w1 and w2 by some ξ > 0 without affecting acceptance
probabilities, unless w2 = 0 or w2 = 1. However, for w2 = 0, it is always possible
to reduce w1 so that c1 = 0 or c1 = 1. For w2 = 1, the manufacturer is always
better off by changing the testing sequence so that the new w1 = 1 and hence
c1 = 1. Note that the latter always leads to increase in acceptance probability,
which is straightforward for old w1 ≥ 1, and for old w1 < 1 consider the change in
acceptance probability (always beneficial for the manufacturer under equal margins
from both prototypes) which is 1− β−Pr(c > c2)(1− β) > 0. Therefore, (w1, w2)
can be optimal only if c1 = 0 or c1 = 1.
Suppose that under some (w1, w2), it holds that c1 = 0 or c1 = 1, and (i) 0 <
w2 < 1 or (ii) w2 > 1. It is always possible to reduce w2 to (i) 0 or (ii) 1
without decreasing acceptance probabilities. Therefore, (w1, w2) can be optimal
only if w2 = 0 or w2 = 1. Therefore, the admissible (w1, w2) are (0, 0), (1, 0),
(0, 1), (αβ, 1), (1, 1), and (1 +αβ, 1). Note that (0, 1) is applicable only for value-
adding components if R1 ≤ R2 − 1, i.e., in the increasing sequence and high
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performance difference case. Similarly, (1 + αβ, 1) is applicable only for value-
adding components if R1 − αβ > R2, i.e., in the decreasing sequence and high
performance difference case.
The manufacturer’s profit is given as
πw1w2 =

αPr(c ≤ c1)((
1− αPr(c ≤ c2)
)
(R1 − w1) + αPr(c ≤ c2)(R2 − w2)
)
+(1− α) Pr(c ≤ c2)(R2 − w2), if R1 − w1 ≤ R2 − w2;
αPr(c ≤ c1)(R1 − w1) + (1− α) Pr(c ≤ c2)(R2 − w2), if R1 − w1 > R2 − w2.
(A.9)
• F scheme. Denote the second period target cost if the first design is accepted
as w(2)2 , and the same if rejected as w
(0)
2 . Then,
c2 =

w
(2)
2 − w1 + c1, if 1 is accepted;
w
(0)
2 , otherwise.
(A.10)
From (A.10), we can see that the manufacturer can always reduce w(2)2 so that
c2 = 0 or c2 = 1. Therefore, from the feasible realizations of c1 and (A.10), w(2)2
can take only the following values: w(2)2 = w1, w
(2)
2 = w1 − 1 (for w1 ≥ 1), and
w
(2)
2 = w1 + 1 (only for value adding case when R2 − R1 ≥ 1, otherwise always
rejected by the manufacturer).
We obtain w(0)2 from the manufacturer’s profit for the last period as
w
(0)
2 =

0, if βR2 > R2 − 1;
1, otherwise.
(A.11)
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The supplier’s expected profits from rejection and acceptance are
U
(0)F
1 = αA(w
(0)
2 )E(w
(0)
2 − c | c ≤ w
(0)
2 ) =

0, if (1− β)R2 < 1;
αβ, (1− β)R2 ≥ 1.
(A.12)
U
(1)F
1 is identical to (A.6) and (A.7) where w2 ≡ w
(2)
2 . Solving for c1, we obtain
for the case R1 − w1 ≤ R2 − w(2)2 :
c1 =


w1 + αβ1−αw
(2)
2 , if 0 ≤ w
(2)
2 < 1− αβ
w1 − α1−α(w
(2)
2 − 1 + β), if w
(2)
2 ≥ 1− αβ
, if (1− β)R2 < 1,

w1 + αβ1−αβ (w
(2)
2 − 1), if 0 ≤ w
(2)
2 < 1
w1 + α1−α(w
(2)
2 − 1), if w
(2)
2 ≥ 1
, if (1− β)R2 ≥ 1,
(A.13)
The same for the case R1 − w1 > R2 − w(2)2 is given as:
c1 =

w1, if (1− β)R2 < 1,
w1 − αβ, if (1− β)R2 ≥ 1,
(A.14)
The manufacturer can always reduce w1 (and hence w(2)2 ) to such a level that
c1 = 1 or c1 = 0. Note that the condition R1 − w1 ≤ R2 − w(2)2 does not raise
a discontinuity concern, since w(2)2 ∈ {w1, w1 − 1, w1 + 1}, i.e., it changes linearly
with w1.
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Finally, the manufacturer’s profit is
πw1F =

αPr(c ≤ c1)((
1− αPr(c ≤ c2)
)
(R1 − w1) + αPr(c ≤ c2)(R2 − w(2)2 )
)
+(1− α) Pr(c ≤ c2)(R2 − w(0)2 ), if R1 − w1 ≤ R2 − w
(2)
2 ;
αPr(c ≤ c1)(R1 − w1) + (1− α) Pr(c ≤ c2)(R2 − w(0)2 ), if R1 − w1 > R2 − w
(2)
2 .
(A.15)
A.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3
In parts A.3.1 and A.3.2, we denote the manufacturer’s expected profit from policy
(w1, w2) under the C scheme as πw1w2 and under the F scheme as πw1F .
• C scheme. To ensure c1 = 1, we need to consider the following payment
schemes (w1, w2): (1, 1) and (1, 0). For c1 = 0 to hold, the following schemes are
possible: (0, 0) and (αβ, 1), as given by equation (A.8).
Installing both payments to high cost level 1 leads to c1 = 1, and the manu-
facturer’s profit is given as π11 = α(1 − β)
(
(R − 1)(1 − αβ) + αβ(R − 1)
)
+
αβ(R − 1) + (1 − α)α(R − 1) = α(2 − α)(R − 1). Installing both payments to
low cost level 0 leads to c1 = c2 = 0, and the manufacturer’s profit is given as
π00 = αβR + (1 − αβ)αβR = (2 − αβ)αβR. Installing a decreasing payment
scheme when w1 = 1 and w2 = 0 leads to c1 = 1, and the manufacturer’s profit is
given as π10 = α(1 − β)
(
(R − 1)(1 − αβ) + αβR
)
+ αβ(R − 1) + (1 − α)αβR =
α(1−αβ(1−β))(R−1)+αβ(1−αβ)R. Comparing the potentially optimal profits,
we find that π11 ≥ π10 if R ≥ (1−α)(1−β(1−β))(1−α)(1−β) , π00 < π11 if R >
2−α
(1−β)(2−α(1+β)) , and
π10 ≥ π00 if R ≥ 1−α+αβ(1−β)(1−α)(1−β) . Defining R ≡ min
{
1−α+αβ(1−β)
(1−α)(1−β) ,
2−α
(1−β)(2−α(1+β))
}
, and
R ≡ max
{
2−α
(1−β)(2−α(1+β)) ,
1−α(1−β(1−β))
(1−α)(1−β)
}
, we have π00 dominating when R < R, π10
dominating when R ≤ R < R, and π11 when R ≥ R. Now consider w1 = αβ and
w2 = 1. Since π(αβ)1 = αβ
(
R− αβ
)
+ (1− αβ)α(R− 1) = π10, the manufacturer
is indifferent between these policies.
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• F scheme. Note that for functional components, (A.14) can never hold, since
the manufacturer would never accept an equally performing component at a higher
target cost.
Case 1. (1−β)R ≥ 1. Equation (A.11) implies w(0)2 = 1. From (A.10), the feasible
w
(2)
2 are w
(2)
2 = w1 and w
(2)
2 = w1−1 (if w1 ≥ 1). From (A.13), we need to consider
the following combinations of (w1, w(2)2 ): (αβ, αβ), and (1 + αβ, αβ).
Therefore, we consider the policies w1 = αβ and w1 = 1+αβ, which lead to c1 = 0
and c1 = 1, respectively, and w(2)2 = αβ for either w1. The manufacturer profit
from the first strategy is given as π(αβ)F = αβ
(
R − αβ
)
+ (1 − αβ)α(R − 1) =
π10 = π(αβ)1. Consider π(1+αβ)F = α(1 − β)
((
R − 1 − αβ
)
(1 − αβ) + αβ
(
R −
αβ
))
+ αβ
(
R− 1− αβ
)
+ (1− α)α(R− 1) = α(1− αβ(1− β))
(
R− 1− αβ
)
+
α2β(1 − β)
(
R − αβ
)
+ (1 − α)α(R − 1) < π11. Therefore, for Case 1, F scheme
leads to the same profit for the manufacturer when R ≤ R < R, but is inferior
otherwise.
Case 2. (1− β)R < 1. From the case definition, w(0)2 = 0. From (A.13), we need
to consider the following policies (w1, w(2)2 ): (0, 0) and (1, 0). The corresponding
profit functions for the feasible policies will be identical to π00 and π10 in the C
scheme. However, for (1− β)R < 1 (i.e. R < RF )), π10 is dominated by π00.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4
• C scheme. Recall that for value-adding components we additionally consider
the testing sequence of the designs. Further we consider all the admissible policies
established under the general framework in part C. In particular, we consider
(0, 0), (1, 0), (αβ, 1), and (1, 1). Recall that for high performance difference and
increasing sequence we need to consider an additional policy, (0, 1). Similarly, for
high performance difference and decreasing sequence — (1 + αβ, 1).
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(A) Increasing performance, R1 < R2 (denoted as ↑). First we consider policies
independent of performance difference. Consider w1 = w2 = 0, then c1 = 0, and
π↑00 = αβ
(
RL(1 − αβ) + αβRH
)
+ (1 − αβ)αβRH = αβ(1 − αβ)RL + αβRH . If
w1 = w2 = 1, then c1 = 1, and π↑11 = α
(
(1 − β)
(
(RL − 1)(1 − α) + α(RH −
1)
)
+ β
(
(RL − 1)(1 − αβ) + αβ(RH − 1)
))
+ (1 − α)α(RH − 1) = α(1 − α +
αβ(1 − β))(RL − 1) + α(1 − αβ(1 − β))(RH − 1). The difference is π↑11 − π↑00 =
(1− α)(1− β)RL + (1− β)(1 + αβ))RH − 2.
If w1 = 1 and w2 = 0, then c1 = 1, and π↑10 = α
(
(1 − β)
(
(RL − 1)(1 − αβ) +
αβRH
)
+β(RL−1)
)
+(1−α)αβRH = α(1−αβ(1−β))(RL−1)+αβ(1−αβ)RH .
Now we turn to the policies dependent on performance difference. Case 1. Low
performance difference, RH−1 < RL. Consider the intermediate payment w1 = αβ
and w2 = 1, which ensures c1 = 0. π↑1(αβ)1 = αβ
(
(RL − αβ)(1 − αβ) + αβ(RH −
1)
)
+ (1− αβ)α(RH − 1) = αβ(1− αβ)(RL − αβ) + α(1− αβ(1− β))(RH − 1).
Case 2. High performance difference, RH − 1 ≥ RL. With w1 = 0 and w2 = 1,
the profit is π↑201 = αβ
(
RL(1 − α) + α(RH − 1)
)
+ (1 − αβ)α(RH − 1) = αβ(1 −
α)RL + α(RH − 1).
(B) Decreasing performance, R1 > R2 (denoted as ↓). Again, we start with policies
independent of performance difference. Consider π↓00 = αβRH + (1− αβ)αβRL =
π↑00. For the case of w1 = w2 = 1, 1 > c1 ≥ 0, and therefore this policy is not
optimal.
Now we turn to policies dependent on performance difference. Case 1. Low
performance difference, RH − 1 < RL. Let w1 = 1 and w2 = 0, which ensures
c1 = 1. π↓110 = α
(
(1−β)
(
(RH−1)(1−αβ)+αβRL
)
+β(RH−1)
)
+(1−α)αβRL =
α(1− αβ(1− β))(RH − 1) + αβ(1− αβ)RL.
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Comparison with increasing performance for Case 1. Note that π↓110 > π↑101 and
π↓110 > π
↑1
(αβ)1. π
↓1
10 can be higher or lower than π↑11 and π↑00. It is higher if and only
if two conditions hold: RL < 1−α+αβ(1−β)(1−α)(1−β) and RH >
1−αβ(1−β)
(1−β)(1−αβ) .
Case 2. High performance difference, RH − 1 ≥ RL. If w1 = 1 and w2 = 0,
π↓210 = α(RH − 1) + (1− α)αβRL.
In this case, RH −αβ ≥ RL, and therefore we need to consider π↓2(1+αβ)1 = α(RH −
1− αβ) + (1− α)α(RL − 1).
Finally, consider the policy w1 = αβ and w2 = 1, which ensures c1 = 0. π↓(αβ)1 =
αβ(RH − αβ) + (1− αβ)α(RL − 1) = αβ(RH − αβ) + (1− αβ)α(RL − 1).
Comparison with increasing performance for Case 2. Consider π↑00 − π↓210 =
(
1 −
(1−β)RH +αβ(1−β)RL
)
α. Therefore, π↓210 is optimal if (1−β)(RH−αβRL) ≥ 1.
Note that π↓210 − π↑10 = α(1 − β(1 − αβ))(RH − RL) − α2β(1 − β) > 0. Consider
π↓210−π
↓
(αβ)1 = π
↑2
01−π
↓
(αβ)1 = (1−β)(RH −RL−αβ) > 0. Furthermore, π
↓2
(1+αβ)1 >
π↓210 if (1 − β)RL ≥ 1 + αβ1−α , which is satisfied if (1 − β)RL ≥ 1, and hence if
(1− β)RH ≥ 1 (this case, subcase 2.2, is considered in the proof for the F scheme
below).
Conclusion for the C scheme: The profit functions generated by the non-dominated
policies are π↑00, π↑11, π↓210, π↑201, and π↓2(1+αβ)1. In the proof for the F scheme below,
we will find that π↓2(1+αβ)1 is dominated by π
↑2.2
(1−α)F .
• F scheme. (A) Increasing performance R1 < R2. Case 1. (1 − β)RH < 1. It
means w(0)2 = 0. We need to consider the following combinations of (w1, w
(2)
2 ) as
prescribed by (A.13) and (A.14): (0, 0), and (1, 0). For (0, 0), the profit is identical
to π↑00. For (1, 0), the profit is identical to π↑10.
Case 2. (1 − β)RH ≥ 1. It means w(0)2 = 1. Subcase 2.1. Low performance
difference, RH − 1 < RL. In this subcase w(2)2 ≤ w1. We need to consider the
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following combinations of (w1, w(2)2 ) as prescribed by (A.13) and (A.14): (αβ, αβ),
and (1 + αβ, αβ). Then, π↑2.1(αβ)F = αβ
(
(RL − αβ)(1 − αβ) + αβ(RH − αβ)
)
+
(1 − αβ)α(RH − 1), which is equal to π↓110 from the C scheme. And π↑2.1(1+αβ)F =
α
(
(RL − 1− αβ)(1− α) + α(RH − αβ)
)
+ (1− α)α(RH − 1), which is dominated
by π↓210 from the C scheme.
Subcase 2.2. High performance difference, RH−1 ≥ RL. In this subcase w(2)2 ≥ w1.
Therefore, we need to consider the following combinations of (w1, w(2)2 ): (αβ, αβ),
(0, 1), and (1 − α), (2 − α). Note that the analysis of (αβ, αβ) is identical to the
Subcase 2.1 above.
Then, π↑2.20F = αβ
(
RL(1−α) +α(RH − 1)
)
+ (1−αβ)α(RH − 1) = αβ(1−α)RL +
α(RH −1) = π↑201. If w1 = 1, then w
(2)
2 = w
(0)
2 = 1 and the profit is identical to π↑11.
π↑2.2(1−α)F = α((1− α)(RL − (1− α)) + α(RH − (2− α))) + (1− α)α(RH − 1). Now
we compare it to the optimal C scheme policies. We verify the following: (a)
π↑2.2(1−α)F ≥ π
↑
11, (b) π↑2.2(1−α)F ≥ π
↓2
(1+αβ)1, (c) π
↑2.2
(1−α)F ≥ π
↑2
01, and (d) π↑2(1−α)F ≥ π
↑
00.
Note that (b) is always satisfied as π↑2.2(1−α)F − π
↓2
(1+αβ)1 = α2β > 0. Solving the
system of inequalities, we can see that π↑2.2(1−α)F dominates the C scheme policies
if (1 − β)RH + (1 − α(1 + β))RL ≥ 2 − α. Note that c1 = 1 and c2 = 1 for this
subcase, which completes the proof of Corollary 1.
(B) Case R1 > R2. Case 1. (1 − β)RL < 1. It means w(0)2 = 0. Then c1 = w1
from (A.14) if RH − w1 > RL − w(2)2 , and otherwise the thresholds are prescribed
by (A.13). Therefore, two policies are feasible: (0, 0) and (1, 0). If w1 = 0, then
manufacturer’s profit is identical to π↓00. If w1 = 1, then it is identical to π↓10.
Case 2. (1 − β)RL ≥ 1. It means w(0)2 = 1. Then, c1 = w1 − αβ from (A.14)
if RH − w1 > RL − w(2)2 , and otherwise the thresholds are prescribed by (A.13).
Note that w(2)2 = w1 + 1 is not feasible for this case, as the manufacturer never
accepts RL instead of RH at a higher target cost.Subcase 2.1. RH−1 < RL. Then,
the admissible policy is (1, 0). The manufacturer’s profit for w1 = 1 is given as
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π↓2.11F = αβ
(
(RH − 1)(1− αβ) + αβRL
)
+ (1− αβ)α(RL − 1) = αβ(1− αβ)(RH −
1) + α2β2RL + α(1− αβ)(RL − 1), which is dominated by π↓10.
Subcase 2.2. RH − 1 ≥ RL. The only admissible policy is again (1, 0), and the
manufacturer’s profit is π↓2.21F = αβ(RH−1)+(1−αβ)α(RL−1), which is dominated
by π↑11.
Conclusion for the F scheme. The only strategy strictly dominating the others
(including those from the C scheme) is π↑2.2(1−α)F .
A.4 Proof of Corollary 2.5.
Refer to part A.3.2, F scheme, (A) Increasing performance, subcase 2.2.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 2.6.
From the profit comparison for the C and F schemes we can easily see that the
optimal policies satisfy R1 −w1 < R2 −w2 for the C scheme and R1 < R2 for the
F scheme.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Following a similar logic as for the sequential case, we construct the supplier
thresholds for both designs. Note that we do not have the time dimension, and
therefore we replace the digital indices 1 and 2 with indices L and H for designs
with performance of RL and RH , respectively. We start with characterizing the
supplier’s expected profit if she rejects (U (0)) or accepts (U (1)) prototype L (with
symmetric results for H):
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U
(0)
L =

αwH , if cH = 0;
α(wH − 1), if cH = 1 and wH ≥ 1;
0, otherwise;
(A.16)
U
(1)
L = (1− α)U
(0)
L
+ α

wL − cL, if RL − wL > RH − wH ;
αwH + (1− α)(wL − cL), if cH = 0
α(wH − 1) + (1− α)(wL − cL), if cH = 1
, if RL − wL ≤ RH − wH .
(A.17)
From (A.16) and (A.17), we find the supplier’s acceptance threshold for prototype
L:
cL =

wL, if RL − wL ≤ RH − wH or wL − cL ≥ wH − cH ;
wL − αwH , if 0 ≤ wH < 1
wL − α(wH − 1), if wH ≥ 1
, if RL − wL > RH − wH and wL − cL < wH − cH .
(A.18)
cH is symmetric, i.e., all the indices should be changed from L to H and vice versa.
Note that each threshold takes three different forms depending on the realization
of cL and cH , i.e., if cH = cL, cH = 1 and cL = 0, or cH = 0 and cL = 1.
From the threshold structure, it follows that in optimality at least one of the
following holds: either wL = cL ∈ {0, 1} or wH = cH ∈ {0, 1}. The intuition
behind it is straightforward: either RL − wL ≤ RH − wH or RH − wH ≤ RL − wL
must hold, which means that either wL = cL or wH = cH . Therefore, one can
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always reduce wL or wH to 0 or 1 without affecting the supplier’s acceptance
thresholds.
Therefore, the optimal strategy can contain only four possible cases: wL = cL = 1,
wL = cL = 0, wH = cH = 1, and wH = cH = 0, which are presented in Table A.1.
The optimal target cost and the corresponding thresholds for each of the case is
obtained from (A.18) and the symmetric equation for cH , three conditions of which
correspond to three lines for each of the four cases. We refer to this set of target
costing policies as the potentially optimal policies for parallel prototyping. The
Condition column in Table A.1 means that a policy is optimal for parallel proto-
typing only if the corresponding condition is satisfied, as obtained from (A.18). Ω
indicates that a policy can be optimal for all parameter configurations. In the col-
umn of F components, the profits for each potentially optimal policy for functional
components for parallel prototyping is compared against the profits for the optimal
policies for functional components for sequential prototyping. In the column of
VA components, we provide the same analysis for value-adding components with
segregation for low and high performance difference components.
The list of the manufacturer’s profits π||(wL, wH) for the potentially optimal poli-
cies for parallel prototyping is provided below. Let πL ≡ α(RL − wL), πH ≡
α(RH − wH), πHL ≡ πH + (1 − α)πL, and πLH ≡ πL + (1 − α)πH . The nota-
tion stands for the manufacturer’s profits, if he receives only component L, only
component H, both components but component H margin is higher, and both
components but component L margin is higher, respectively. Denote the vector of
potential cost realizations as β = (β2, (1 − β)β, β(1 − β), (1 − β)2). It stands for
four potential cost realizations: cL = cH = 0; cL = 1, cH = 0; cL = 0, cH = 1; and
cL = cH = 1. Then the profits are as follows:
π||(1, 1 +RH −RL) = βT × (πHL, πHL, πHL, πHL),
π||(1, α) = βT × (πHL, πH , πL, πL),
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wL cL wH cH Condition F components VA components
RH −RL < 1 RH −RL ≥ 1
1
1 +RH −RL wH Ω = π11 < π↓11
α 0 Ω < π(αβ)1 < π↓(αβ)1
1 + α 1 RH −RL > α N/A < π↓11 < π↓2(1+αβ)1
0
RH −RL wH Ω = π00 < π↓00 ≤ π
↓2
10
0 0 Ω = π00 = π↓00
1 1 Ω < π10 < π↓110 = π
↓2
10
1 +RL −RH wL
1
RH −RL ≤ 1 = π11 < π↓110 N/A
α 0 Ω < π(αβ)1 < π↓110
1 + α 1 ∅ N/A N/A
RL −RH wL
0
∅ N/A N/A
0 0 Ω = π00 = π↓00
1 1 ∅ N/A N/A
N/A — a policy is not optimal under parallel prototyping case.
Table A.1: Optimal Target Cost Scheme for Parallel Prototyping
π||(1, 1 + α) = βT × (πHL, πHL, πHL, πHL), if RH −RL > α,
π||(0, RH −RL) = βT ×

(πHL, πH , πHL, πH), if RH −RL ≥ 1
(πLH , πH , πL, 0), if RH −RL < 1
,
π||(0, 0) = βT × (πHL, πL, πH , 0),
π||(0, 1) = βT ×

(πHL, πHL, πH , πH), if RH −RL ≥ 1
(πH , πLH , πH , πH), if RH −RL < 1
,
π||(1 +RL −RH , 1) = βT × (πHL, πH , πHL, πH), if RH −RL ≤ 1,
π||(α, 1) = βT ×

(πHL, πH , πHL, πH), if RH −RL ≥ 1− α
(πLH , πH , πL, πH), if RH −RL < 1− α
,
where superscript T means transposed. The result of the comparison for each
of these policies with the optimal C scheme policies for sequential prototyping is
presented in Table A.1.
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We can see that the optimal C scheme policies under sequential prototyping weakly
dominate the optimal policies under parallel prototyping. For example, π||(1, 1 +
RH − RL) = π11 for functional components and π||(1, 1 + RH − RL) < π↓11 for
value-adding components.
A.6.1 Costly Prototyping
We will show that for costly prototyping under both C and F schemes c1c and
c2c for any given policy are not greater than the respective thresholds for costless
prototyping, c1 and c2. It means that any target costing policy for costless pro-
totyping weakly dominates the same policy under costly prototyping. Therefore,
if an optimal policy for costless prototyping leads to the same c1c and c2c and
thus the same profit level under costly prototyping, this policy is also optimal for
costly prototyping. Finally, we will derive the conditions under which all the op-
timal policies for high performance difference components for costless prototyping
— which are (0, 0) and (0, 1) for the C scheme and w1 = 1− α, w(1)2 = 2− α, and
w
(0)
2 = 1 for the F scheme — are optimal for costly prototyping.
C scheme. c2c = c2 as defined by (A.4). The supplier expected profit if she rejects
(U (0)1c ) or accepts (U
(1)
1c ) the design will be as follows.
U
(0)
1c = α

βw2, if 0 ≤ w2 < 1 and αβ(R2 − w2) ≥M ;
βw2 + (1− β)(w2 − 1), if w2 ≥ 1 and α(R2 − w2) ≥M ;
0, otherwise.
(A.19)
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U
(1)
1c = (1− α)U
(0)
1c
+α

w1 − c1 + αX, if αEc1≤c1 Pr{w2 − c2 ≥ w1 − c1}(R2 − w2)−M ≥ R1 − w1;
w1 − c1, otherwise;
,
(A.20)
where X is as defined by (A.7) and
Ec1≤c1 Pr{w2 − c2 ≥ w1 − c1}
=


0, if w2 − w1 < 0
β, if 0 ≤ w2 − w1 < 1
1, if w2 − w1 ≥ 1
, if 0 ≤ c1c < 1;

0, if w2 − w1 < −1
(1− β)β, if −1 ≤ w2 − w1 < 0
1− (1− β)β, if 0 ≤ w2 − w1 < 1
1, if w2 − w1 ≥ 1
, if c1c ≥ 1.
(A.21)
We can see that the supplier’s profit in case of acceptance as defined by (A.20) is
equal to or less than the respective profit as defined by (A.6) for any given w1 and
w2. U (1)1c is not greater than the respective measure for costless prototyping and
U
(0)
1c is the same for any given w1 and w2. It means that c1c which can be found by
solving U (1)1c = U
(0)
1c for c1 will be equal to or less than the threshold c1 as defined
by (A.8). (Note that although U (0)1c can be lower than the respective measure for
costless prototyping, it holds only when the manufacturer chooses not to develop
the second prototype irrespective of the first prototype outcome, and thus it does
not affect the analysis.)
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From (A.20), it follows that (0, 0) policy leads to the same thresholds as for costless
prototyping if αEc1≤c1 Pr{w2− c2 ≥ w1− c1}(R2−w2)−M ≥ R1−w1 holds true.
Plugging in the values, we obtain M ≤ αβRH −RL.
Solving the same for (0, 1) policy, we obtain M ≤ α(RH − 1) − RL. A sufficient
condition for both inequalities to hold simultaneously is
M ≤

α(RH − 1)−RL, if RH < RF ;
αβRH −RL, if RH ≥ RF .
(A.22)
F scheme. The second-period target cost following a rejection will take the form
w
(0)
2 =

0, if βR2 > R2 − 1 and αβR2 −M ≥ 0;
1, if βR2 ≤ R2 − 1 and α(R2 − 1)−M ≥ 0;
n/a, otherwise,
(A.23)
where n/a means that the manufacturer chooses to stop the development process
and not to declare any target cost for the second period. The rest of the analysis
is similar to the C scheme with necessary changes of w2 to w(1)2 . Then, the policy
w1 = 1− α, w(1)2 = 2− α, and w
(0)
2 = 1 is optimal if M ≤ α(RH − 1) from (A.23)
and αEc1≤c1 Pr{w
(1)
2 − c2 ≥ w1 − c1}(R2 − w
(1)
2 )−M ≥ R1 − w1 which reduces to
M ≤ α(RH − 2 + α) − RL + 1 − α. Note that both inequalities hold under the
conditions for the C scheme.
IfM is too high, i.e., (A.22) does not hold, the manufacturer may prefer to develop
only one prototype prototype, and clearly the optimal testing sequence can be
reversed so that the manufacturer tests RH first and possibly stops after that.
It is intuitive that the threshold for testing costs increases in the performance
difference and design success probability (α), since the former makes the F scheme
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with increasing performance sequencing more attractive and the latter augments
the expected value of the second design making it more attractive for development.
A.7 Manufacturer’s Objective Functions
A.7.1 C Scheme
In (2.4) the expectation is over the joint distribution of ct and rt. The realized
ct and rt determine the thresholds ct. Expression (2.4) sums over each i ∈ S,
assuming i is the manufacturer’s final choice. The term (ri−wi)+ ≡ max{ri−wi, 0}
is his payoff from choosing i. For i to be finally chosen, it must be released by the
supplier; the term A(ci) is the probability. It must also give the manufacturer the
highest payoff among all released prototypes; the probability, conditional on the set
of other released prototypes s, equals the probability that all prototypes in S\{i}\s
are not released (i.e., ∏j∈S\{i}\sA(cj)) times the probability that all prototypes in
s are released and yield no greater payoff (i.e., ∏j∈sA(cj) Pr(ri − wi ≥ rj − wj)).
A.7.2 F scheme
We explain equation (2.5). The manufacturer chooses wt to maximize his expected
payoff. In (2.5), the expectation is over the distributionBt and the random variable
rt. As previously explained, the threshold ct depends on the unknown ck; let ct(ck)
denote the threshold given ck. With probability A(ct), the supplier does not release
the prototype, and hence πt+1 = πt; B(0)t+1 denotes the manufacturer’s updated
belief in this case. With probability A(ct), the supplier releases the prototype,
and hence πt+1 = max{rt−wt, πt}; in this case, B(1)t+1 denotes the updated belief if
the status-quo does not change (when rt−wt < πt), and B(2)t+1 denotes the updated
belief if the status-quo choice becomes design t (when rt − wt ≥ πt).
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The manufacturer updates Bt to B(0)t+1, B
(1)
t+1, or B
(2)
t+1 per Bayes’ rule. In particular,
if the supplier does not release prototype t, the manufacturer knows that ct > ct;
therefore,
B
(0)
t+1(c) = Pr[ck < c|ct > ct(ck)] =
Pr[ck < c & ct > ct(ck)]
Pr[ct > ct(ck)]
=
∫ c
−∞A(ct(ck))dBt(ck)∫∞
−∞A(ct(ck))dBt(ck)
.
(A.24)
However, if the supplier releases the prototype and the status-quo choice does not
change, B(1)t is the posterior distribution of ck given that ct ≤ ct(ck), and therefore
B
(1)
t+1(c) = Pr[ck < c|ct ≤ ct(ck)] =
Pr[ck < c & ct ≤ ct(ck)]
Pr[ct ≤ ct(ck)]
=
∫ c
−∞A(ct(ck))dBt(ck)∫∞
−∞A(ct(ck))dBt(ck)
.
(A.25)
By contrast, B(2)t is the distribution of ct given that ct ≤ ct(ck), and therefore
B
(2)
t+1(c) = Pr[ct < c|ct ≤ ct(ck)] =
A(c)∫∞
−∞A(ct(ck))dBt(ck)
. (A.26)
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B.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
As the best response, supplier i exerts an ε higher effort than supplier j if her
profit from winning the competition, i.e., the case ri(ei) > rj(ej) in (3.1), exceeds
her profit from the case ri(ei) < rj(ej). Simplifying the profit difference from (3.1),
we obtain c(ei) < c(r−1i (ēj)), or equivalently ei < r−1i (ēj). Otherwise, supplier i
exerts the minimum effort to satisfy the manufacturer’s reservation performance,
i.e., ei = r−1i (u), which proves (i).
Let the cumulative distribution functions Fn(·) and Fc(·) represent the mixed
strategy used by player n and c, respectively. Then, the utility function from
equation (3.1) is given as
vTi (ei) =
(
1− Fj
(
r−1j (ri(ei))
))
Si(1− Sj)u+ Fj
(
r−1j (ri(ei))
)
Siu− c(ei)Bi (B.1)
where i 6= j and i, j = n, c.
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At the equilibrium, each action ei must yield the same payoff. Therefore,
Si(1− Sj)u+ Fj
(
r−1j (ri(ei))
)
SiSju− c(ei)Bi = consti (B.2)
And thus,
Fj
(
r−1j (ri(ei))
)
= consti − Si(1− Sj)u+ c(ei)Bi
SiSju
(B.3)
We can find the constant from the terminal conditions which are different for
supplier n and supplier c: Fc (ēc) = 1 and Fn (r−1c (rn(ēc))) = 1, where ēc =
2−1
(
SnScu
Bc
+ c(ec)
)
, where c(ec) = r−1c (u).
Therefore,
Fn (x) =

0, if r−1c (rn(x)) < ec;
Bc
SnScu
(
c (r−1c (rn(x)))− c (ec)
)
, if ec ≤ r−1c (rn(x)) < ēc;
1, if r−1c (rn(x)) ≥ ēc;
(B.4)
and
Fc (x) =

0, if x < ec;
1− Bn
SnScu
(
c (r−1n (rc(ēc)))− c(r−1n (rc(x)))
)
, if ec ≤ x < ēc;
1, if x ≥ ēc;
, (B.5)
which proves (ii).
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B.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let
β = argβ
{
∂Fn(x)
∂tc
= 0
}
= −(1− α)
tc ln(1− α)
1− (1− α)tc + (tc − 1)(1− α)tc ln(1− α)
,
where x ∈
[
r−1n (rc(ec)), r−1n (rc(ēc))
)
.
Then ∀ β > β, ∀ x ∈
[
r−1n (rc(ec)), r−1n (rc(ēc))
)
: ∂Fn(x)
∂tc
> 0, which means that the
probability of effort being less than any given x is increasing, and ∀ β < β, ∀ x ∈[
r−1n (rc(ec)), r−1n (rc(ēc))
)
: ∂Fn(x)
∂tc
< 0, which means that the probability of effort
being higher than any given x is increasing. Consider the border sensitivity to tc.
Note that ∂r
−1
n (rc(ec))
∂tc
= 0 and ∂r
−1
n (rc(ēc))
∂tc
< 0 if β > β and ∂r
−1
n (rc(ēc))
∂tc
> 0 if β < β,
which completes the proof.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
If rj(ej) ≤ ri(e∗i ), supplier i chooses the optimal effort level e∗i which she exerts
being the first-choice supplier of the manufacturer. However, if rj(ej) > ri(e∗i ),
supplier i can either choose the optimal effort level for the second-best choice of
the manufacturer e∗i or exert ε higher efforts than supplier j and become the first
choice. Supplier i optimally chooses the former if wi
(
r−1i (rj(ej) + ε)
)
< li(e∗i ) and
the latter otherwise, which proves (i).
Equating the best-response functions of the suppliers, we can see that the pure-
strategies equilibria are (e∗n, e∗c) and (e∗n, e∗c), which proves (ii). And for the mixed-
strategy equilibria, we solve the problem identical to the one in Proposition 3.1,
and obtain (3.9), which proves (iii).
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
To find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, we solve a system of equations ensuring
the constant payoff of each supplier irrespective of the chosen action:

µvcLL + (1− µ)vcHL = µvcLH + (1− µ)vcHH
ρvnLL + (1− ρ)vnLH = ρvnHL + (1− ρ)vnHH
(B.6)
where µ is the probability that supplier n exerts low effort, ρ is the probability
that supplier c exerts low effort, vixz is the supplier i payoff when supplier n exerts
effort of x and supplier c exerts effort of z, where i = n, c and x, z = {L,H}.
Solving (B.6) for µ and ρ, we obtain ρ = Snyn(eH)−Sn(1−Sc)yn(eL)−∆cBn
SnScyn(eL) and µ =
∆cBc−Sc(1−Sn)(yc(eH)−yc(eL))
SnScyc(eL) , where ∆c = c(eH) − c(eL). The pure-strategy Nash
equilibria are derived directly from Table 3.1, which completes the proof.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Isolating πT (2, 1)− πT (1, 2) for β we obtain (3.11). Note that πT (2, 1)− πT (1, 2)
is monotone and increasing in β which completes the proof.
Appendix C
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C.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Informed supplier releases the component if her expected profit is non-negative,
i.e., if θr1− (1− θ)(l+ r0) ≥ 0. Solving for θ, we obtain θ ≥ l+r0r1+l+r0 . Following the
same logic, the supplier quits the development if θ < l+r0
r1+l+r0 . Denoting z =
l+r0
r1+l+r0 ,
we obtain
q∗1 =

1 if θ ≥ z
0 if θ < z
, (C.1)
For the uninformed supplier, the corresponding condition for release is Eθ{θr1 −
(1− θ)(l + r0)} ≥ 0, and hence the result is direct:
q∗0 =

1 if Eθ{θr1 − (1− θ)(l + r0)} ≥ 0
0 if Eθ{θr1 − (1− θ)(l + r0)} < 0
. (C.2)
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2
If Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} ≥ 0, equation (4.5) takes the form
(
1− F (z)
)
Eθ≥z{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} − c ≥
(
Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L}
)
.
Taking the (conditional) expected values and isolating for c, we obtain c ≤
∫ z
0
(
(1−
θ)L− θ(R− S)
)
f(θ)dθ.
If Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} < 0, equation (4.5) takes the form
(
1− F (z)
)
Eθ≥z{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L} − c ≥ 0.
Taking the conditional expected value and isolating for c, we obtain c ≤
∫ 1
z
(
θ(R−
S)− (1− θ)L
)
f(θ)dθ.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
First, we find such T that the supplier’s payoff from blind recommendation equals
0. We obtain T = argT{Eθ{θ(R− S − T )− (1− θ)l} = 0} = R− S − l
(
1
Eθθ
− 1
)
.
Now assume that (4.9) does not hold at T = T meaning that the supplier chooses
not to perform tests at T = T . Then, ∀T > T : Eθ{θ(R− S − T )− (1− θ)l} < 0
which means that the supplier quits the development process. On the other hand,
∀T < T , (4.9) does not hold while Eθ{θ(R−S−T )− (1− θ)l} > 0 which means a
stricter lower manufacturer’s payoff than under T = T . Therefore, T ∗ = T , which
proves (ii).
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Now assume that (4.9) holds at T = T . Similarly to the previous case, ∀T < T ,
the supplier’s behavior is unchanged while the manufacturer’s payoff is strictly
lower which makes these values of T suboptimal. Now recall that ∀T > T :
Eθ{θ(R−S−T )−(1−θ)l} < 0 and that
∫ 1
ẑ
(
θ(R−S)−(1−θ)l−θT
)
f(θ)dθ is non-
increasing in T , which means that there exists the maximum value of T at which
the supplier chooses to perform tests rather than quitting the development. This
value is T = argT{
(
1−F (ẑ)
)
Eθ≥ẑ{θ(R−S−T )−(1−θ)l} = c} = argT{
∫ 1
ẑ
(
θ(R−
S) − (1 − θ)l − θT
)
f(θ)dθ = c}. Therefore, the optimal T ∗ ∈ [T , T ]. Hence,
T ∗ = arg maxT∈[T ,T ]{(1 − F (ẑ)Eθ≥ẑ
(
θT − (1 − θ)L} = arg maxT∈[T ,T ]{
∫ 1
ẑ
(
θT −
(1− θ)L
)
f(θ)dθ}, which proves (i).
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Recall that if (4.11) holds for some value of T , then it will hold for all T ′ ≥ T ,
and for T = 0, (4.11) is equivalent to (4.5). It means that if (4.5) holds at
T = 0, then (4.11) holds for all T ′ ≥ 0. Therefore, the manufacturer can set
the highest possible T satisfying the supplier participation constraint, which is(
1 − F (z̃)
)
Eθ≥z̃{θ(R − S) − (1 − θ)L − T} − c ≥ 0, which gives us (4.15), i.e.,
T ∗ = T̃ and proves (i).
Now assume that (4.5) does not hold, which is equivalent to the fact that (4.11)
does not hold at T = 0. Note that π0 is increasing in T faster than π1, or, more
formally, ∂π0
∂T
≥ ∂π1
∂T
. Therefore, if π1(T̃ ) ≥ π0(T̃ ) and the supplier chooses to test
at T = T̃ , i.e., (4.11) holds at T = T̃ , then T ∗ = T̃ , which proves (ii), part 1.
If the supplier chooses not to test at the highest value of T , i.e., (4.11) does not
hold at T = T̃ (as well as at T = 0), it means that the manufacturer cannot induce
the supplier to perform tests regardless of T , and the optimal solution is to set the
highest possible T so that the supplier is indifferent between blind recommendation
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and quitting the development, which gives us T ∗ = argT
{(
Eθ{θ(R − S) − (1 −
θ)L−T}
)+
= 0
}
, which solves to T ∗ = Eθ{θ(R−S)− (1− θ)L} proving (ii), part
2.
Finally, consider the case when the supplier chooses to test at T = T̃ , but the
manufacturer would be better off if the supplier released the component blindly,
i.e., π1(T̃ ) < π0(T̃ ). Given that ∂π0∂T ≥
∂π1
∂T
, it is optimal for the manufacturer
to reduce T until the point when the supplier is indifferent between testing the
component and releasing it blindly, which is achieved when (4.11) holds as strict
equality, which proves (ii), part 3.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 4.5
The sufficient condition to achieve the first-best outcome is to ensure that the
decision on testing the component is equivalent to the first-best scenario, i.e., to
(4.5). It follows from the sample path argument: If any realization of random
variables leads to the same decision under both contracts, it means that they lead
to the same outcome, which is first-best in our case.
The supplier chooses to test the component if (following the logic of Proposi-
tion 4.1)
(
1− F (z̃)
)
Eθ≥z̃{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L− T} − c− F (z̃)T
≥
(
Eθ{θ(R− S)− (1− θ)L− T}, 0
)+
, (C.3)
where z̃ = z = L
R−S+L . Simplifying (C.3), we obtain
(
1−F (z̃)
)
Eθ≥z̃{θ(R−S)−(1−θ)L}−c−T ≥
(
Eθ{θ(R−S)−(1−θ)L−T}, 0
)+
.
(C.4)
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We can see that if (C.4) holds at T = 0, i.e., (4.5) holds, it will hold for all T ≤(
1−F (z̃)
)
Eθ≥z̃{θ(R−S)−(1−θ)L}−c. Then, the optimal T for the manufacturer
must capture the entire expected payoff and equal T ∗ =
(
1 − F (z)
)
Eθ≥z{θ(R −
S) − (1 − θ)L} − c. If (C.4) does not hold at T = 0, i.e., (4.5) does not hold,
the manufacturer cannot induce testing from the supplier, and sets the highest
possible T ensuring supplier participation, which is T ∗ = Eθ{θ(R−S)− (1−θ)L},
thus proving (ii).
Plugging the optimal T ∗ into (C.4), we find it is equivalent to (4.5), which proves
(i), and thus the first-best outcome is achieved.
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Titre : La conception collaborative de produit sous l’asymétrie d’infor-
mation
Résumé : Les premières phases de conception de produit sont très importantes
pour le développement de produits à succès, parce que jusqu’à 90 % des coûts
des produits sont verrouillés durant les phases de concept et d’ingénierie. Lors de
ces phases, les entreprises impliquent activement leurs fournisseurs à participer au
développement du produit. Cependant, la littérature académique n’a pas accordé
suffisamment d’attention au lien entre le stade de l’implication des fournisseurs
précoce et le stade de production en série subséquente. Les objectifs de l’entreprise,
qui développe le nouveau produit, et ses fournisseurs ne sont pas nécessairement
alignés, ce qui peut entraîner de graves inefficacités. Par conséquent, l’objectif
de cette thèse est de résoudre le conflit d’incitations à l’étape de la conception
du produit, lorsque le fabricant d’un nouveau produit implique le fournisseur du
composant clé. Cette thèse considère trois scénarios importants de la conception
collaborative de produit : (1) les plusieurs conceptions alternatives du composant
clé, (2) le développement de composants en parallèle par plusieurs fournisseurs,
et (3) le test du composant clé par le fournisseur afin d’apprendre sa qualité.
S’appuyant sur la méthodologie de la théorie des jeux non coopératifs, la thèse
fournit des prescriptions pratiques sur la façon d’atténuer le décalage d’incitation
dans chacun des trois scénarios.
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Title: Collaborative Product Development under Information Asym-
metry
Abstract: Product design stage is utterly important for successful product de-
velopment, as up to 90% of the product costs are locked in during the concept
and design engineering phases. At these phases, manufacturers of new products
actively involve their suppliers to participate in product development. However,
academic literature has not given sufficient attention to the link between the early
supplier involvement stage and the subsequent mass production stage. The goals of
the product developing manufacturer and its suppliers are not necessarily aligned,
which can result in serious inefficiencies. Therefore, the objective of this thesis is to
resolve the conflict of incentives at the product design stage when a manufacturer
of a new product involves a supplier of a key component. This thesis considers
three important facets of collaborative product development: (1) multiple alterna-
tive designs of the key component, (2) parallel component development by several
suppliers, and (3) testing of the key component by the supplier in order to learn its
quality. Relying on the methodology of non-cooperative game theory, the thesis
provides practical prescriptions on how to mitigate the incentive misalignment in
each of the three cases.
Key words: product development, collaboration, game theory
